Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Dynamic Formal Epistemology.Patrick Girard, Olivier Roy & Mathieu Marion (eds.) - 2010 - Berlin, Germany: Springer.
    This volume is a collation of original contributions from the key actors of a new trend in the contemporary theory of knowledge and belief, that we call “dynamic epistemology”. It brings the works of these researchers under a single umbrella by highlighting the coherence of their current themes, and by establishing connections between topics that, up until now, have been investigated independently. It also illustrates how the new analytical toolbox unveils questions about the theory of knowledge, belief, preference, action, and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Belief ascription under bounded resources.Natasha Alechina & Brian Logan - 2010 - Synthese 173 (2):179 - 197.
    There exists a considerable body of work on epistemic logics for resource-bounded reasoners. In this paper, we concentrate on a less studied aspect of resource-bounded reasoning, namely, on the ascription of beliefs and inference rules by the agents to each other. We present a formal model of a system of bounded reasoners which reason about each other’s beliefs, and investigate the problem of belief ascription in a resource-bounded setting. We show that for agents whose computational resources and memory are bounded, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Verifying time, memory and communication bounds in systems of reasoning agents.Natasha Alechina, Brian Logan, Hoang Nga Nguyen & Abdur Rakib - 2009 - Synthese 169 (2):385-403.
    We present a framework for verifying systems composed of heterogeneous reasoning agents, in which each agent may have differing knowledge and inferential capabilities, and where the resources each agent is prepared to commit to a goal (time, memory and communication bandwidth) are bounded. The framework allows us to investigate, for example, whether a goal can be achieved if a particular agent, perhaps possessing key information or inferential capabilities, is unable (or unwilling) to contribute more than a given portion of its (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations