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  1. Drinking in the Last Chance Saloon: Luck Egalitarianism, Alcohol Consumption, and the Organ Transplant Waiting List.Andreas Albertsen - 2016 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 19 (2):325-338.
    The scarcity of livers available for transplants forces tough choices upon us. Lives for those not receiving a transplant are likely to be short. One large group of potential recipients needs a new liver because of alcohol consumption, while others suffer for reasons unrelated to their own behaviour. Should the former group receive lower priority when scarce livers are allocated? This discussion connects with one of the most pertinent issues in contemporary political philosophy; the role of personal responsibility in distributive (...)
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  • Taking Responsibility for Health in an Epistemically Polluted Environment.Neil Levy - 2018 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 39 (2):123-141.
    Proposals for regulating or nudging healthy choices are controversial. Opponents often argue that individuals should take responsibility for their own health, rather than be paternalistically manipulated for their own good. In this paper, I argue that people can take responsibility for their own health only if they satisfy certain epistemic conditions, but we live in an epistemic environment in which these conditions are not satisfied. Satisfying the epistemic conditions for taking responsibility, I argue, requires regulation of this environment. I describe (...)
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  • Responsibility as an Obstacle to Good Policy: The Case of Lifestyle Related Disease.Neil Levy - 2018 - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 15 (3):459-468.
    There is a lively debate over who is to blame for the harms arising from unhealthy behaviours, like overeating and excessive drinking. In this paper, I argue that given how demanding the conditions required for moral responsibility actually are, we cannot be highly confident that anyone is ever morally responsible. I also adduce evidence that holding people responsible for their unhealthy behaviours has costs: it undermines public support for the measures that are likely to have the most impact on these (...)
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  • Fresh Starts for Poor Health Choices: Should We Provide Them and Who Should Pay?Andreas Albertsen - 2016 - Public Health Ethics 9 (1):55-64.
    Should we grant a fresh start to those who come to regret their past lifestyle choices? A negative response to this question can be located in the luck egalitarian literature. As a responsibility-sensitive theory of justice, luck egalitarianism considers it just that people’s relative positions reflect their past choices, including those they regret. In a recent article, Vansteenkiste, Devooght and Schokkaert argue against the luck egalitarian view, maintaining instead that those who regret their past choices in health are disadvantaged in (...)
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  • Luck Egalitarianism and What Valuing Responsibility Requires.Alexandra Couto - 2018 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 21 (2):193-217.
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  • Inquiry in Bioethics and the Philosophy of Medicine: Organ Donation, Defining Death, and Fairness in Distribution.Victor Saenz - 2015 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 40 (3):263-277.
    This issue of the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy brings together fresh essays addressing three main genres of questions: questions about the nature of bioethical inquiry and the relevance of the humanities to medical practice; questions regarding the ethics of organ donation; questions bearing on the application of fairness to the distribution of medical resources.
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