- Why the exclusion problem seems intractable and how, just maybe, to tract it.Karen Bennett - 2003 - Noûs 37 (3):471-97.details
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Concepts, introspection, and phenomenal consciousness: An information-theoretical approach.Murat Aydede & Güven Güzeldere - 2005 - Noûs 39 (2):197-255.details
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Knowing What It's Like.Andrew Y. Lee - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):187-209.details
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Acquaintance and Phenomenal Concepts.David Pitt - 2019 - In Sam Coleman (ed.), The Knowledge Argument. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 87-101.details
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(1 other version)Forms of Luminosity: Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics.David Elohim - 2017 - Dissertation, Arché, University of St Andrewsdetails
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Functionalism.Janet Levin - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Zombies.Robert Kirk - 2003 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Conceptual analysis and reductive explanation.David J. Chalmers & Frank Jackson - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (3):315-61.details
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Consciousness, Haecceitism, and Grounding.David Elohim - manuscriptdetails
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(1 other version)Forms of Luminosity: Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics.David Elohim - 2017details
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(1 other version)Access Denied to Zombies.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):81-93.details
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Consciousness.Robert van Gulick - 2004 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Grounding, Conceivability, and the Mind-Body Problem.David Elohim - 2018 - Synthese 195 (2):919-926.details
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