The statement everyone wants to live a fulfilled and happy life may seem simple, self-evident, and even trivial at first glance. However, upon closer philosophical analysis, can we unequivocally assert that people are truly focused on well-being? Assuming they are, the question becomes: what guidelines should be followed and how should one behave in order to achieve true well-being and attain their goals? One popular viewpoint is that cultivating moral virtues and personal qualities is essential for a life of "true" (...) well-being, rather than mere pleasure. This perspective is not particularly original, as it was advocated quite clearly by Aristotle. However, we must ask: what guarantees that virtue will lead to well-being? Can we really ignore the common-sense doubt that virtue (and moral life), as Kant points out, may not be rewarded with any form of well-being or "happiness" in the broadest sense during our earthly existence? How might we address this doubt? If questions about the relationship between happiness and virtue have been asked since ancient times, why don't we have definitive answers yet? Perhaps there is something wrong with the questions themselves, as is often the case in philosophy. Views on this relationship have influenced the modification of theories that philosophers have put forth in order to provide satisfactory answers. One such theory is the renewed and modernized ethics of virtue, which places the greatest emphasis on building an individual's moral character, assuming that Aristotelian character virtues such as courage, honesty, generosity, prudence, self-control, and compassion will enable us to lead a happy and fulfilling life. "Virtues" refer to a wide range of "excellences" or activities that individuals can use to perfect themselves. For example, an ordinary person might accept that courage can make their life more fulfilling, but it's important to recognize that virtues cannot be acquired overnight. Furthermore, many people believe that virtues are innate qualities that one either possesses or lacks. In contrast, ethics of virtue provides guidance and instructions for developing virtues over extended periods of time, as well as for continuously "practicing" the development of moral characteristics that will make us better individuals. The central and most significant concept in ethics of virtue is the golden mean, which can be interpreted in various ways. Essentially, ethics of virtue offers a path to a life filled with pleasure, harmony, and virtuous action. However, this collection of essays, Virtues and Vices: Between Ethics and Epistemology, is not exclusively concerned with virtues or ethics. Knowledge, as well as the processes of belief formation and justification of those beliefs, are also essential to ethics of virtue. Going back to the systematic Greek philosopher and his teacher, we can emphasize that virtues and knowledge are inseparable. Without the epistemology of virtues, even a thematic collection like this one would be incomplete. The Epistemology of Virtue is a relatively new branch of philosophy that has emerged as a response to questions about the value-neutrality of science. For a long time, the separation of values and scientific inquiry has been viewed as the correct methodological approach. However, it is clear that every scientist is also a human being with their own virtues and flaws. It is naive to assume that a scientist can leave their values and moral qualities outside the laboratory and treat their colleagues in the team differently than they would treat other people in their everyday life. Taking this into account, we can notice that Epistemology of Virtue is a theory that examines the influence of virtues on the processes of acquiring knowledge. Epistemic virtues refer to qualities that enable individuals to acquire knowledge and make reliable judgments. These virtues include traits such as openness to diverse testimonies and arguments, critical thinking, a tendency to question one's own assumptions, and the ability to identify errors in one's own thought processes. Just like in virtue ethics, the Epistemology of Virtue raises the question of how we can cultivate the necessary virtues and how these virtues can have a positive impact on both individuals and society. The field also explores how epistemic virtues can be put into practice, such as in educational settings, scientific research, and various social activities. Finally, we turn to a topic that is often overlooked in philosophy - human flaws. While ethics typically views flaws as the opposite of virtues, requiring correction both individually and socially, the Epistemology of Virtue questions what happens when flaws occur in knowledge-related qualities. Do these flaws also need to be eliminated, or are they an inherent part of the process of acquiring knowledge and making judgments? At first glance, prejudices, stereotypes, dogmatism, conformism, closed-mindedness towards arguments and evidence, as well as uncritical acceptance of authority, can all hinder our ability to acquire knowledge. Epistemologists view these qualities as vices, rather than flaws like ethicists do. The Epistemology of Vices is the newest of the three branches of philosophy covered in this thematic collection, and it examines the ways in which false and untrue beliefs develop and persist in society. This area of study seeks to answer questions about how people form delusions and whether it is possible to overcome them. On the other hand, the Epistemology of Virtue is like the "older brother" that supervises these vices. It contributes to the investigation and overcoming of vices by developing virtues that enable individuals to more accurately assess the truthfulness of their beliefs. However, even though vices can have a destructive impact on knowledge acquisition, the question remains: are vices always detrimental in every context? Conversely, can virtues be detrimental? For example, does a virtue like solidarity sometimes hinder the efficient formation of true beliefs in time-sensitive situations such as finding a vaccine to combat a virus pandemic? Can vices be useful? Can stubbornness and uncooperativeness sometimes help a research team by allowing two sides to reach the same goal through different paths? Within this collection, some of these questions will receive answers, some of which may confirm existing impressions, while others may surprise readers. The thematic collection, Virtues and Vices: Between Ethics and Epistemology, consists of four interesting chapters and 21 papers that cover the selected topic through the prism of philosophical disciplines such as ethics, epistemology, the history of philosophy, philosophy of mind, political philosophy, and philosophy of science. In this introduction, we will not discuss the contents of the articles so as not to disrupt the intended integral approach to reading the collection. A significant feature of this collection is the continuity that extends from one paper to another, from topic to topic, and from problem to problem. Lastly, we would like to express our gratitude to the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Belgrade for their support in realizing this collection, as well as to our colleagues from the Department and Institute of Philosophy who have made this collection a relevant and significant achievement with their contributions. We are also thankful to the reviewers of the collection as a whole, as well as to the referees of individual articles, who have provided us with detailed comments and remarks that have made this collection clearer and more comprehensive. We owe a special thanks to our colleagues from Zagreb, Rijeka, and Maribor, whose exceptional papers have contributed to making this collection an unabashed international contribution to debates about the ethics and epistemology of virtues and vices. (shrink)

