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  1. A Troublesome Case of Backward Causation for Lewis’s Counterfactual Theory.George Seli - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.
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  • Causation and Counterfactual Dependence.Sungho Choi - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (1):1-16.
    Recently Stephen Barker has raised stimulating objections to the thesis that, roughly speaking, if two events stand in a relation of counterfactual dependence, they stand in a causal relation. As Ned Hall says, however, this thesis constitutes the strongest part of the counterfactual analysis of causation. Therefore, if successful, Barker’s objections will undermine the cornerstone of the counterfactual analysis of causation, and hence give us compelling reasons to reject the counterfactual analysis of causation. I will argue, however, that they do (...)
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  • A Peculiarity in Pearl’s Logic of Interventionist Counterfactuals.Jiji Zhang, Wai-Yin Lam & Rafael De Clercq - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (5):783-794.
    We examine a formal semantics for counterfactual conditionals due to Judea Pearl, which formalizes the interventionist interpretation of counterfactuals central to the interventionist accounts of causation and explanation. We show that a characteristic principle validated by Pearl’s semantics, known as the principle of reversibility, states a kind of irreversibility: counterfactual dependence (in David Lewis’s sense) between two distinct events is irreversible. Moreover, we show that Pearl’s semantics rules out only mutual counterfactual dependence, not cyclic dependence in general. This, we argue, (...)
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