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  1. Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Blackwell.
    Counterfactuals is David Lewis' forceful presentation of and sustained argument for a particular view about propositions which express contrary to fact conditionals, including his famous defense of realism about possible worlds and his theory of laws of nature.
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  • Causation as Influence.David K. Lewis - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):182-197.
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  • A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance.David K. Lewis - 1980 - In Richard C. Jeffrey (ed.), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Volume II. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. 263-293.
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  • Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow.David K. Lewis - 1979 - Noûs 13 (4):455-476.
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  • Causation.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):556-567.
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  • A Counterfactual Analysis of Causation.Murali Ramachandran - 1997 - Mind 106 (422):263-277.
    On David Lewis's original analysis of causation, c causes e only if c is linked to e by a chain of distinct events such that each event in the chain (counter-factually) depends on the former one. But this requirement precludes the possibility of late pre-emptive causation, of causation by fragile events, and of indeterministic causation. Lewis proposes three different strategies for accommodating these three kinds of cases, but none of these turn out to be satisfactory. I offer a single analysis (...)
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  • Agency and Probabilistic Causality.Huw Price - 1991 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (2):157-176.
    Probabilistic accounts of causality have long had trouble with ‘spurious’ evidential correlations. Such correlations are also central to the case for causal decision theory—the argument that evidential decision theory is inadequate to cope with certain sorts of decision problem. However, there are now several strong defences of the evidential theory. Here I present what I regard as the best defence, and apply it to the probabilistic approach to causality. I argue that provided a probabilistic theory appeals to the notions of (...)
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  • Causation.D. Lewis - 1973 - In Philosophical Papers Ii. Oxford University Press. pp. 159-213.
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  • Counterfactuals. [REVIEW]William Parry - 1973 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 44 (2):278-281.
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  • Events.David Lewis - 1986 - In Philosophical Papers Vol. II. Oxford University Press. pp. 241-269.
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  • Probabilistic Causation and Causal Processes: A Critique of Lewis.Peter Menzies - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (4):642-663.
    This paper examines a promising probabilistic theory of singular causation developed by David Lewis. I argue that Lewis' theory must be made more sophisticated to deal with certain counterexamples involving pre-emption. These counterexamples appear to show that in the usual case singular causation requires an unbroken causal process to link cause with effect. I propose a new probabilistic account of singular causation, within the framework developed by Lewis, which captures this intuition.
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  • The Causalist Program. Rational or Irrational Persistence?Eduardo H. Flichman - 1989 - Critica 21 (62):29-53.
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  • Keeping Track of the Time: Emending the Counterfactual Analysis of Causation.L. A. Paul - 1998 - Analysis 58 (3):191–198.
    Counterfactual analyses of causation can provide elegant analyses of many cases of causation. However, they fail to give intuitively correct analyses of cases involving a commonplace variety of late preemptive causation. I argue that a small emendation can solve the problem.
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  • The M-Set Analysis of Causation: Objections and Responses.Murali Ramachandran - 1998 - Mind 107 (426):465-471.
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  • Agency and Causal Asymmetry.Huw Price - 1992 - Mind 101 (403):501-520.
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  • Probabilistic Causation, Preemption and Counterfactuals.Paul Noordhof - 1999 - Mind 108 (429):95-125.
    Counter factual theories of Causation have had problems with cases of probabilistic causation and preemption. I put forward a counterfactual theory that seems to deal with these problematic cases and also has the virtue of providing an account of the alleged asymmetry between hasteners and delayers: the former usually being counted as causes, the latter not. I go on to consider a new type of problem case that has not received so much attention in the literature, those I dub catalysts (...)
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  • Causation and Counterfactual Dependence Reconsidered.Daniel M. Hausman - 1996 - Noûs 30 (1):55-74.
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  • Counterfactuals and Temporal Direction.Jonathan Bennett - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (1):57-91.
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  • Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1975 - Philosophy of Science 42 (3):341-344.
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  • Counterfactual Dependence and Broken Barometers: A Response to Flichman's Argument.Helen Beebee - 1997 - Critica 29 (86):107-119.
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