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  1. Kant’s Deductions of Morality and Freedom.Owen Ware - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (1):116-147.
    It is commonly held that Kant ventured to derive morality from freedom in Groundwork III. It is also believed that he reversed this strategy in the second Critique, attempting to derive freedom from morality instead. In this paper, I set out to challenge these familiar assumptions: Kant’s argument in Groundwork III rests on a moral conception of the intelligible world, one that plays a similar role as the ‘fact of reason’ in the second Critique. Accordingly, I argue, there is no (...)
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  • Reviving the No‐Bad‐Action Problem in Kant's Ethics.Ryan S. Kemp - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (2):347-358.
    European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.
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  • The Deductions of Freedom/Morality-as-Autonomy and the Categorical Imperative in Groundwork III and Their Problems.Fernando Rudy Hiller - 2016 - Tópicos: Revista de Filosofía 50:61-94.
    El primer objetivo de este artículo es presentar una interpretación del tercer capítulo de la Fundamentación para establecer dos puntos: primero, que Kant ofrece ahí una deducción de la libertad/moralidad como autonomía a partir de premisas provenientes exclusivamente de la filosofía teórica. Segundo, que Kant ofrece también una deducción distinta del imperativo categórico. El segundo objetivo del artículo es examinar y criticar en detalle un paso crucial en estas deducciones, a saber, la inferencia de la existencia noumenal del sujeto como (...)
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  • Kant on Common Sense and Scepticism.Paul Guyer - 2003 - Kantian Review 7:1-37.
    Is the refutation of scepticism a central objective for Kant? Some commentators have denied that the refutation of either theoretical or moral scepticism was central to Kant's concerns. Thus, in his recent book Kant and the Fate of Autonomy, Karl Ameriks rejects 'taking Kant to be basically a respondent to the skeptic'. According to Ameriks, who here has Kant's theoretical philosophy in mind,What Kant goes on to propose is that, instead of focusing on trying to establish with certainty – against (...)
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  • Practical Cognition and Knowledge of Things-in-Themselves.Karl Schafer - forthcoming - In Evan Tiffany & Dai Heide (eds.), Kantian Freedom. Oxford University Press.
    Famously, in the second Critique , Kant claims that our consciousness of the moral law provides us with sufficient grounds to attribute freedom to ourselves as noumena or things-in-themselves. In this way, while we have no rational basis to make substantive assertions about things-in-themselves from a theoretical point of view, it is rational (in some sense) for us to believe that we are noumenally free from a practical one.
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  • Empirical Psychology, Common Sense, and Kant’s Empirical Markers for Moral Responsibility.Patrick Frierson - 2008 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (4):473-482.
    This paper explains the empirical markers by which Kant thinks that one can identify moral responsibility. After explaining the problem of discerning such markers within a Kantian framework, I briefly explain Kant’s empirical psychology. I then argue that Kant’s empirical markers for moral responsibility—linked to higher faculties of cognition—are not sufficient conditions for moral responsibility, primarily because they are empirical characteristics subject to natural laws. Next, I argue that these markers are not necessary conditions of moral responsibility. Given Kant’s transcendental (...)
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  • From Deduction to Deed: Kant's Grounding of the Moral Law.David Sussman - 2008 - Kantian Review 13 (1):52-81.
    In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant presents the moral law as the sole ‘fact of pure reason’ that neither needs nor admits of a deduction to establish its authority. This claim may come as a surprise to many readers of his earlier Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. In the last section of the Groundwork, Kant seemed to offer a sketch of just such a ‘deduction of the supreme principle of morality’ . Although notoriously obscure, this sketch shows that (...)
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  • The Role of the Holy Will.John J. Callanan - 2014 - Hegel Bulletin 35 (2):163-184.
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  • The French Revolution and the New School of Europe: Towards a Political Interpretation of German Idealism.Michael Morris - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (4):532-560.
    Abstract: In this paper I consider the significant but generally overlooked role that the French Revolution played in the development of German Idealism. Specifically, I argue that Reinhold and Fichte's engagement in revolutionary political debates directly shaped their interpretation of Kant's philosophy, leading them (a) to overlook his reliance upon common sense, (b) to misconstrue his conception of the relationship between philosophical theory and received cognitive practice, (c) to fail to appreciate the fundamentally regressive nature of his transcendental argumentative strategy, (...)
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