The fairy tale The Three Princes of Serendip can be taken to be allegorical of not only chance discovery (serendipity) but of other aspects of scientific discovery as well. Just as Horace Walpole coined serendipity, so can the term bahramdipity be derived from the tale and defined as the cruel suppression of a serendipitous discovery. Suppressed, unpublished discoveries are designated nulltiples. Several examples are presented to make the case that bahramdipity is an existent aspect of scientific discovery. Other examples of (...) non-ideal scientific research and discovery are provided in order to contrast and clarify the meaning and use of bahramdipity. Additional allegories of scientific discovery are taken from the tale and a hope for the strengthening of scientific integrity is expressed. (shrink)

Unreasonable expectations about the nature and character of scientific knowledge support the widespread political assumption that predictive scientific assessments are a necessary precursor to environmental decision making. All too often, the practical outcome of this assumption is that scientific uncertainty becomes a ready-made dodge for what is in reality just a difficult political decision. Interdisciplinary assessments necessary to address complex environmental policy issues invariably result in findings that are inherently contestable, especially when applied in the unrestrained realm of partisan politics. (...) In this article, the authors argue that predictive scientific assessments are inherently limited in the extent to which they can guide policy development and that rigorous scientific assessments can be much more valuable in the role of ex post policy evaluation than they can in the context of ex ante policy formulation. (shrink)

The impact of new technologies on the transformation of information into knowledge is not clear. Especially problematic is the degree to which electronic communication can replace traditional forums in which information is judged and social consensus about its value is achieved. This article uses electronic bulletin boards active during the cold fusion saga that began in 1989 to explore these issues. Dividing the contents of the bulletin boards into big ideas and little ideas, the article suggests that only about half (...) of all messages on the boards were big ideas, and only half of those were on technical issues. The study suggests that the substantial volume of irrelevant material and the difficulty of applying extratextual cues to the judgment of information made the bulletin boards an ineffective tool for creating knowledge in this case. (shrink)

This paper analyses the real origin and nature of scientific errors against claims of science critics, by examining a number of examples from the history of electricity and optics. This analysis leads to a conclusion that errors are a natural and unavoidable part of scientific process. If made available to students, through their science teachers, such a knowledge, would give students a deeper insight into the scientific process and remove their fear of making errors in their own laboratory work.

Philosophy of science has undergone a naturalistic turn, moving away from traditional idealized concerns with the logical structure of scientific theories and toward focusing on real-world scientific practice, especially in domains such as modeling and experimentation. As part of this shift, recent work has explored how the project of philosophically understanding science as a natural phenomenon can be enriched by drawing from different fields and disciplines, including niche construction theory in evolutionary biology, on the one hand, and ecological and enactive (...) views in embodied cognitive science, on the other. But these insights have so far been explored in separation from each other, without clear indication of whether they can work together. Moreover, the focus on particular practices, however insightful, has tended to lack consideration of potential further implications for a naturalized understanding of science as a whole (i.e., above and beyond those particular practices). Motivated by these developments, here we sketch a broad-ranging view of science, scientific practice and scientific knowledge in terms of ecological-enactive co-construction. The view we propose situates science in the biological, evolutionary context of human embodied cognitive activity aimed at addressing the demands of life. This motivates reframing theory as practice, and reconceptualizing scientific knowledge in ecological terms, as relational and world-involving. Our view also brings to the forefront of attention the fundamental link between ideas about the nature of mind, of science and of nature itself, which we explore by outlining how our proposal differs from more conservative, and narrower, conceptions of “cognitive niche construction.”. (shrink)

This study presents the circuitous route taken in an attempt to identify an assessment mechanism for evaluating the impact of STS courses. After initially developing a survey that faculty felt only allowed for the measurement of student opinions about the impact of required STS general education courses, the faculty at Clemson University identified Aikenhead and Ryan's Views on Science-Technology-Society (VOSTS) as an instrument that, when used with the scoring guide created in this project, might be able to assess the sophistication (...) of students views about science and technology in society. The results from administering the pre- and post-VOSTS surveys in one STS course revealed no significant differences when comparing the sophistication of students' views about STS before and after the course. These findings demonstrate that, among other considerations discussed in the manuscript, it will be difficult to find a way of assessing STS courses that can be used for the diverse courses meeting the requirement. (shrink)

There are two truths in this world: one of the laboratory, and the other of the media. What people perceive as the truth is truer in a democracy than some grubby little experiment in a laboratory notebook.(1).

