Changes in healthcare financing increasingly rely upon patient cost-sharing to control escalating healthcare expenditures. These changes raise new challenges for physicians that are different from those that arose either under managed care or traditional indemnity insurance. Historically, there have been two distinct bases for arguing that physicians should not consider costs in their clinical decisions—an “aspirational ethic” that exhorts physicians to treat all patients the same regardless of their ability to pay, and an “agency ethic” that calls on physicians to (...) be trustworthy advisors to their patients. In the setting of greater patient cost-sharing, physicians' aspiration and agency roles increasingly conflict. Satisfactorily navigating the new terrain of consumer-driven healthcare requires physicians to consider these two roles and how they can best be reconciled so as to maximize quality of care while respecting the heterogeneity of patients' financial resources and willingness to pay. (shrink)

This article describes the ethical conflicts that a sample of US nurse utilization reviewers faced in their work, and also each nurse’s self-reported ethical orientation that was used to resolve the dilemmas. Data were collected from a sample of 97 registered nurses who were working at least 20 hours per week as utilization reviewers. Respondents were recruited from three managed care organizations that conduct utilization reviews in a large midwestern city. A cross-sectional survey design was used to collect demographic data (...) and to ask closed-response, short-answer and open-ended questions. Ethical conflicts reported by nurses were similar across utilization review settings and many were justice orientated. Self-reported ethical orientations were similar across organizations, with beneficence dominating. Implications of these findings are discussed. (shrink)

Physicians vary in their moral judgments about health care costs. Social intuitionism posits that moral judgments arise from gut instincts, called “moral foundations.” The objective of this study was to determine if “harm” and “fairness” intuitions can explain physicians’ judgments about cost-containment in U.S. health care and using cost-effectiveness data in practice, as well as the relative importance of those intuitions compared to “purity”, “authority” and “ingroup” in cost-related judgments.

Abstract:This paper utilizes a qualitative case study of the health care industry and a recent legal case to demonstrate that stakeholder theory’s focus on ethics, without recognition of the effects of incentives, severely limits the theory’s ability to provide managerial direction and explain managerial behavior. While ethics provide a basis for stakeholder prioritization, incentives influence whether managerial action is consistent with that prioritization. Our health care examples highlight this and other limitations of stakeholder theory and demonstrate the explanatory and directive (...) power added by the inclusion of the interactive effects of ethics and incentives in stakeholder ordering. (shrink)

Debate surrounding the SUPPORT study highlights the absence of consensus regarding what information should be disclosed to potential research participants. Some commentators endorse the view that clinical research should be subject to high disclosure standards, even when it is testing standard-of-care interventions. Others argue that trials assessing standard-of-care interventions need to disclose only the information that is disclosed in the clinical care setting. To resolve this debate, it is important to identify the ethical concerns raised by clinical research and determine (...) what consent process is needed to address them. (shrink)

The principle that physicians should always act in the best interests of the present patient is widely endorsed. At the same time, and often within the same document, it is recognised that there are appropriate exceptions to this principle. Unfortunately, little, if any, guidance is provided regarding which exceptions are appropriate and how they should be handled. These circumstances might be tenable if the appropriate exceptions were rare. Yet, evaluation of the literature reveals that there are numerous exceptions, several of (...) which pervade clinical medicine. This situation leaves physicians without adequate guidance on when to allow exceptions and how to address them, increasing the chances for unfairness in practice. The present article considers the range of exceptions, illustrates how the lack of guidance poses ethical concern and describes an alternative account of physician obligations to address this concern. (shrink)

The commonly occurring metaphors and models of the doctor–patient relationship can be divided into three clusters, depending on what distribution of power they represent: in the paternalist cluster, power resides with the physician; in the consumer model, power resides with the patient; in the partnership model, power is distributed equally between doctor and patient. Often, this tripartite division is accepted as an exhaustive typology of doctor–patient relationships. The main objective of this paper is to challenge this idea by introducing a (...) fourth possibility and distribution of power, namely, the distribution in which power resides with neither doctor nor patient. This equality in powerlessness—the hallmark of “the age of bureaucratic parsimony”—is the point of departure for a qualitatively new doctor–patient relationship, which is best described in terms ofsolidaritybetweencomrades. This paper specifies the characteristics of this specific type of solidarity and illustrates it with a case study of how Swedish doctors and patients interrelate in the sickness certification practice. (shrink)

