It is commonly accepted that people can, and regularly do, deceive themselves. Yet closer examination reveals a set of conceptual puzzles that make self-deception difficult to explain. Applying the conditions for other-deception to self-deception generates what are known as the ‘paradoxes’ of belief and intention. Simply put, the central problem is how it is possible for me to believe one thing, and yet intentionally cause myself to simultaneously believe its contradiction. There are two general approaches taken by philosophers to account (...) for these puzzles about the self-deceptive state and the process of self-deception. ‘Partitioning’ strategies try to resolve the paradoxes by proposing that the mind is divided in some way that allows self-deception to occur. ‘Reformulation’ strategies suggest that the conditions we use to define self-deception should be modified so that the paradoxes do not arise at all. Both approaches are subject to criticism about the consequences of the strategies philosophers use, but recent cross-disciplinary analyses of self-deception may help shed light on the puzzles that underlie this phenomenon. (shrink)

Following recent developments in philosophy of education, this thesis attempts to relate work done in analytic philosophy of education to work done in normative philosophy of education. The first part of the thesis focuses on the analysis of the concept Curriculum. The aim of this analysis is to attempt to clarify Curriculum and show that it is an essentially normative concept. An examination of the nature of this concept raises serious moral issues, e.g. that of the justification of the content (...) of the Curriculum. This issue is dealt with in the second part of the thesis where I investigate two major philosophical attempts to justify the content of the Curriculum and show that the arguments adduced by Peters and Wilson do not satisfactorily resolve the issue, either in their own terms or in terms of the extent to which they speak to practical considerations. Mary Warnock attempts to merge the double rift, between Peters and Wilson, and between theoretical and practical considerations, by arguing that imagination and work are the criteria by which decisions as to the content of the Curriculum should be made. This moderate position, although more adequate, is not devoid of problems, especially with regard to the relationship between imagination and work. It is my belief that a fundamental change in the understanding of theory and practice in the field of education must occur before serious advances can be made with regard to the justificatory issue. (shrink)

I argue that considerations about computational complexity show that all finite agents need characteristics like those that have been called epistemic virtues. The necessity of these virtues follows in part from the nonexistence of shortcuts, or efficient ways of finding shortcuts, to cognitively expensive routines. It follows that agents must possess the capacities – metavirtues –of developing in advance the cognitive virtues they will need when time and memory are at a premium.

Scholars have recently identified resemblances between pragmatist thought and contemporary trends in cognitive science in the area of ‘embodied cognition’ or ‘4E cognition.’ In this article I explore these resemblances in the account of religious belief provided by the classical pragmatist philosopher William James. Although James’s psychology does not always parallel the commitments of embodied cognition, his insights concerning the role of emotion and socio-cultural context in shaping religious belief, as well as the action-oriented nature of such beliefs, resonate with (...) embodied and embedded accounts of religious belief. James’s insights are readily extended in light of contemporary embodied cognition research to highlight the interdependency between religious belief of individuals and the cognitive scaffolding provided by embodied religious practices. (shrink)

The underrepresentation of women, people of color, and especially women of color—and the corresponding overrepresentation of white men—is more pronounced in philosophy than in many of the sciences. I suggest that part of the explanation for this lies in the role played by the idealized rational self, a concept that is relatively influential in philosophy but rarely employed in the sciences. The idealized rational self models the mind as consistent, unified, rationally transcendent, and introspectively transparent. I hypothesize that acceptance of (...) the idealized rational self leads philosophers to underestimate the influence of implicit bias on their own judgments and prevents them from enacting the reforms necessary to minimize the effects of implicit bias on institutional decision-making procedures. I consider recent experiments in social psychology that suggest that an increased sense of one’s own objectivity leads to greater reliance on bias in hiring scenarios, and I hypothesize how these results might be applied to philosophers’ evaluative judgments. I discuss ways that the idealized rational self is susceptible to broader critiques of ideal theory, and I consider some of the ways that the picture functions as a tool of active ignorance and color-evasive racism. (shrink)

The rightness and wrongness of actions fits on a continuous scale. This fits the way we evaluate actions chosen among a diverse range of options, even though English speakers don’t use the words “righter” and “wronger”. I outline and defend a version of scalar consequentialism, according to which rightness is a matter of degree, determined by how good the consequences are. Linguistic resources are available to let us truly describe actions simply as right. Some deontological theories face problems in accounting (...) for degrees of rightness, as they don't invoke continuous parameters among the right-making features of action. (shrink)

This paper argues that a number of entrenched posthumanist positions are seriously flawed as a result of their dependence on a technical interpretive approach that creates more problems than it solves. During the course of our discussion we consider in particular the question of personhood. After all, until we can determine what it means to be a person we cannot really discuss what it means to improve a person. What kinds of enhancements would even constitute improvements? This in turn leads (...) to an examination of the technical model of analysis and the recurring tendency to approach notions like personhood using this technical model. In looking to sketch a Heideggerian account of personhood, we are reaffirming what we take to be a Platonic skepticism concerning technical models of inquiry when it comes to certain subjects. Finally we examine the question as to whether the posthumanist looks to apply technology’s benefits in ways that we have reflectively determined to be useful or desirable or whether it is technology itself (or to speak as Heidegger would – the “essence” of technology) which prompts many posthumanists to rely on an excessively reductionist view of the human being. (shrink)