In spite of incomplete knowledge we are permanently forced to act in complex real-life situations. First, a modern concept of information, the non-trivial transition from information to knowledge, patterns of missing knowledge, and the concept of perspective notions are studied. The main sections review some guidelines for action under incomplete information. A modern view of the concepts of holism and wholeness reveals that (in contrast to some critics) general system theory does not require any metaphysical assumption or previously accepted worldview. (...) The concepts of holism and wholeness, as well as general system theory, are well-founded, even under strict criteria. (shrink)

A recent article by Vihalemm (Foundations of Chemistry, 2003) is critical of an earlier essay. We find that there is some justification for his criticism of vagueness in defining terms. Nevertheless the main conclusions of the earlier work, when carefully restated to deflect Vihalemm’s criticisms, are unaffected by his arguments. The various dicta that are used as the bases of chemical explanations are different in character, and are used in a different way from the laws and theories in classical physics.

Research on the nature of science and science education enjoys a longhistory, with its origins in Ernst Mach's work in the late nineteenthcentury and John Dewey's at the beginning of the twentieth century.As early as 1909 the Central Association for Science and MathematicsTeachers published an article – ‘A Consideration of the Principles thatShould Determine the Courses in Biology in Secondary Schools’ – inSchool Science and Mathematics that reflected foundational concernsabout science and how school curricula should be informed by them. Sincethen (...) a large body of literature has developed related to the teaching andlearning about nature of science – see, for example, the Lederman and Meichtry reviews cited below. As well there has been intensephilosophical, historical and philosophical debate about the nature of scienceitself, culminating in the much-publicised ‘Science Wars’ of recent time. Thereferences listed here primarily focus on the empirical research related to thenature of science as an educational goal; along with a few influential philosophicalworks by such authors as Kuhn, Popper, Laudan, Lakatos, and others. Whilenot exhaustive, the list should prove useful to educators, and scholars in otherfields, interested in the nature of science and how its understanding can berealised as a goal of science instruction. The authors welcome correspondenceregarding omissions from the list, and on-going additions that can be made to it. (shrink)

Fabi and Goldberg investigate how funding availability influences the landscape of bioethics as a field, and perpetuates forms of social and epistemic injustice while limitin...

This inaugural handbook documents the distinctive research field that utilizes history and philosophy in investigation of theoretical, curricular and pedagogical issues in the teaching of science and mathematics. It is contributed to by 130 researchers from 30 countries; it provides a logically structured, fully referenced guide to the ways in which science and mathematics education is, informed by the history and philosophy of these disciplines, as well as by the philosophy of education more generally. The first handbook to cover the (...) field, it lays down a much-needed marker of progress to date and provides a platform for informed and coherent future analysis and research of the subject. -/- The publication comes at a time of heightened worldwide concern over the standard of science and mathematics education, attended by fierce debate over how best to reform curricula and enliven student engagement in the subjects There is a growing recognition among educators and policy makers that the learning of science must dovetail with learning about science; this handbook is uniquely positioned as a locus for the discussion. -/- The handbook features sections on pedagogical, theoretical, national, and biographical research, setting the literature of each tradition in its historical context. Each chapter engages in an assessment of the strengths and weakness of the research addressed, and suggests potentially fruitful avenues of future research. A key element of the handbook’s broader analytical framework is its identification and examination of unnoticed philosophical assumptions in science and mathematics research. It reminds readers at a crucial juncture that there has been a long and rich tradition of historical and philosophical engagements with science and mathematics teaching, and that lessons can be learnt from these engagements for the resolution of current theoretical, curricular and pedagogical questions that face teachers and administrators. (shrink)

1. Overview and organizing themes 2. Historical Review: Aristotle to Mill 3. Logic of method and critical responses 3.1 Logical constructionism and Operationalism 3.2. H-D as a logic of confirmation 3.3. Popper and falsificationism 3.4 Meta-methodology and the end of method 4. Statistical methods for hypothesis testing 5. Method in Practice 5.1 Creative and exploratory practices 5.2 Computer methods and the ‘third way’ of doing science 6. Discourse on scientific method 6.1 “The scientific method” in science education and as seen (...) by scientists 6.2 Privileged methods and ‘gold standards’ 6.3 Scientific method in the court room 6.4 Deviating practices 7. Conclusion Bibliography Academic Tools Other Internet Resources Related Entries . (shrink)

