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  1. Likelihoodism and Guidance for Belief.Tamaz Tokhadze - 2022 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 53 (4):501-517.
    Likelihoodism is the view that the degree of evidential support should be analysed and measured in terms of likelihoods alone. The paper considers and responds to a popular criticism that a likelihoodist framework is too restrictive to guide belief. First, I show that the most detailed and rigorous version of this criticism, as put forward by Gandenberger (2016), is unsuccessful. Second, I provide a positive argument that a broadly likelihoodist framework can accommodate guidance for comparative belief, even when objectively well-grounded (...)
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  • How Pseudo-hypotheses Defeat a Non-Bayesian Theory of Evidence: Reply to Bandyopadhyay, Taper, and Brittan.Colin Howson - 2016 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 30 (3):299-306.
    Bandyopadhyay, Taper, and Brittan advance a measure of evidential support that first appeared in the statistical and philosophical literature four decades ago and have been extensively discussed since. I have argued elsewhere, however, that it is vulnerable to a simple counterexample. BTB claim that the counterexample is flawed because it conflates evidence with confirmation. In this reply, I argue that the counterexample stands, and is fatal to their theory.
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