Kant’s Deductions of Morality and Freedom

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (1):116-147 (2017)
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Abstract
It is commonly held that Kant ventured to derive morality from freedom in Groundwork III. It is also believed that he reversed this strategy in the second Critique, attempting to derive freedom from morality instead. In this paper, I set out to challenge these familiar assumptions: Kant’s argument in Groundwork III rests on a moral conception of the intelligible world, one that plays a similar role as the ‘fact of reason’ in the second Critique. Accordingly, I argue, there is no reversal in the proof-structure of Kant’s two works.
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2017
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Archival date: 2016-12-05
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2016-09-05

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