Resource finitude, cost containment, and a purchaser monopsony market have created public concern-about the moral and legal responsibility for quality assurance in health plans. Resource allocation and standards of care represent a clash of moral values in intensive care treatment. This essay advances a procedural model, based on legislation passed in Oregon, that could govern the incorporation of private sector health insurance plans in Oregon to assure democratic input from consumers, providers, and employers into a limited vision of individual entitlement (...) to consume futile or inappropriate care in intensive care units. The model, which I call the Oregonian ICU, presumes that rationing of care is implicit and not publicly disclosed under managed care. It focuses on maximizing the quality of limited benefits available in the basic managed care insurance tier. Limitations to futile and inappropriate care are developed on the basis of morally weighted prognostic scoring systems that inform the creation of negotiated private sector contracts. (shrink)

Resource finitude, cost containment, and a purchaser monopsony market have created public concern-about the moral and legal responsibility for quality assurance in health plans. Resource allocation and standards of care represent a clash of moral values in intensive care treatment. This essay advances a procedural model, based on legislation passed in Oregon, that could govern the incorporation of private sector health insurance plans in Oregon to assure democratic input from consumers, providers, and employers into a limited vision of individual entitlement (...) to consume futile or inappropriate care in intensive care units. The model, which I call the Oregonian ICU, presumes that rationing of care is implicit and not publicly disclosed under managed care. It focuses on maximizing the quality of limited benefits available in the basic managed care insurance tier. Limitations to futile and inappropriate care are developed on the basis of morally weighted prognostic scoring systems that inform the creation of negotiated private sector contracts. (shrink)

Alternative allocations of a fixed bundle of healthcare resources often involve significantly different indirect, non-health effects. The question arises whether these effects must figure in accounts of the conditions under which a distribution of healthcare resources is morally justifiable. In this article we defend a Scanlonian, affirmative answer to this question: healthcare resource managers should sometimes select an allocation which has worse direct, health-related effects but better indirect, nonhealth effects; they should do this when the interests served by such a (...) policy are more urgent than the healthcare interests better served by an alternative allocation. We note that there is a prima facie case for the claim that such benefits (and costs) are relevant—i.e. they are real benefits, and in other contexts our decisions can permissibly be guided by them. We then proceed to rebut three lines of argument that might be thought to defeat this prima facie case: they appeal to fairness, the Kantian Formula of Humanity as an End in Itself, and the equal moral worth of persons, respectively. (shrink)

The inevitable need for rationing of healthcare has apparently presented the medical profession with the dilemma of choosing the lesser of two evils. Physicians appear to be obliged to adopt either an implausible version of traditional professional ethics or an equally problematic ethics of bedside rationing. The former requires unrestricted advocacy of patients but prompts distrust, moral hazard and unfairness. The latter commits physicians to rationing at the bedside; but it is bound to introduce unfair inequalities among patients and lack (...) of political accountability towards citizens. In this paper I shall argue that this dilemma is false, since a third intermediate alternative exists. This alternative, which I term 'administrative gatekeeping', makes it possible for physicians to be involved in rationing while at the same time being genuine advocates of their patients. According to this ideal, physicians are required to follow fair rules of rationing adopted at higher organizational levels within healthcare systems. At the same time, however, they are prohibited from including considerations of cost in their clinical decisions. (shrink)

In this article, the authors attempt to build a bridge between economic theory and medical ethics to offer a new perspective to tackle ethical challenges in the physician–patient encounter. They apply elements of new institutional economics to the ethically relevant dimensions of the physician–patient relationship in a descriptive heuristic sense. The principal–agent theory can be used to analytically grasp existing action problems in the physician–patient relationship and as a basis for shaping recommendations at the institutional level. Furthermore, the patients’ increased (...) self-determination and modern opportunities for the medical laity to inform themselves lead to a less asymmetrical distribution of information between physician and patient and therefore require new interaction models. Based on the analysis presented here, the authors recommend that, apart from the physician’s necessary individual ethics, greater consideration should be given to approaches of institutional ethics and hence to incentive systems within medical ethics. (shrink)