The common view of science is a misunderstanding of today's science that does not recognize how "modern" science has changed since its inception in the 16th to 17th centuries. Science is generally taken to be objectively reliable because it uses "the scientific method" and because scientists work disinterestedly, publish openly, and keep one another honest through peer review. That common view was not too unrealistic in the early days and the glory days of modern science, but it is quite wrong (...) about contemporary science, which has ceased to be trustworthy because it is subject to commercial and bureaucratic influences that have spawned highly damaging conflicts of interest, institutional as well as personal. The birth of "modern" science is credited uncontroversially to "The" Scientific Revolution of the 17th century, but it has not been widely under-stood that there have been three distinctly different stages of scientific activity since then. In the first stage, amateurs were seeking to satisfy their curiosity about how the world works. There were essentially no controlling interests other than truth-seeking. Missteps taken resulted chiefly from the inherent difficulty of making discoveries and from such inherent human flaws as pride and avarice. The second stage, roughly the 19th century, saw science becoming a career, a plausible way to make a living, not unlike other careers in academe or professions like engineering: respectable and potentially satisfying but not any obvious path to great influence or wealth. Inevitably there were conflicts of interest between furthering a career and following objectively where evidence pointed, but competition and collegiality served well enough to keep the progress of science little affected by that conflicting career interest. The way to get ahead was by doing good science. In the third and present stage, which began at about the middle of the 20th century, science faces a necessary change in ethos as its centuries-long expansion at an exponential rate has changed to a zero-sum, steady-state situation that has fostered intensely cutthroat competition. At the same time, the record of science's remarkable previous successes has led industry and government to co-opt and exploit science and scientists. Those interactions offer the possibility for individuals to gain considerable public influence and wealth. That possibility tempts to corruption. Outright fraud in research has become noticeably more frequent, and public pronouncements about matters of science are made for self-interested bureaucratic and commercial motives. The public cannot now rely safely on the soundness of advice from the scientific community. Keywords: historical changes in science, science become untrustworthy. (shrink)

Some vociferous proponents of established science assert that it should always be believed when there are controversies over issues of public importance. That assertion rests on three assumptions, none of which are usually made explicit: 1) that only science is capable of arriving at truths about the natural world and that it actually does so; 2) that “science” is identical to the views propounded by the contemporary prevailing establishment of science, its mainstream institutions; and 3) that science can be distinguished (...) unequivocally, with certainty, from everything else. None of those presumptions has been demonstrated to be correct, and indeed there are excellent historical and logical reasons to regard all of them as wrong. Since these underlying assumptions cannot be proven, self-styled “skeptics” and other activists who seek hegemony for contemporaneous scientific consensuses engage in intellectual and rhetorical misdirection to give actual uncertainty the appearance of “practical” certainty. In doing so, activists fail to acknowledge the crucial distinction between a point of view that appropriately guides scholarly discourse or scientific research and views (expert opinions or assertions or conclusions) that “everyone” should accept and that offer appropriate guidance to public policies and actions. (shrink)

Recent decades have seen a number of public disputes over scientific anomalies and unorthodoxies, typically framed as science versus pseudo-science. This Essay suggests historical and intellectual context for these controversies. The main point: There is no universally applicable, objective, impartial formula for distinguishing good science from bad science or real science from pseudo—the devil is always in the details. Anomalies and unorthodoxies are defined implicitly by the contemporary state of the art in mainstream science; “pseudo-science” is a pejorative aimed at (...) non-mainstream claims in defense of the authority of established, mainstream science. WWII was a game-changer: In its aftermath, science achieved unprecedented influence over public policies. As the stakes became high, “pseudo-science” seemed no longer a sufficiently powerful pejorative and was superseded by charges of “junk science” and “denialism.”. (shrink)

Bruce Charlton describes in trenchant tone and terms the state of contemporary modern science in what I've called its decadent third stage (Bauer 2013). Lacking citations, the book is really an extended essay, but no informed observer will doubt the comprehensive accuracy with which Charlton points to present-day careerism, bureaucracy, overspecialization, dysfunctional incentives, and snowballing dishonesty; there is too much "science" (Bauer 2014) and too much influence of self-interested forces from outside science (commerce, politics, the media), and insiders fear to (...) rock the boat even when they recognize that it needs rocking. All of that is in the starkest contrast to the popular misconception of science (Charlton's "Real Science") as a disinterested search for truth. Charlton dates the "extraordinarily rapid-yet dishonestly concealed-collapse" from that ideal Real Science (in my view accurately [Bauer 2013]), from about the middle of the 20th century, paralleling what has happened outside science (Barzun 2000). Though Charlton describes his aim as "opening eyes to the obvious, of clarifying the already-known" (p. 135), the book nevertheless illuminates causes and connections in ways that can be fresh and useful, for example in asserting inevitability: "The main problem is that when science becomes big, as it is now, the social processes of science come to control all aspects of science" (p. 116). (shrink)

