Citations of:
Nonclassical Metatheory for Nonclassical Logics
Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (2):335355 (2013)
Add citations
You must login to add citations.


Logical orthodoxy has it that classical firstorder logic, or some extension thereof, provides the right extension of the logical consequence relation. However, together with naïve but intuitive principles about semantic notions such as truth, denotation, satisfaction, and possibly validity and other naïve logical properties, classical logic quickly leads to inconsistency, and indeed triviality. At least since the publication of Kripke’s Outline of a theory of truth , an increasingly popular diagnosis has been to restore consistency, or at least nontriviality, by (...) 

Investigase a possibilidade de uma abordagem do fenômeno do pluralismo lógico a partir de uma perspectiva inspirada no pensamento de Quine. A matematização da lógica termina por levar à flexibilização da teoria lógica, logo surgindo, não apenas sistemas complementares e alternativos à lógica clássica, mas também a questão da admissibilidade de mais do que um sistema lógico. A tal posição se dá o nome “pluralismo lógico”. Quine foi um destacado defensor da lógica clássica a partir de uma perspectiva monista, ainda (...) 

Special issue: "Reflecting on the Legacy of C.I. Lewis: Contemporary and Historical Perspectives on Modal Logic". 

The Knower paradox purports to place surprising a priori limitations on what we can know. According to orthodoxy, it shows that we need to abandon one of three plausible and widelyheld ideas: that knowledge is factive, that we can know that knowledge is factive, and that we can use logical/mathematical reasoning to extend our knowledge via very weak singlepremise closure principles. I argue that classical logic, not any of these epistemic principles, is the culprit. I develop a consistent theory validating (...) 

A natural suggestion and increasingly popular account of how to revise our logical beliefs treats revision of logic analogously to the revision of scientific theories. I investigate this approach and argue that simple applications of abductive methodology to logic result in revisioncycles, developing a detailed case study of an actual dispute with this property. This is problematic if we take abductive methodology to provide justification for revising our logical framework. I then generalize the case study, pointing to similarities with more (...) 

ABSTRACTDo truth tables—the ordinary sort that we use in teaching and explaining basic propositional logic—require an assumption of consistency for their construction? In this essay we show that truth tables can be built in a consistencyindependent paraconsistent setting, without any appeal to classical logic. This is evidence for a more general claim—that when we write down the orthodox semantic clauses for a logic, whatever logic we presuppose in the background will be the logic that appears in the foreground. Rather than (...) 

In this paper a principle of substitutivity of logical equivalents salve veritate and a version of Leibniz’s law are formulated and each is shown to cause problems when combined with naive truth theories. 

The perhaps most important criticism of the nontransitive approach to semantic paradoxes is that it cannot truthfully express exactly which metarules preserve validity. I argue that this criticism overlooks that the admissibility of metarules cannot be expressed in any logic that allows us to formulate validityCurry sentences and that is formulated in a classical metalanguage. Hence, the criticism applies to all approaches that do their metatheory in classical logic. If we do the metatheory of nontransitive logics in a nontransitive logic, (...) 

Revenge arguments purport to show that any proposed solution to the semantic paradoxes generates new paradoxes that prove that solution to be inadequate. In this paper, I focus on revenge arguments that employ the modeltheoretic semantics of a target theory and I argue, contra the current revengetheoretic wisdom, that they can constitute genuine expressive limitations. I consider the antirevenge strategy elaborated by Field and argue that it does not offer a way out of the revenge problem. More generally, I argue (...) 