According to the widely accepted principles of beneficence and distributive justice, I argue that healthcare providers and facilities have an ethical duty to reduce the ecological footprint of the services they provide. I also address the question of whether the reductions in footprint need or should be patient-facing. I review Andrew Jameton and Jessica Pierce’s claim that achieving ecological sustainability in the healthcare sector requires rationing the treatment options offered to patients. I present a number of reasons to think that (...) we should not ration health care to achieve sufficient reductions in a society’s overall consumption of ecological goods. Moreover, given the complexities of ecological rationing, I argue that there are good reasons to think that the ethical duty to reduce the ecological footprint of health care should focus on only nonpatient-facing changes. I review a number of case studies of hospitals who have successfully retrofitted facilities to make them more efficient and reduced their resource and waste streams. (shrink)

It is often claimed that managed care organizations involve physicians in conflicts of interest by creating financial incentives for physicians to refrain from ordering treatments or making referrals. Such incentives, the argument goes, force the physician to balance the patient's health interests against the MCO's interests and the physician's own financial interest. I assume, for the sake of argument, that such arrangements at least provide reason to believe that physicians in MCOs are involved in conflicts of interest. Two approaches have (...) evolved for dealing with these conflicts. On one approach, MCOs disclose the financial arrangements under which their physicians work so that patients can consent to the managed care plan and thereby to the plan's limitations. The chief proponent of this approach is Mark Hall, whose recent book Making Medical Spending Decisions applies prior consent to a variety of decisions regarding medical financing and allocation. The other approach is simply to forbid conflicts of interest through regulations. (shrink)

It is often claimed that managed care organizations involve physicians in conflicts of interest by creating financial incentives for physicians to refrain from ordering treatments or making referrals. Such incentives, the argument goes, force the physician to balance the patient's health interests against the MCO's interests and the physician's own financial interest. I assume, for the sake of argument, that such arrangements at least provide reason to believe that physicians in MCOs are involved in conflicts of interest. Two approaches have (...) evolved for dealing with these conflicts. On one approach, MCOs disclose the financial arrangements under which their physicians work so that patients can consent to the managed care plan and thereby to the plan's limitations. The chief proponent of this approach is Mark Hall, whose recent book Making Medical Spending Decisions applies prior consent to a variety of decisions regarding medical financing and allocation. The other approach is simply to forbid conflicts of interest through regulations. (shrink)

Power is an inescapable aspect of all socialrelationships, and inherently is neither goodnor evil. Doctors need power to fulfil theirprofessional obligations to multipleconstituencies including patients, thecommunity and themselves. Patients need powerto formulate their values, articulate andachieve health needs, and fulfil theirresponsibilities. However, both parties canuse or misuse power. The ethical effectivenessof a health system is maximised by empoweringdoctors and patients to develop `adult-adult'rather than `adult-child' relationships thatrespect and enable autonomy, accountability,fidelity and humanity. Even in adult-adultrelationships, conflicts and complexitiesarise. Lack of (...) concordance between doctors andpatients can encourage paternalism but may bebest resolved through negotiated care. Afurther area of conflict involves the `doubleagency' of doctors for both patients and thecommunity. Empowerment of all players is notalways possible but is most likely where eachparty considers and acknowledges power issues. (shrink)

Abstract:This paper utilizes a qualitative case study of the health care industry and a recent legal case to demonstrate that stakeholder theory’s focus on ethics, without recognition of the effects of incentives, severely limits the theory’s ability to provide managerial direction and explain managerial behavior. While ethics provide a basis for stakeholder prioritization, incentives influence whether managerial action is consistent with that prioritization. Our health care examples highlight this and other limitations of stakeholder theory and demonstrate the explanatory and directive (...) power added by the inclusion of the interactive effects of ethics and incentives in stakeholder ordering. (shrink)

The medical profession contains five “spheres of morality”: clinical care, clinical research, scientific knowledge, population health, and the market. These distinct sets of normative commitments require physicians to act in different ways depending on the ends of the activity in question. For example, a physician-scientist emphasizes patients’ well-being in clinic, prioritizes the scientific method in lab, and seeks to maximize shareholder returns as a board member of a pharmaceutical firm. Physicians increasingly occupy multiple roles in healthcare and move between them (...) frequently, creating the possibility of conflict between the ethical obligations of their various roles. This paper examines the entire moral landscape of medicine through the lens of role morality. It develops a novel framework that helps physicians recognize how their moral commitments depend on the nature and context of the situation, clarifies ethical conflicts that physicians face, and concludes with ideas for resolving these conflicts. (shrink)