After a short overview of arguments pro and contra peer reviews, examples of gross misjudgement are compiled, followed by an attempt to identify some frequent, recurrent patterns of unjustified rejection of scientific manuscripts. A few specific questions are studied in more detail: the claim for still more precise and comprehensive definitions, the right way of handling ‘‘parallel theories’’, and the frequent misuse of the term ‘‘pseudoscience’’. Finally, practical rules to improve refereeing and ‘‘basic rights of authors’’ are proposed, together with (...) a word of encouragement for future authors. Keywords: Peer reviews—cases of misjudgement—patterns of unjustified rejection—misuse of the term ‘‘pseudoscience’’—proposals to improve refereeing. (shrink)

Abominable Science by Daniel Loxton and Donald R. Prothero. Columbia University Press, 2013. xvi + 411 pp. $29.95 (hardcover). ISBN 978-0231153201. This book is superbly produced by a prominent university press. It is also intellectually shoddy, even dishonest. Science is described in naïve shibboleths that bear no relation to how science is actually done. The chapters about individual cryptids are chock-full of misrepresentation and evasion of the best evidence. Abominable Science is unsatisfactory in ways that are all too common with (...) self-styled “skeptics”: They assume authority but reveal ignorance. Their underlying agenda is scientism, the belief that whatever contemporary science says is true. They claim to speak for “science” but get much wrong about science and its history. They debunk instead of being skeptical. They do not engage honestly with the strongest evidence. They imply guilt by association (all anomalists are “flat-earthers”) and thereby lapse into irrelevance and ad hominem distortions. In addition, Abominable Science is extraordinarily replete with illogic. Loxton and Prothero purport to examine the cases of 5 cryptids: Bigfoot (Chapter 2), Yeti (Chapter 3), Nessie (Chapter 4), sea serpents (Chapter 5), Mokele Mbembe (Chapter 6). Chapter 1 is about whether cryptozoology is science or pseudo-science, and the concluding Chapter 7 asks why people believe in monsters. (shrink)

Of course psychiatry is not asserting explicitly that consciousness is just an illusion; but Gary Greenberg demonstrates that this assertion underlies implicitly what has become standard psychiatric practice: the dispensing of pills to treat purported mental illness. So the title of this book does not do justice to the depth and breadth of its contents. Still, “depression” is the book’s explicit focus throughout. History illustrates that the task of defining mental illness in general is impossible: What are the criteria for (...) distinguishing frank “illness” from “normal” eccentricity and the huge range of human behavior under different social and environmental circumstances? The sociologist David Rosenhan showed—through an undoubtedly unethical experiment—that diagnosing schizophrenia (for example) is highly fallible, and that normal behavior is not recognized as non-pathological once such a diagnosis has been rendered (pp. 41–42). The obvious inference is catastrophic for the profession: “What kind of doctor doesn’t know the difference between sickness and health?” (p. 237). Homosexuality was officially said to be a mental disorder until 1973; since then it is not. Even as the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) offers elaborately detailed guidance, psychiatrists often disagree over the diagnosis to be assigned in any given instance (e.g., pp. 234–236). Greenberg illustrates the profession’s attempts to cope with these circumstances by recounting the history of the several revisions of the DSM. (shrink)

This chapter examines the relationship between the two fields of science education and philosophy of education to inquire how philosophy could better contribute to improving science curriculum, teaching, and learning, especially science teacher education. An inspection of respective research journals exhibits an almost complete neglect of each field for the other (barring exceptions).While it can be admitted that philosophy has been an area of limited and scattered interest for science education researchers for some time, the subfield of philosophy of education (...) has been little canvassed and remains an underdeveloped area. To help bring science education closer into the fold of educational philosophy and theorizing, the historical development of science education and philosophy of education are sketched to reveal their common roots, interests, and concerns. Thereto, the contours of a new philosophy of science education are presented (as an integration of three academic fields). Arguments are provided which seek to illustrate why philosophy in general and philosophy of education in particular can make positive contributions to teacher education and the research field together with suggesting future directions and possible reform contributions (scientific literacy, educational aims, educational theory, pedagogical content knowledge, science teacher, and curricular epistemologies). (shrink)

In this essay we introduce the idea of an epistemic triangle, with factual, theoretical, and conceptual investigations at its vertices, and argue that whereas scientific progress requires a balance among the three types of investigations, psychology's epistemic triangle is stretched disproportionately in the direction of factual investigations. Expressed by a variety of different problems, this unbalance may be created by a main operative theme—the obsession of psychology with a narrow and mechanical view of the scientific method and a misguided aversion (...) to conceptual inquiries. Hence, to redress psychology's epistemic triangle, a broader and more realistic conception of method is needed and, in particular, conceptual investigations must be promoted. Using examples from different research domains, we describe the nature of conceptual investigations, relate them to theoretical investigations, and illustrate their purposes, forms, and limitations. (shrink)