This introduction to a special issue focuses on the complex and contradictory relationships of empires and nation-states. It contests the traditional views that posit nation-states and empires as the mutually exclusive forms of state organization. The paper identifies the key features of these two ideal types and then briefly reviews the current developments in this field. This introduction also provides a summary overview of the nine contributions that compose the special issue.

ABSTRACT The common claim that American foreign policy is “imperial” is contradicted by the fact that the actual, definable historical empires have characteristically exercised formal, as well as decisive, control over their peripheral dependencies—properties that the keenest analysts do not ascribe to the geopolitical system that has been constructed by the United States. Why, then, the ascription of “empire” to the United States? One reason is to condemn American foreign policy by linking it to the unjust, destructive, and self‐destructive tendencies (...) that are held to be inherent in a nation’s quest for, and maintenance of, “empire.” The variant of this anti‐imperial thesis that has been the special province of certain conservatives and libertarians appropriates the “empire” thesis to invent non‐security motives for American foreign policies, and correspondingly to denigrate security threats to the United States. Yet—ironically—as with the more characteristic left‐wing anti‐imperialism, the conservative‐libertarian version exemplifies a cultural dimension of the strategic situation of the United States: Far from being an “empire,” or even an accomplished hegemon, America is better described (metaphorically) as the object of a multi‐pronged “siege.”. (shrink)

This article analyzes some important aspects of socioeconomic and political development of the world in the near future. The future always stems from the present. The first part of the article is devoted to the study of some crucial events of the present, which could be regarded as precursors of forthcoming fundamental changes. In particular, it is shown that the turbulent events of late 2010 and 2011 in the Arab World may well be regarded as a start of the global (...) reconfiguration. The article also offers an analysis of some aspects of the global financial system that, according to the authors, notwithstanding all its negative points, performs certain important positive functions including the ?insurance? of social guaranties at the global scale. The second part of the article considers some global scenarios of the World System's new future and describes a few characteristics of the forthcoming ?Epoch of New Coalitions.? The article attempts to answer such questions as the following: What are the implications of the economic weakening of the United States as the World System center? Will the future World System have a leader? Will it experience a global governance deficit? Will the world fragmentation increase? (shrink)

Conventional historical and popular accounts tend to emphasize sharp polarities between empires and nation-states. While an empire is traditionally associated with conquests, slavery, political inequalities, economic exploitation and the wars of yesteryear, a nation-state is understood to be the only legitimate and viable form of large-scale territorial organization today. This article challenges such interpretations by focusing on the organizational and ideological continuities between the imperial and the nation-state models of social order. In particular, I focus on the role coercive and (...) ideological apparatuses as well as the transformation of micro-solidarities play in the formation of polities over long periods of time. I argue that although empires and nation-states are different ideal types of polity they are highly compatible and as such prone to metamorphosing into each other. More specifically I explore how, when and why specific coercive-organizational, ideological and micro-interactional processes make this periodic historical metamorphosis possible. (shrink)

Contemporary (post-1945) liberalism functions analogously to Roman Catholicism in the decades after 1443. Both ideologies, in their respective periods, represent the hegemonic ideology of Western civilization, despite the fact that both comprise a miscellany of competing belief systems. Both ideologies are dominated by a single hegemonic power—the United States and the Renaissance papacy, respectively—which strives for doctrinal stability. All who reject official “doctrine,” however, are rendered liable to violent suppression. In this, papal Catholicism and American liberalism display an ultra-conservative outlook; (...) but they also evince a powerfully millenarian streak, as evidenced by their dual proclamations of the “end of history” and their zealous missionary responses to macro-historical events in the final decades of the fifteenth and twentieth centuries. For ideologues of both regimes, those events speak to an ultimate harmony of truth and value that only serves to entrench their own dogmatism. This, however, has dire consequences when it comes to war, as can be seen in the “crusading” character of contemporary liberal warfare. Ultimately, the Renaissance papacy proves unable to maintain its monopoly on Christian doctrine; and one has to wonder if a similar fate may befall America's perceived role as the champion of liberalism. (shrink)

This article examines the ‘deictic signature’ of the discourse worlds that are projected through representations of the Cold War and post-Cold War global security environments. I focus on the means by which US national security discourse creates ‘threat environments’ through historically specific renderings of the spatial configuration of global society and projections of the future. Specifically, I examine how the ‘powerhouse’ metaphor embedded within Henry Luce's conception of the ‘American Century', as well as the national security approach it implicated have (...) reverberated within national security discourse at two moments of significant historical change: the inception of the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. I argue that the discourses marking both of these moments embed and project construals of geopolitical space and temporality which presuppose an atemporal and extraterritorial conception of US ‘national’ security interests. This conception, in turn, provides the rationale for an expansionist security strategy that focuses on shaping global society in ways that accord with US values and interests. (shrink)