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  1. Review of C. Koopman, Pragmatism as Transition. Historicity and Hope in James, Dewey, and Rorty. [REVIEW]Roberto Frega - 2009 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 1 (1).
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  • Common Sense and Pragmatism: Reid and Peirce on the Justification of First Principles.Nate Jackson - 2014 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 12 (2):163-179.
    This paper elucidates the pragmatist elements of Thomas Reid's approach to the justification of first principles by reference to Charles S. Peirce. Peirce argues that first principles are justified by their surviving a process of ‘self-criticism’, in which we come to appreciate that we cannot bring ourselves to doubt these principles, in addition to the foundational role they play in inquiries. The evidence Reid allows first principles bears resemblance to surviving the process of self-criticism. I then argue that this evidence (...)
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  • Reid's Adaptation and Radicalization of Newton's Natural Philosophy.Steffen Ducheyne - 2006 - History of European Ideas 32 (2):173-189.
    For Thomas Reid, Isaac Newton's scientific methodology in natural philosophy was a source of inspiration for philosophical methodology in general. I shall look at how Reid adapted Newton's views on methodology in natural philosophy. We shall see that Reid radicalized Newton's methodology and, thereby, begins to pave the way for the positivist movement, of which the origin is traditionally associated with the Frenchman Auguste Comte. In the Reidian adaptation of Newtonianism, we can already notice the beginnings of the anti-causal trend (...)
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  • 'Scottish Commonsense' About Memory: A Defence of Thomas Reid's Direct Knowledge Account.Andy Hamilton - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):229-245.
    Reid rejects the image theory --the representative or indirect realist position--that memory-judgements are inferred from or otherwise justified by a present image or introspectible state. He also rejects the trace theory , which regards memories as essentially traces in the brain. In contrast he argues for a direct knowledge account in which personal memory yields unmediated knowledge of the past. He asserts the reliability of memory, not in currently fashionable terms as a reliable belief-forming process, but more elusively as a (...)
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  • Re-Evaluating Reid's Response to Skepticism.Blake McAllister - 2016 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 14 (3):317-339.
    I argue that some of the most prominent interpretations of Reid's response to skepticism marginalize a crucial aspect of his thought: namely, that our common sense beliefs meet whatever normative standards of rationality the skeptic might fairly demand of them. This should be seen as supplementary to reliabilist or proper functionalist interpretations of Reid, which often ignore this half of the story. I also show how Reid defends the rationality of believing first principles by appealing to their naturalness and irresistibility. (...)
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  • On the Subtleties of Reidian Pragmatism: A Reply to Magnus.Peter Baumann - 2004 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 2 (1):73-77.
    In this paper I respond to P.D. Magnus’ critique of an earlier paper of mine on Thomas Reid’s theory of common sense. In the earlier paper (The Scottish Pragmatist? The Dilemma of Common Sense and the Pragmatist Way Out, Reid Studies 2, 1999, 47-57) I argued that Reid faces a dilemma between dogmatism and scepticism but that there are also hints in his work towards a pragmatist way out of the problem. P.D. Magnus, in a response to this paper (Reid’s (...)
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  • Reid's Dilemma and the Uses of Pragmatism.P. D. Magnus - 2004 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 2 (1):69-72.
    Peter Baumann offers the tantalizing suggestion that Thomas Reid is almost, but not quite, a pragmatist. He motivates this claim by posing a dilemma for common sense philosophy: Will it be dogmatism or scepticism? Baumann claims that Reid points to but does not embrace a pragmatist third way between these unsavory options. If we understand `pragmatism' differently than Baumann does, however, we need not be so equivocal in attributing it to Reid. Reid makes what we could call an argument from (...)
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