A semiotic theory of systems derived from language would have the purpose of classifying all the systems of linguistic expression: philosophy, ideology, myth, poetry, art, as much as the dream, lapsus, and free association in a pluridimensional matrix that will interact with many diversified fields. In each one of these discourses it is necessary to consider a plurality of questions, the essence of which will only be comprehensible by the totality; it will be necessary to ask, in the first place, (...) what will be the purpose of this language, what function does it fulfill and for which reason has it been constructed. The concept of World vision (WV) is introduced and its relation with Generalized Collective Conscience (GCC) and Particularized Collective Conscience. Culture implies a particular WV. Culture creates GCC. The semantic field is a structure that formalizes the units of a certain culture constituting a portion of the vision of the Reality that owns this culture. An ecological case is explained. (shrink)

In “Other Minds,” Austin maintained that, unless there is a special reason to suspect the bird he saw is stuffed, he does not need to do enough to show it is not stuffed in order to be credited with knowing what he has just claimed to know: that the bird he saw is a goldfinch. But suppose Austin were presented with the following argument: You don’t know the bird is not a stuffed goldfinch. If you don’t know the bird is (...) not a stuffed goldfinch, you don’t know the bird is a goldfinch. Therefore, you don’t know the bird is a goldfinch. Which of the premises of this argument would Austin have rejected? My brief is that the answer is, “Neither”: Austin would have dismissed the very idea that he needed to choose a premise to reject. The burden of this essay is to explain why. (shrink)

Classical logic rests on the assumption that there are two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive truth values. This assumption has always been surrounded by philosophical controversy. Doubts have been raised about its legitimacy, and hence about the legitimacy of classical logic. Usually, the assumption is stated in the form of a general principle, namely the principle that every proposition is either true or false. Then, the philosophical controversy is often framed in terms of the question whether every proposition is either (...) true or false. The main purpose of the paper is to show that there is something wrong in this way of putting things. The point is that the common way of understanding the controversial assumption is misconceived, as it rests on a wrong picture of propositions. In the first part of the paper I outline this picture and I argue against it. In the second part I sketch a different picture of propositions and I suggest how this leads to conceive the issue of classical logic in different terms. (shrink)

In this paper I will try to defend a quasi-naturalistic interpretation of J.L. Austin’s work. I will rely on P. Kitcher’s 1992 paper “The Naturalists Return” to compile four general criteria by which a philosopher can be called a naturalist. Then I will turn to Austin’s work and examine whether he meets these criteria. I will try to claim that versions of such naturalistic elements can be found in his work.

This dissertation is a contribution to the philosophy of language. Its central question is: In virtue of which facts do linguistic expressions mean what they do? E.g. why does “apple” mean apple in English? The question receives a systematic answer; in short: Linguistic expressions mean what they do because among their users, there are linguistic conventions and social norms to use and understand them in certain ways. The answer is clarified and defended as a central thesis. For in this form, (...) it is at best a slogan: What is meaning? What is it to use and understand expressions? What are conventions and social norms anyway? How does the use and understanding determine meaning? The goal of the dissertation consists in answering these questions. (shrink)

The thesis is a metatheoretical analysis of the concept of ‘speaker’s intention’ as it is used in traditional linguistic-philosophical and in cognitive pragmatics. The analysis centers around works of Austin, Searle, Grice, and Relevance Theory. The main aim is to argue for the following thesis: (T1) if pragmatics is targeting on how speaker’s intentions contribute to linguistic choices in communicative language use, then focusing solely on causally efficient mental states and analyzing them at the utterance level necessarily leads to unsatisfactory (...) consequences in theorizing. -/- The secondary aim of the dissertation is to argue that: (T2) the traditional account of intentionality is tenable only if we take utterances as data. Surely, there are causally efficient intentions which lead the speaker to formulate her utterances as part of conversational turns. But speakers also have intentions which shape the conversation itself (motives, goals, plans). However: (T3) if we take discourses or conversations as divergent sources of data (besides of utterances), we run into an explanatory gap that cannot be filled mechanically: the structured-proposionalist theory is simply insufficient to grasp discourse-level intentions. To argue for (T3), I analyse speaker’s intentions in a fictive conversation (The smuggler sketch from Monty Python’s Flying Circus) through the “prisms” of Austin’s speech act theory, Searle’s (at least) two theories of intentions, Grice’s M-intention, and the ostensive-inferential view on communication. (shrink)

The present paper focuses on the Austinian approach to intentionality. My aim is to demonstrate that the Austinian concept and its application in the classical version of speech act theory are fundamentally different from the treatment of intentionality in the received version of speech act theory (as developed by Searle). The received version of speech act theory treats intentional states as a bunch of internal individual beliefs, desires, and intentions, while it assumes that conventions belong to the external social domains. (...) Contrary to that, the Austinian version of speech act theory doesn’t make a sharp ideological distinction between intentional states and conventions as a result of Austin’s natural realism. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to examine whether conceptual relativism is a prerequi-site for conceptual engineering (and if so, then to what extent). In the first part of the paper, I explore and classify varieties of relativism to prepare a distinctive definition of conceptual relativism. In the second part I analyse conceptual relativism and I consequently propose two different readings of conceptual scheme: (i) conceptual scheme as a monolithic, timeless, and determinate systems of meanings, and (ii) conceptual scheme as (...) a system of relatively stable meanings, that is based on agreement and is open to change over time. In the third part of the paper, I show that of those two readings only the second reading of conceptual scheme fits into the practice of conceptual engineering. (shrink)

Self-deception poses serious difficulties for belief attribution because the behavior of the self-deceived is deeply conflicted: some of it supports the attribution of a certain belief, while some of it supports the contrary attribution. Theorists have resorted either to attributing both beliefs to the self-deceived, or to postulating an unconscious belief coupled with another kind of cognitive attitude. On the other hand, deflationary accounts of self- deception have attempted a more parsimonious solution: attributing only one, false belief to the subject. (...) My aim in this paper is to critically examine this strategy and, subsequently, to suggest that its failure gives support to the neglected view that the self-deceived are not accurately describable as believing either of the relevant propositions. (shrink)