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Properties

In D. H. Mellor & Alex Oliver (eds.), Properties. Oxford University Press (1997)

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  1. An Ontological Sketch for Robust Non-Reductive Realists.Bruno Niederbacher - 2018 - Topoi 37 (4):549-559.
    The aim of this article is to draw a sketch of an ontology for Realist Non-Naturalist Cognitivists. A distinction is made between moral property-universals and moral property-particulars. It is argued, first, that moral property-universals have the same ontological status as non-moral property-universals; second, that moral property-universals have many instances in the spatio-temporal world; third that these moral property-instances or -particulars have the same ontological status as non-moral property-particulars.
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  • Can Metaphysical Structuralism Solve the Plurality Problem?Sophie R. Allen - 2018 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (5):722-746.
    ABSTRACTMetaphysics has a problem with plurality: in many areas of discourse, there are too many good theories, rather than just one. This embarrassment of riches is a particular problem for metaphysical realists who want metaphysics to tell us the way the world is and for whom one theory is the correct one. A recent suggestion is that we can treat the different theories as being functionally or explanatorily equivalent to each other, even though they differ in content. The aim of (...)
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  • Ostrich Nominalism and Peacock Realism: A Hegelian Critique of Quine.Paul Giladi - 2014 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (5):734-751.
    My aim in this paper is to offer a Hegelian critique of Quine’s predicate nominalism. I argue that at the core of Hegel’s idealism is not a supernaturalist spirit monism, but a realism about universals, and that while this may contrast to the nominalist naturalism of Quine, Hegel’s position can still be defended over that nominalism in naturalistic terms. I focus on the contrast between Hegel’s and Quine’s respective views on universals, which Quine takes to be definitive of philosophical naturalism. (...)
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  • Phenomenal Intentionality and the Problem of Cognitive Contact.Christopher A. Young - unknown
    Part 1 of the thesis questions the traditional relation model of intentionality. After fixing reference on the target phenomenon, intentionality, and explaining my interest in it, I ask what sorts of things intentionality might be a relation to. I consider ordinary objects, properties, propositions and hybrid views, and conclude all make the intentional relation appear rather mysterious. From there, I move on to examine the relation view’s most prominent proponents, the tracking theorists—pointing out some challenges such views face, and concluding (...)
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  • The Ontology of Things, Properties and Powers.Steve Fleetwood - 2009 - Journal of Critical Realism 8 (3):343-366.
    Whilst the concept of causal powers is central to much post-positivist social science in general, and to critical realism in particular, it has not been significantly developed by critical realists since the initial work of Harré and Madden and Bhaskar in the mid-1970s. To deepen our understanding of powers we need to start with a ‘package’ of related terms. In §1 of the paper I introduce this package, clear up some terminological ambiguity and inconsistency, and focus the discussion upon things, (...)
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  • Spinoza’s Metaphysics of Thought: Parallelisms and the Multifaceted Structure of Ideas.Yitzhak Y. Melamed - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):636-683.
    In this paper, I suggest an outline of a new interpretation of core issues in Spinoza’s metaphysics and philosophy of mind. I argue for three major theses. (1) In the first part of the paper I show that the celebrated Spinozistic doctrine commonly termed “the doctrine of parallelism” is in fact a confusion of two separate and independent doctrines of parallelism. Hence, I argue that our current understanding of Spinoza’s metaphysics and philosophy of mind is fundamentally flawed. (2) The clarification (...)
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  • Function and Structure in Aristotle.Travis Butler - 2007 - Dialogue 46 (1):69-90.
    ABSTRACT: Aristotle is sometimes committed to a pattern of inference that moves from complexity of functioning to complexity in the entity’s metaphysical structure. This article argues that Aristotle rejects this inference in the case of the basic essence, the ultimate differentia that determines the kind to which the entity belongs. Specifically, the functional difference between active and passive reasoning in humans is not matched in the structure of the basic human essence. The basic essence is an immediate unity in the (...)
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  • Could Charge and Mass Be Universals?Marian J. R. Gilton - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):624-644.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
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  • Modalising Plurals.Simon Thomas Hewitt - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (5):853-875.
