The present PhD dissertation aims to examine the relation between modality and change in Aristotle’s metaphysics. -/- On the one hand, Aristotle supports his modal realism (i.e., worldly objects have modal properties - potentialities and essences - that ground the ascriptions of possibility and necessity) by arguing that the rejection of modal realism makes change inexplicable, or, worse, banishes it from the realm of reality. On the other hand, the Stagirite analyses processes by means of modal notions (‘change is the (...) actuality of what is virtual insofar as it is virtual’). In other words: to grasp what change is, one has to resort to the modal idiom of potentialities, while the fact that there is change is indicative of the fact that nature is full of modal properties. -/- Aristotle’s modal and kinetic realism finds a negative in the figure of the Megaric Diodorus Kronus. The polemical situation of Greek philosophy has indeed the dialectical advantage of not opposing the Aristotelian position to a sui generis straw man. Both in its reduction of modal judgements to temporal quantifications and in its dissolution of the reality of the state-of-being-in-motion in favour of a cinematographic view of processes, the philosophical figure of reductionist antirealism embodied by Diodorus constitutes an alternative that takes the opposite view of Aristotle’s realism. -/- The present study is structured as a discussion between these two positions. In the face of Diodorus’ antirealist challenges, Aristotle articulates modal and kinetic considerations: the answers he gives to Diodorus’ puzzles thus provide valuable insight into his metaphysics. Moreover, the examination of Aristotle’s and Diodorus’ metaphysics, because of their insight and originality, will not fail to interest the philosopher concerned with the metaphysical foundations of modern physics, insofar as the entanglement between modalities and processes is nowadays at the core of mechanics (phase spaces, path integrals, etc.). (shrink)

Where do computer games "happen"? The articles collected in this pioneering volume explore the categories of "space," "place," and "territory" to lay the groundwork for the study of spatiality in games.

Lexical evidence reveals that ordinary notions of space underwent a dramatic change from the late seventeenth century into the first decades of the nineteenth century: the word’s core meaning metamorphosed from INTERVAL to DIMENSION, revolutionizing relations between ordinary conceptions of time and space. Analyzing instances of the word in French over the years 1330–1835 indicates this conceptual change of SPACE was concurrent with growing interest in metaphysics and natural philosophy and echoed debates—provoked by Newton’s Principia (1687)—over the precise nature of (...) space. Employing both quantitative and qualitative methodologies, I show how changes in philosophical and scientific theory reshaped the general lexicon. I argue that ordinary lexical mechanisms largely determine the manner of science’s dissemination into culture and propose a model accounting for such changes. (shrink)

Plato's dialogue the Timaeus-Critias presents two connected accounts, that of the story of Atlantis and its defeat by ancient Athens and that of the creation of the cosmos by a divine craftsman. This book offers a unified reading of the dialogue. It tackles a wide range of interpretative and philosophical issues. Topics discussed include the function of the famous Atlantis story, the notion of cosmology as 'myth' and as 'likely', and the role of God in Platonic cosmology. Other areas commented (...) upon are Plato's concepts of 'necessity' and 'teleology', the nature of the 'receptacle', the relationship between the soul and the body, the use of perception in cosmology, and the work's peculiar monologue form. The unifying theme is teleology: Plato's attempt to show the cosmos to be organised for the good. A central lesson which emerges is that the Timaeus is closer to Aristotle's physics than previously thought. (shrink)

The ‘traditional’ interpretation of the Receptacle in Plato’s Timaeus maintains that its parts act as substrata to ordinary particulars such as dogs and tables: particulars are form-matter compounds to which Forms supply properties and the Receptacle supplies a substratum, as well as a space in which these compounds come to be. I argue, against this view, that parts of the Receptacle cannot act as substrata for those particulars. I also argue, making use of contemporary discussions of supersubstantivalism, against a substratum (...) interpretation that separates substratum and space in the Timaeus. (shrink)

Following the traces of some references to pre-existing matter in the Septuagint, the article analyses the interpretation of Gen 1, 2a in Philo of Alexandria’s De opificio mundi with a focus on his omission of the ἀκατασκεύαστος character of the earth. Philo’s interpretation is closely linked to his conception of emptiness and to his pioneering defence of a creation ex nihilo. In his cosmology, which is articulated as a dual interpretation of the Genesis and Plato’s Timaeus, the matter plays an (...) essential role. Philo justifies its existence on Aristotelian-Stoic grounds, highlighting the process of gradual refinement whereby matter passes from being a rough ὕλη to being an elaborate type of οὐσία. (shrink)

Place is the most fundamental concept in architecture and is a necessity of architectural design, and since we face changes in our understanding of place notion in the modern era which have had distinctly profound and sometimes unpleasant effects on modern and subsequent designs- in a way that architecture has largely neglected its primary task of making the noble place of human life, and its responsibility in human dwelling dimension- in order to find the roots of the evolution in place (...) nature and its meaning, we will answer these two question: what the concept of place has been for ancient thinkers? What have been the reasons for changing the understanding of place in the modern era? How these changes have affected the understanding of place in modern architecture? and yet we will try to understand the concepts of place in ancient Greece (as the origin of western thoughts especially modern thinking) versus the modern, and finally the main findings of this study are the massive semantic transformation of place in modern age and its replacement by space in modern architecture design which mainly is the result of major attention paid to the extendedness of place, the emergence of functionalism in degradation of place, and the commercialization of place. (shrink)

Recent scholarship has recognized some thematic connections related to onto-cosmological issues between two late Platonic dialogues, such as Philebus and Timaeus, and has tried to explain them in different ways. The aim of this paper is to contribute to such a debate by analysing an ancient exegesis of Timaeus 35a1-b4, that of Plutarch of Chaeronea, which made use of the ontological sections of the Philebus in his treatise on the cosmogony of the Timaeus. More specifically, this analysis will show that (...) the notions of ‘limit’ and ‘unlimitedness’ played a decisive role in the shaping of the “essence” of the world-soul according to Plutarch. (shrink)

In the Timaeus, Plato makes a distinction between reason and necessity. This distinction is often accounted for as a distinction between two types of causation: purpose oriented causation and mechanistic causation. While reason is associated with the soul and taken to bring about its effects with the good and the beautiful as the end, necessity is understood in terms of a set of natural laws pertaining to material things. In this paper I shall suggest that there are reasons to reconsider (...) the latter part of this account and argue for a non-mechanistic understanding of necessity. I will first outline how the notion of necessity is introduced in the dialogue. I will then show how a mechanistic account of necessity fails to capture Plato’s purpose of treating it as a causal factor; and, finally, argue that this purpose is better understood as an attempt, on Plato’s part, to account for the causal origin of disorder and irrationality, an origin articulated in terms of a pre-cosmic situation and the notoriously difficult notion of the third kind. (shrink)