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  1. Paths to Triviality.Tore Fjetland Øgaard - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 45 (3):237-276.
    This paper presents a range of new triviality proofs pertaining to naïve truth theory formulated in paraconsistent relevant logics. It is shown that excluded middle together with various permutation principles such as A → (B → C)⊩B → (A → C) trivialize naïve truth theory. The paper also provides some new triviality proofs which utilize the axioms ((A → B)∧ (B → C)) → (A → C) and (A → ¬A) → ¬A, the fusion connective and the Ackermann constant. An (...)
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  • Truth Without Standard Models: Some Conceptual Problems Reloaded.Eduardo Barrio & Bruno Da Ré - 2018 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 28 (1):122-139.
    A theory of truth is usually demanded to be consistent, but -consistency is less frequently requested. Recently, Yatabe has argued in favour of -inconsistent first-order theories of truth, minimising their odd consequences. In view of this fact, in this paper, we present five arguments against -inconsistent theories of truth. In order to bring out this point, we will focus on two very well-known -inconsistent theories of truth: the classical theory of symmetric truth FS and the non-classical theory of naïve truth (...)
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  • Naive Structure, Contraction and Paradox.Lionel Shapiro - 2015 - Topoi 34 (1):75-87.
    Rejecting structural contraction has been proposed as a strategy for escaping semantic paradoxes. The challenge for its advocates has been to make intuitive sense of how contraction might fail. I offer a way of doing so, based on a “naive” interpretation of the relation between structure and logical vocabulary in a sequent proof system. The naive interpretation of structure motivates the most common way of blaming Curry-style paradoxes on illicit contraction. By contrast, the naive interpretation will not as easily motivate (...)
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  • Non-Deterministic Conditionals and Transparent Truth.Federico Pailos & Lucas Rosenblatt - 2015 - Studia Logica 103 (3):579-598.
    Theories where truth is a naive concept fall under the following dilemma: either the theory is subject to Curry’s Paradox, which engenders triviality, or the theory is not trivial but the resulting conditional is too weak. In this paper we explore a number of theories which arguably do not fall under this dilemma. In these theories the conditional is characterized in terms of non-deterministic matrices. These non-deterministic theories are similar to infinitely-valued Łukasiewicz logic in that they are consistent and their (...)
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  • Contraction, Infinitary Quantifiers, and Omega Paradoxes.Bruno Da Ré & Lucas Rosenblatt - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (4):611-629.
    Our main goal is to investigate whether the infinitary rules for the quantifiers endorsed by Elia Zardini in a recent paper are plausible. First, we will argue that they are problematic in several ways, especially due to their infinitary features. Secondly, we will show that even if these worries are somehow dealt with, there is another serious issue with them. They produce a truth-theoretic paradox that does not involve the structural rules of contraction.
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  • Fusion and Confusion.Graham Priest - 2015 - Topoi 34 (1):55-61.
    IntroductionCurry’s paradox is well known.See, e.g., Priest , ch. 6. It comes in both set theoretic and semantic versions. Here we will concentrate on the semantic versions. Historically, these have deployed the notion of truth. Those who wish to endorse an unrestricted T-schema have mainly endorsed a logic which rejects the principle of Absorption, \\models A\rightarrow B\). High profile logics of this kind are certain relevant logics; these have semantics which show how and why this principle is not valid. Of (...)
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