This paper explores the relation of thought and the stream of consciousness in the light of an ontological argument raised against cognitive phenomenology views. I argue that the ontological argument relies on a notion of ‘processive character’ that does not stand up to scrutiny and therefore it is insufficient for the argument to go through. I then analyse two more views on what ‘processive character’ means and argue that the process-part account best captures the intuition behind the argument. Following this (...) view, I reconstruct the ontological argument and argue that it succeeds in establishing that some mental episodes like judging, understanding and occurrent states of thought do not enter into the stream but fails to exclude episodes like entertaining. Contrary to what it might seem, this conclusion fits well with cognitive phenomenology views, given that, as I show, there is a way for non-processive mental episodes to be fundamentally related to processive ones, such that they cannot be excl.. (shrink)

As of March 2012, students with concealed carry permits attending public colleges and universities in the state of Colorado may carry their weapons on campus. Colorado is one of six states with legal provisions permitting guns on public campuses. An additional twenty-two states leave it up to the governing bodies of individual colleges and universities to determine their institution's gun policy, while twenty-two states ban concealed weapons on campuses. The NRA often asserts that "an armed society is a polite society." (...) They and those who favorably quote them take this as a positive result of an armed citizenry. People won't be rude. They won't argue. They won't say anything offensive, for fear of being shot. And that may be right. But we do not want a polite campus. If an armed campus is a polite campus, then students at such campuses will miss a fundamentally important aspect of their college experience. Students ought to be able to voice their opinions, to argue with others, and to test new ideas without fear. The threat of violence that guns create challenges the most fundamental liberty we have: the freedom of speech. (shrink)

Chierchia's (1998) theory of noun denotations, formalized in the Nominal Mapping Parameter, makes the prediction that no language will have both a generalized classifier system and a singular – plural contrast in nouns. Evidence presented in this note suggests that Indonesian is just such a language. The evidence is used to raise the more general issue of the extent to which the morphosyntax of nouns can be reliably predicted from the routes by which they are mapped into their denotations (and (...) vice versa). (shrink)

Existing studies of statutory interpretation are often of excellent quality but they have tended either to focus on legal practice to the detriment of comparative jurisprudence, or have examined legal reasoning at a level of abstraction which has made empirical study difficult. The author examines a recent development in this area and considers how it might be used to begin a project to identify any divergences in statutory interpretation among the various legal systems of the United Kingdom.

In this paper I attempt to o f fer a concept of discretion and to an a l yse the forms of control that can be e x ercised in this matte r . F rom the concept of l e g al ce r taint y , w e can obse r v e h o w discretion eme r ges in those cases that are e n visaged b y the norms and in the so called hard cases. (...) F requent l y it is maintained h o w e v e r , that, the on l y limit on discretion can be found in arbitrariness and that, apa r t from that, a n y decision w ould be co r rect. This could result in e xcluding discretiona r y decisions from l e gal control. A g ainst this opinion, there are authors that think that l e gal control of discretionary decisions is possi b le because th e y defend the e xistence of on l y one co r rect an sw e r . Other authors reject the e xistence of on l y one co r rect an sw er or the possibility of f inding it. N e v er theless, e v en accepting that there are some aspects of discretiona r y decisions that do not der i ve from l e gal no r ms bu t from personal preferences, those preferences must be coherent with some theo r y that contains no r mat i v e l y co r rect criteria. These criteria must be as coherent as possi b le with the dominant system of v alues in the socie t y. (shrink)

My father, whose name was Ben, loved telling stories. It was from his storytelling sessions with my Uncle Charlie that I first understood Pythonesque one-upmanship. These competitive narratives consisted of colourful descriptions of shoeless boys collecting firewood in the snow while daddy became emphysemic in a coalmine and mummy planned their exodus to Australia. In these sessions, matriarchs fight back tears while burying a succession of choleric children, patriarchs swear off the booze in a pact with God that involved, at (...) the very least, the survival of the remaining offspring. These were the first ideas I formed of life in another place and time, and from these two old raconteurs, who liked to outdo each other in their colourful and not altogether nonfictional retelling of their shared history, I learned not only about making stories but about listening to them. (shrink)

Zaller's model of public-opinion formation portrays the average citizen as an automaton who responds unthinkingly to elite cues. That is, once people have received information from political elites, they tend to abide by whatever their respective cue-givers dictate, since rejecting information is more cognitively costly than simply accepting it. Empirical research in psychology on priming supports this view of the citizen as a passive receiver of information. For example, people are likely to be unconsciously influenced by subtle cues and they (...) tend to base their opinions on the accessibility of information in memory. However, some citizens, under certain conditions, may be ?active processors? of information: actively interpreting it, elaborating on its implications, and negotiating its meaning. Whether or not Zaller's model is an accurate representation of the process of public-opinion formation depends substantially upon the inclusiveness of the researcher's views about what constitutes public opinion and how to study its determinants. (shrink)