Modern societies depend on a growing production of scientific knowledge, which is based on the functional differentiation of science into still more specialised scientific disciplines and subdisciplines. This is the basis for the paradox of scientific expertise: The growth of science leads to a fragmentation of scientific expertise. To resolve this paradox, the present paper investigates three hypotheses: 1) All scientific knowledge is perspectival. 2) The perspectival structure of science leads to specific forms of knowledge asymmetries. 3) Such perspectival knowledge (...) asymmetries must be handled through second order perspectives. We substantiate these hypotheses on the basis of a perspectivist philosophy of science grounded in Peircean semiotics and autopoietic systems theory. Perspectival knowledge asymmetries are an unavoidable and necessary part of the growth of scientific knowledge, and more awareness of this fact can help avoid blind and futile struggles between scientific perspectives, and direct efforts toward more appropriate ways of handling these fundamental knowledge asymmetries. Concretely, we show how different kinds of scientific knowledge, expertise, disagreement and learning can be correlated to the perspectival structure of science, and propose how polyocular communication based on observations of the observations made by specialised perspectives can be used to handle such perspectival knowledge asymmetries. This can help overcome the observed problems in carrying out cross-disciplinary research and in the collective use of different kinds of scientific expertise, and thereby make society better able to solve complex, real-world problems. (shrink)

Traditional inflationary approaches that specify the nature of truth are attractive in certain ways; yet, while many of these theories successfully explain why propositions in certain domains of discourse are true, they fail to adequately specify the nature of truth because they run up against counterexamples when attempting to generalize across all domains. One popular consequence is skepticism about the efficaciousness of inflationary approaches altogether. Yet, by recognizing that the failure to explain the truth of disparate propositions often stems from (...) inflationary approaches' allegiance to alethic monism, pluralist approaches are able to avoid this explanatory inadequacy and the resulting skepticism, though at the cost of inviting other conceptual difficulties. A novel approach, alethic functionalism, attempts to circumvent the problems faced by pluralist approaches while preserving their main insights. Unfortunately, it too generates additional problems---namely, with its suspect appropriation of the multiple realizability paradigm and its platitude-based strategy---that need to be dissolved before it can constitute an adequate inflationary approach to the nature of truth. (shrink)

This article concerns whether Nietzsche is sympathetic to monism about concrete objects, the heterodox metaphysical view that there is exactly one concrete object. I first dispel prominent reasons for thinking that Nietzsche rejects monism. I then develop the most compelling arguments for monism in Nietzsche’s writings and check for soundness. The arguments seem to be supported by the texts, but they have not been developed in the literature. Despite such arguments, I suggest that Nietzsche is actually not sympathetic to monism (...) about objects—but his reasons for siding against monism are not at all obvious. The result should be a new understanding of some of Nietzsche’s fundamental ontological commitments. (shrink)

Nietzsche appears to adopt a radical Kantian view of objects called constructivism, which holds that the existence of all objects depends essentially on our practices. This essay provides a new reconstruction of Nietzsche's argument for constructivism and responds to five pressing objections to reading Nietzsche as a constructivist that have not been addressed by commentators defending constructivist interpretations of Nietzsche.

This paper argues there are crucial points in Nietzsche’s texts where he offers a priori epistemic justification for views he believes are correct. My reading contrasts with the dominant view that Nietzsche’s philosophical naturalism is incompatible with a priori justification. My aim is to develop Nietzsche’s brand of a priori justification, show that he employs this account of justification in the texts, and suggest how it might be compatible with naturalism.

L’un des philosophes les plus importants de l’histoire, Friedrich Nietzsche, est presque ignoré par les physiciens. L’auteur qui a déclaré la mort de Dieu au xixe siècle était enthousiasmé par la science, principalement durant la deuxième partie de son œuvre. À l’aide de la notion physique de force, Nietzsche a créé son concept de volonté de puissance. En pensant à la conservation de l’énergie, le philosophe allemand a eu une certaine inspiration pour créer son concept de l’éternel retour. Dans cet (...) article, on souligne certaines influences de la physique sur Nietzsche et on discute de l’actualité de sa position épistémologique—le perspectivisme. À partir du concept de volonté de puissance, je propose que le perspectivisme conduise à l’interprétation où la physique et la science en général sont considérées comme un jeu. (shrink)

L’un des philosophes les plus importants de l’histoire, Friedrich Nietzsche, est presque ignoré par les physiciens. L’auteur qui a déclaré la mort de Dieu au xixe siècle était enthousiasmé par la science, principalement durant la deuxième partie de son œuvre. À l’aide de la notion physique de force, Nietzsche a créé son concept de volonté de puissance. En pensant à la conservation de l’énergie, le philosophe allemand a eu une certaine inspiration pour créer son concept de l’éternel retour. Dans cet (...) article, on souligne certaines influences de la physique sur Nietzsche et on discute de l’actualité de sa position épistémologique—le perspectivisme. À partir du concept de volonté de puissance, je propose que le perspectivisme conduise à l’interprétation où la physique et la science en général sont considérées comme un jeu. (shrink)

