Events between which we have no epistemic reason to discriminate have equal epistemic probabilities. Bertrand’s chord paradox, however, appears to show this to be false, and thereby poses a general threat to probabilities for continuum sized state spaces. Articulating the nature of such spaces involves some deep mathematics and that is perhaps why the recent literature on Bertrand’s Paradox has been almost entirely from mathematicians and physicists, who have often deployed elegant mathematics of considerable sophistication. At the same time, the (...) philosophy of probability has been left out. In particular, left out entirely are the philosophical ground of the principle of indifference, the nature of the principle itself, the stringent constraint this places on the mathematical representation of the principle needed for its application to continuum sized event spaces, and what these entail for rigour in developing the paradox itself. This book puts the philosophy and its entailments back in and in so doing casts a new light on the paradox, giving original analyses of the paradox, its possible solutions, the source of the paradox, the philosophical errors we make in attempting to solve it and what the paradox proves for the philosophy of probability. The book finishes with the author’s proposed solution—a solution in the spirit of Bertrand’s, indeed—in which an epistemic principle more general than the principle of indifference offers a principled restriction of the domain of the principle of indifference. (shrink)

RESUMEN El artículo reconstruye la concepción metodológica de Leibniz de finales del periodo parisino, que subyace al tratado Sobre la cuadratura aritmética del círculo, la elipse y la hipérbola (1676). Se muestra que Leibniz concibió un procedimiento en el cual el hallazgo de nuevos conocimientos de alguna manera coincide con su demostración, y en el que los procesos de análisis y síntesis se emplean de diversas maneras. ABSTRACT The article reconstructs Leibniz's methodological conception of the late Parisian period underlying the (...) treatise On the Arithmetical Squaring of the Circle, the Ellipse, and the Hyperbola (1676). It is shown that Leibniz conceived of a procedure where the finding of new knowledge somehow coincided with its demonstration and in which the processes of analysis and synthesis were employed in various ways. (shrink)

Beta integrals for several non-integer values of the exponents were calculated by Leonhard Euler in 1730, when he was trying to find the general term for the factorial function by means of an algebraic expression. Nevertheless, 70 years before, Pietro Mengoli (1626–1686) had computed such integrals for natural and half-integer exponents in his Geometriae Speciosae Elementa (1659) and Circolo(1672) and displayed the results in triangular tables. In particular, his new arithmetic–algebraic method allowed him to compute the quadrature of the circle. (...) The aim of this article is to show how Mengoli calculated the values of these integrals as well as how he analysed the relation between these values and the exponents inside the integrals. This analysis provides new insights into Mengoli’s view of his algorithmic computation of quadratures. (shrink)

Bonaventura Cavalieri has been the subject of numerous scholarly publications. Recent students of Cavalieri have placed his geometry of indivisibles in the context of early modern mathematics, emphasizing the role of new geometrical objects, such as, for example, linear and plane indivisibles. In this paper, I will complement this recent trend by focusing on how Cavalieri manipulates geometrical objects. In particular, I will investigate one fundamental activity, namely, superposition of geometrical objects. In Cavalieri’s practice, superposition is a means of both (...) manipulating geometrical objects and drawing inferences. Finally, I will suggest that an integrated approach, namely, one which strives to understand both objects and activities, can illuminate the history of mathematics. (shrink)

In On Local Motion in the Two New Sciences, Galileo distinguishes between ‘time’ and ‘quanto time’ to justify why a variation in speed has the same properties as an interval of time. In this essay, I trace the occurrences of the word quanto to define its role and specific meaning. The analysis shows that quanto is essential to Galileo’s mathematical study of infinitesimal quantities and that it is technically defined. In the light of this interpretation of the word quanto, Evangelista (...) Torricelli’s theory of indivisibles can be regarded as a natural development of Galileo’s insights about infinitesimal magnitudes, transformed into a geometrical method for calculating the area of unlimited plane figures. (shrink)

During the first half of the nineteenth century, mathematical analysis underwent a transition from a predominantly formula-centred practice to a more concept-centred one. Central to this development was the reorientation of analysis originating in Augustin-Louis Cauchy's (1789–1857) treatment of infinite series in his Cours d’analyse. In this work, Cauchy set out to rigorize analysis, thereby critically examining and reproving central analytical results. One of Cauchy's first and most ardent followers was the Norwegian Niels Henrik Abel (1802–1829) who vowed to shed (...) some light on the vast darkness in analysis.This paper investigates some important aspects of Abel's contribution to the reorientation in analysis. In particular, it stresses the role for critical revision in the process of rigorization. By critically examining past practice, the new practice sought to explain the relative success of the previous—now outdated—approach. This is illustrated by discussing a number of issues related to Abel's new proof of the binomial theorem (1826) including his reactions to the exception that he encountered to one of the central theorems of Cauchy's theory.Following this discussion, the formation of new concepts as the result of critical revisions is illustrated by analysing the early history of the concept of absolute convergence. Thereby, it is shown how a new concept was distilled, investigated, put to use and eventually superseded. (shrink)

At the turn of the seventeenth century, Bruno and Cavalieri independently developed two theories, central to which was the concept of the geometrical indivisible. The introduction of indivisibles had significant implications for geometry – especially in the case of Cavalieri, for whom indivisibles provided a forerunner of the calculus. But how did this event occur? What can we learn from the fact that two theories of indivisibles arose at about the same time? These are the questions addressed in this paper. (...) Relying on the methodology of “historical epistemology”, this paper asserts that the similarities and differences between the theories of Bruno and Cavalieri can be explained in terms of “shared knowledge”. The paper shows that the idea – on which both Bruno and Cavalieri build – that geometrical objects are generated by motion was part of the mathematical culture of the time. Tracing this idea back to its Pythagorean origins thus sheds light on the relationship between motion and continuum in mathematics. (shrink)

Many historical and philosophical studies treat infinity as an exclusively quantitative notion, whose proper domain of application is mathematics and physics. The main aim of this paper is to disentangle, by critically examining, three notions of infinity in the early modern period, and to argue that one—but only one—of them is quantitative. One of these non-quantitative notions concerns being or reality, while the other concerns a particular iterative property of an aggregate. These three notions will emerge through examination of three (...) central figures in the period: Locke, Descartes, and Leibniz. (shrink)

One of the most famous critiques of the Leibnitian calculus is contained in the essay “The Analyst” written by George Berkeley in 1734. His key argument is those on compensating errors. In this article, we reconstruct Berkeley's argument from a systematical point of view showing that the argument is neither circular nor trivial, as some modern historians think. In spite of this well-founded argument, the critique of Berkeley is with respect to the calculus not a fundamental one. Nevertheless, it highlights (...) central aspects of the calculus that are characteristic of modern scientific theories. (shrink)

Some protestant Mathematicians had a strong preoccupation with the Day of Judgement. Stifel, Faulhaber, Napier and Newton made calculations in order to determine the date of the end of the world. Craig gave mathematical rules for a decline in the reliability of Christian tradition; in order to prevent a reliability of nearly zero, the Day of Judgement must come before. Furthermore, some conflicts between theology and mathematics are discussed. The Council of Konstanz condemned Wyclif's theory of the continuum. It seems (...) that the relation between part and whole was a crucial point between the Aristotelians and the “moderns”. (shrink)