Re-evaluating Reid's Response to Skepticism

Journal of Scottish Philosophy 14 (3):317-339 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I argue that some of the most prominent interpretations of Reid's response to skepticism marginalize a crucial aspect of his thought: namely, that our common sense beliefs meet whatever normative standards of rationality the skeptic might fairly demand of them. This should be seen as supplementary to reliabilist or proper functionalist interpretations of Reid, which often ignore this half of the story. I also show how Reid defends the rationality of believing first principles by appealing to their naturalness and irresistibility. The resulting interpretation supplies Reid with a more satisfying and formidable response to the skeptic than interpretations currently offer.

Author's Profile

Blake McAllister
Hillsdale College

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-10-26

Downloads
719 (#28,525)

6 months
244 (#8,526)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?