In spite of successful tests, the standard cosmological model, the $$\varLambda$$ CDM model, possesses the most problematic concept: the initial singularity, also known as the big bang. In this paper—by adopting the Kantian difference between to think of an object and to cognize an object—it is proposed a degree of scientificity using fuzzy sets. Thus, the notion of initial singularity will not be conceived of as a scientific issue because it does not belong to the fuzzy set of what is (...) known. Indeed, the problematic concept of singularity is some sort of what Kant called the noumenon, but science, on the other hand, is constructed in the phenomenon. By applying the fuzzy degree of scientificity in cosmological models, one concludes that cosmologies with a contraction phase before the current expansion phase are potentially more scientific than the standard model. At the end of this article, it is shown that Kant’s first antinomy of pure reason indicates a limit to our cosmological models. (shrink)

: This paper examines a claim defended by an unlikely pair: Friedrich Nietzsche and Iris Murdoch. The claim is that perceptual experience itself—as distinct from perceptually based judgments and beliefs—can be morally significant. In particular, Nietzsche and Murdoch hold that two agents in the same circumstances attending to the same objects can have experiences with different contents, depending on the concepts that they possess and employ. Moreover, they maintain that this renders perception an object of moral concern. This paper explicates (...) these claims, examines the way in which we might distinguish between better and worse perceptual experiences, and argues that if some version of the Murdochian/Nietzschean claim is accepted, then certain influential accounts of moral epistemology and agency must be rejected. (shrink)

Contrary to what a superficial reading of Nietzsche might suggest, Nietzsche’s perspectivism is only apparently limited to the theoretical sphere. In fact, Nietzsche also relates perspectivism with his analysis of values and, more in general, with his critique of morality. The aim of the present paper is to present an overview of what might be called Nietzsche’s “moral perspectivism”. In order to answer the question about what kind of practical philosophy derives from Nietzsche’s perspectivism, we shall focus the attention on (...) two views which are erroneously believed to follow from it: radical individualism and strong relativism. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s “perspectivism” has often invited the charge of relativism. I give a reading of GM III 12 in order to show, on the contrary, that perspectivism is in part a claim about how best to seek knowledge. I argue that perspectivism consists of two claims, one descriptive and one prescriptive. The first claim describes the nature of enquiry; it is that enquiry is guided and shaped by the affects. The second is a prescriptive claim about how we ought to enquire (...) given that the descriptive claim is true. It is that we can enquire better if we approach a subject-matter in a way that is affectively-engaged, rather than affectively-detached. I argue that affective-engagement can benefit enquiry in two ways. First, Nietzsche thinks that affective states cause us to adopt moral and philosophical views. By attending to our affects, we can gain knowledge of the states that give rise to those views. Second, we can gain knowledge of why we hold a given moral/philosophical view when, instead of ignoring our affects, or letting them guide us unconsciously, we attend to them directly. Thus, perspectivism involves an injunction to probe our intuitions about a given subject-matter for the sake of knowledge. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s perspectivism has received restricted and unrestricted interpretations. The latter take the cognitive effects of ‘perspectives’ to be pervasive and general; the former argue they are restricted to special subject matters, have limited effects, or are not essentially cognitive at all. I argue on textual grounds that Nietzsche was committed to the unrestricted view. Comparison to A.W. Moore’s treatment of perspectival representation in Points of View illuminates both the nature of perspectivism and key arguments needed to defend it. Nietzschean perspectivism (...) must deny the very possibility of absolute representations (sensu Moore), and to do so, it must block a form of argument that promises to integrate perspectival representations into progressively less restricted, and ultimately absolute, representations of the world. Such arguments depend on a strong assumption about the unity of the independent world, which Moore accepts and Nietzsche denies. Nietzsche’s pluralism about perspectives thereby turns out to rely on pluralism about the world, which shapes his understanding of us as essentially bounded cognitive agents. Nietzsche holds that the longing for absolute representation manifest in Moore, Leibniz, and many other philosophers, which aspires to overcome the limitations of perspective, amounts to ascetic self-denial about our cognitive condition. (shrink)

This paper explores a pair of puzzling and controversial topics in the history of late nineteenth-century philosophy: the psychologism debates, and the nature of neo-Kantianism. Each is sufficientl...

This paper explores a pair of puzzling and controversial topics in the history of late nineteenth-century philosophy: the psychologism debates, and the nature of neo-Kantianism. Each is sufficientl...

