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How all philosophical explanations of human consciousness and the fundamental structure of the cosmos are bizarre—and why that’s a good thing Do we live inside a simulated reality or a pocket universe embedded in a larger structure about which we know virtually nothing? Is consciousness a purely physical matter, or might it require something extra, something nonphysical? According to the philosopher Eric Schwitzgebel, it’s hard to say. In The Weirdness of the World, Schwitzgebel argues that the answers to these fundamental (...) |
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This paper addresses a question about the moral status of Artificial Intelligence (AI): will AIs ever become moral patients? I argue that, while it is in principle possible for an intelligent machine to be a moral patient, there is no good reason to believe this will in fact happen. I start from the plausible assumption that traditional artifacts do not meet a minimal necessary condition of moral patiency: having a good of one's own. I then argue that intelligent machines are (...) |
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Debates about the moral status of social robots (SRs) currently face a second-order, or metatheoretical impasse. On the one hand, moral individualists argue that the moral status of SRs depends on their possession of morally relevant properties. On the other hand, moral relationalists deny that we ought to attribute moral status on the basis of the properties that SRs instantiate, opting instead for other modes of reflection and critique. This paper develops and defends a pragmatic approach which aims to reconcile (...) |
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The possibility of AI consciousness depends much on the correct answer to the mind–body problem: how our materialistic brain generates subjective consciousness? If a materialistic answer is valid, machine consciousness must be possible, at least in principle, though the actual instantiation of consciousness may still take a very long time. If a non-materialistic one (either mentalist or dualist) is valid, machine consciousness is much less likely, perhaps impossible, as some mental element may also be required. Some recent advances in neurology (...) |
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Ethicists, policy-makers, and the general public have questioned whether artificial entities such as robots warrant rights or other forms of moral consideration. There is little synthesis of the research on this topic so far. We identify 294 relevant research or discussion items in our literature review of this topic. There is widespread agreement among scholars that some artificial entities could warrant moral consideration in the future, if not also the present. The reasoning varies, such as concern for the effects on (...) |
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In this paper, I shall set out the pros and cons of assigning legal personhood on artificial intelligence systems under civil law. More specifically, I will provide arguments supporting a functionalist justification for conferring personhood on AIs, and I will try to identify what content this legal status might have from a regulatory perspective. Being a person in law implies the entitlement to one or more legal positions. I will mainly focus on liability as it is one of the main (...) |
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Recent advances in AI raise the possibility that AI systems will one day be able to do anything humans can do, only better. If artificial general intelligence (AGI) is achieved, AI systems may be able to understand, reason, problem solve, create, and evolve at a level and speed that humans will increasingly be unable to match, or even understand. These possibilities raise a natural question as to whether AI will eventually become superior to humans, a successor “digital species”, with a (...) |
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This article investigates the capacity of artificial intelligence (AI) systems to claim the right to self-determination while exploring the prerequisites for individuals or entities to exercise control over their own destinies. The paper delves into the concept of autonomy as a fundamental aspect of self-determination, drawing a distinction between moral and legal autonomy and emphasizing the pivotal role of dignity in establishing legal autonomy. The analysis examines various theories of dignity, with a particular focus on Hannah Arendt’s perspective. Additionally, the (...) |
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The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Volume 60, Issue 1, Page 118-149, March 2022. |
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The possibility of AI consciousness depends much on the correct answer to the mind–body problem: how our materialistic brain generates subjective consciousness? If a materialistic answer is valid, machine consciousness must be possible, at least in principle, though the actual instantiation of consciousness may still take a very long time. If a non-materialistic one (either mentalist or dualist) is valid, machine consciousness is much less likely, perhaps impossible, as some mental element may also be required. Some recent advances in neurology (...) |
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Most philosophical accounts of human rights accept that all persons have human rights. Typically, ‘personhood’ is understood as unitary and binary. It is unitary because there is generally supposed to be a single threshold property required for personhood. It is binary because it is all-or-nothing: you are either a person or you are not. A difficulty with binary views is that there will typically be subjects, like children and those with dementia, who do not meet the threshold, and so who (...) |
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As we step into an era in which artificial intelligence systems are predicted to surpass human capabilities, a number of profound ethical questions have emerged. One such question, which has gained some traction in recent scholarship, concerns the ethics of human treatment of robots and the thought-provoking possibility of robot rights. The present article explores this very aspect, with a particular focus on the notion of human rights for robots. It argues that if we accept the widely held view that (...) |
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In a recent commentary, John-Stewart Gordon points to the need for further elaboration of the pragmatic approach to moral status that I have defended. On the one hand, Gordon points to the need for a clearer account of when individualist and relational deliberative strategies should be employed. On the other hand, he observes that the pragmatic account appears to conflate two theoretical tasks that are typically understood as distinct: the task of determining the grounds of moral status, and the subsequent (...) |
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Should artificial intelligences ever be included as co-authors of democratic decisions? According to the conventional view in democratic theory, the answer depends on the relationship between the political unit and the entity that is either affected or subjected to its decisions. The relational conditions for inclusion as stipulated by the all-affected and all-subjected principles determine the spatial extension of democratic inclusion. Thus, AI qualifies for democratic inclusion if and only if AI is either affected or subjected to decisions by the (...) |
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In this paper, I add to the recent flurry of research concerning the moral patiency of artificial beings. Focusing on David Gunkel's adaptation of Levinas, I identify and argue that the Relationist's extrinsic case-by-case approach of ascribing artificial moral status fails on two accounts. Firstly, despite Gunkel's effort to avoid anthropocentrism, I argue that Relationism is, itself, anthropocentric in virtue of how its case-by-case approach is, necessarily, assessed from a human perspective. Secondly I, in light of interpreting Gunkel's Relationism as (...) |
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