    There has been very little discussion of the appropriate principles to govern a modal logic of plurals. What debate there has been has accepted a principle I call (Necinc); informally if this is one of those then, necessarily: this is one of those. On this basis Williamson has criticised the Boolosian plural interpretation of monadic second-order logic. I argue against (Necinc), noting that it isn't a theorem of any logic resulting from adding modal axioms to the plural logic PFO+, and (...)
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  • Is There A Quasi-Mereological Account of Property Incompatibility?Javier Kalhat - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (2):115-133.
    Armstrong’s combinatorial theory of possibility faces the obvious difficulty that not all universals are compatible. In this paper I develop three objections against Armstrong’s attempt to account for property incompatibilities. First, Armstrong’s account cannot handle incompatibilities holding among properties that are either simple, or that are complex but stand to one another in the relation of overlap rather than in the part/ whole relation. Secondly, at the heart of Armstrong’s account lies a notion of structural universals which, building on an (...)
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  • Incompatible Empirically Equivalent Theories: A Structural Explication.Thomas Mormann - 1995 - Synthese 103 (2):203 - 249.
    The thesis of the empirical underdetermination of theories (U-thesis) maintains that there are incompatible theories which are empirically equivalent. Whether this is an interesting thesis depends on how the term incompatible is understood. In this paper a structural explication is proposed. More precisely, the U-thesis is studied in the framework of the model theoretic or emantic approach according to which theories are not to be taken as linguistic entities, but rather as families of mathematical structures. Theories of similarity structures are (...)
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  • What is the Relation Between an Experience, the Subject of an Experience, and the Content of the Experience?Galen J. Strawson - unknown
    This version of this paper has been superseded by a substantially revised version in G. Strawson, Real Materialism and Other Essays (OUP 2008) I take 'content' in a natural internalist way to refer to occurrent mental content. I introduce a 'thin' or ‘live’ notion of the subject according to which a subject of experience cannot exist unless there is an experience for it to be the subject of. I then argue, first, that in the case of a particular experience E, (...)
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  • ‘Here Be Revisionary Metaphysics!’ A Critique of a Concern About Process Philosophy.Paul Giladi - forthcoming - Dialogue:1-19.
    ABSTRACT In this paper, I argue that John Dupré and Daniel Nicholson's ‘process manifesto’ is ironically more sympathetic to descriptive metaphysics than to revisionary metaphysics. Focusing on their argument that any process philosophy automatically slides into Whiteheadian obscurantism if it does not just rest content with revealing the problematic features of ordinary language, I argue that their position occludes a logical space, one in which revisionary metaphysics is articulated without any Whiteheadian obscurantism and involves no dereliction of critical/revisionary orientation. I (...)
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  • Non-Ontological Structuralism†.Michael Resnik - 2019 - Philosophia Mathematica 27 (3):303-315.
    ABSTRACT Historical structuralist views have been ontological. They either deny that there are any mathematical objects or they maintain that mathematical objects are structures or positions in them. Non-ontological structuralism offers no account of the nature of mathematical objects. My own structuralism has evolved from an early sui generis version to a non-ontological version that embraces Quine’s doctrine of ontological relativity. In this paper I further develop and explain this view.
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  • The Dual Nature of Properties: The Powerful Qualities View Reconsidered.Joaquim Giannotti - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Glasgow
    Metaphysical orthodoxy holds that a privileged minority of properties carve reality at its joints. These are the so-called fundamental properties. This thesis concerns the contemporary philosophical debate about the nature of fundamental properties. In particular, it aims to answer two questions: What is the most adequate conception of fundamental properties? What is the “big picture” world-view that emerges by adopting such a conception? I argue that a satisfactory answer to both questions requires us to embrace a novel conception of powerful (...)
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  • Is There a Single True Theory of Properties?Lars Binderup - 2004 - Res Cogitans 1 (1).
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  • Farewell to States of Affairs.Julian Dodd - 1999 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (2):146 – 160.
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  • An Argument Against Armstrong's Analysis of the Resemblance of Universals.Adam Pautz - 1997 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (1):109 – 111.
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