The heart of this thesis is an examination into the relevant differences between Nietzsche’s perspectivism and standpoint theory. Briefly, both standpoint theory and perspectivism have been subjected to various charges that dissolve into two major ones, which are worthy of additional scrutiny: the charges of essentialism and incoherence. My overall argument in thesis is that standpoint theory, in spite of recent feminist defense, is still susceptible to these charges, and this proves counterproductive to its aims of combatting marginalization. Moreover, I (...) argue that Nietzsche’s perspectivism provides a corrective to the short comings of standpoint theory. (shrink)

Context: The problems that are most in need of interdisciplinary collaboration are “wicked problems,” such as food crises, climate change mitigation, and sustainable development, with many relevant aspects, disagreement on what the problem is, and contradicting solutions. Such complex problems both require and challenge interdisciplinarity. Problem: The conventional methods of interdisciplinary research fall short in the case of wicked problems because they remain first-order science. Our aim is to present workable methods and research designs for doing second-order science in domains (...) where there are many different scientific knowledges on any complex problem. Method: We synthesize and elaborate a framework for second-order science in interdisciplinary research based on a number of earlier publications, experiences from large interdisciplinary research projects, and a perspectivist theory of science. Results: The second-order polyocular framework for interdisciplinary research is characterized by five principles. Second-order science of interdisciplinary research must: 1. draw on the observations of first-order perspectives, 2. address a shared dynamical object, 3. establish a shared problem, 4. rely on first-order perspectives to see themselves as perspectives, and 5. be based on other rules than first-order research. Implications: The perspectivist insights of second-order science provide a new way of understanding interdisciplinary research that leads to new polyocular methods and research designs. It also points to more reflexive ways of dealing with scientific expertise in democratic processes. The main challenge is that this is a paradigmatic shift, which demands that the involved disciplines, at least to some degree, subscribe to a perspectivist view. Constructivist content: Our perspectivist approach to science is based on the second-order cybernetics and systems theories of von Foerster, Maruyama, Maturana & Varela, and Luhmann, coupled with embodied theories of cognition and semiotics as a general theory of meaning from von Uexküll and Peirce. (shrink)

There is little consensus among scholars as to what Nietzsche’s “perspectivism” is or what it entails. I will focus on a limited number of Nietzsche’s commentators, describing and commenting upon the writings of Brian Leiter, R. Lanier Anderson, Maudemarie Clark, Christoph Cox, and John Wilcox. Each commentator provides insight into the problems generated by the interpretations previous commentators have given, while simultaneously generating different problems within these newer interpretations. I hope to draw together the salvageable elements of each of these (...) five interpretations in order to alleviate some general interpretive problems. My own interpretation is as follows: perspectivism entails the two positions ‘knowledge coherentism’ and ‘truth constructivism.’ ‘Knowledge coherentism’ is the need for coherence within a system of knowledge. This position saves perspectivism from relativism. ‘Truth constructivism’ is the claim that we humans intersubjectively create truth; this entails a rejection of the dichotomy of the real and the apparent. (shrink)

Sustainability assessments bring together different perspectives that pertain to sustainability in order to produce overall assessments and a wealth of approaches and tools have been developed in the past decades. But two major problematics remain. The problem of integration concerns the surplus of possibilities for integration; different tools produce different assessments. The problem of implementation concerns the barrier between assessment and transformation; assessments do not lead to the expected changes in practice. This paper aims to analyze issues of complementarity in (...) sustainability assessment and transformation as a key to better handling the problems of integration and implementation. Based on a generalization of Niels Bohr’s complementarity from quantum mechanics, we have identified two forms of complementarity in sustainability assessment, observer stance complementarity and value complementarity. Unlike many other problems of sustainability assessment, complementarity is of a fundamental character connected to the very conditions for observation. Therefore complementarity cannot be overcome methodologically; only handled better or worse. Science is essential to the societal goal of sustainability, but these issues of complementarity impede the constructive role of science in the transition to more sustainable structures and practices in food systems. The agencies of sustainability assessment and transformation need to be acutely aware of the importance of different perspectives and values and the complementarities that may be connected to these differences. An improved understanding of complementarity can help to better recognize and handle issues of complementarity. These deliberations have relevance not only for sustainability assessment, but more generally for transdisciplinary research on wicked problems. (shrink)

El artículo recuerda la filosofía de Nietzsche, su crítica a la religión cristiana y sus propuestas: nihilismo, voluntad de poder… Recuerda el error del análisis y el vacío de su propuesta. Nietzsche se confunde a la hora de interpretar el hombre y el cristianismo. El Sermón de la montaña y las bienaventuranzas no nacen del resentimiento hacia la vida, sino de la alegría de la auténtica vida humana y personal. This paper reminds Nietzsche’s philosophy and his critique to the Christian (...) religion and his offers: nihilism, will of power … Reminds the mistake of the analysis and the emptiness of his offer. Nietzsche gets confused at the moment of interpreting the man and the Christianity. The Sermon of the mountain and the Beatitudes are not born of the resentment towards the life, but of the happiness of the authentic human and personal life. (shrink)

There is a difficulty in understanding Nietzsche’s epistemology. It is generally accepted that he endorses the naturalized epistemological view that knowledge should be closely connected to the sciences. He also holds the evolutionary epistemological position that knowledge has developed exclusively to benefit human survival. Nietzsche’s evolutionary epistemology, however, appears to imply a debunking argument about the truth of our beliefs that seems to undermine his commitment to a naturalized epistemology. This paper argues that Nietzsche’s evolutionary epistemology does not, in fact, (...) undermine his naturalized epistemology. (shrink)

Review of Tsarnia Doyle, Nietzsche's Metaphysics of the Will to Power: The Possibility of Value.