There has been a revived interest in the relevance of Kant's philosophy for contemporary global issues. This paper investigates the extent to which Kant's philosophy can provide grounds for addressing the global issue of climate change, despite his seemingly conservative defense of reform over revolution. First, I argue that Kant's account of societal progress as metamorphosis is compatible with the conception of a green revolution understood as restructuring society toward sustainability. Second, I claim that Kant's evolutionary model of political change (...) offers a helpful framework for thinking about how to transition present societies to more sustainable ones. I conclude with reflections on how Kant's views have applied relevance for climate-related problems. (shrink)

The Walking Dead is a popular TV series depicting a catastrophic and violent world. After a pandemic that turns humans into zombies, we witness the collapse of civilization with all its institutions, the depletion of the resources, and the struggle to build a new world in the middle of the wars between surviving groups. It illustrates a world of literal and metaphorical homo homini lupus. Some people choose sheer survival, and others try to build a moral, civil world. In this (...) article, I propose a reading of this series from a Kantian perspective by employing his interrelated ideas on history, ethics, and politics. I claim that The Walking Dead represents the state of nature and the violence it contains, and illustrates the course of history toward a civil society as defined by Kant. (shrink)

This is the final part of a series of two papers that have examined the conceptual development of the philosophical justifications for tyrannicide. While Part I focused on the classical, medieval, and liberal justifications for tyrannicide, Part II aims to provide the tentative outlines of a contemporary model of tyrannicide in world politics. It is contended that a reinvigorated conception of self-defence, when coupled with the modern understanding of universal human rights, may provide the foundation for the normative validity of (...) tyrannicide in contemporary world politics. (shrink)

In June of 1945, the International Military Tribunal (ITM) formed in London, faced the problem of a non-yet existing legal armor for the Nazi crimes. Two new rules were widely accepted there. First, a new category of war crimes, the “crimes against humanity” was legally defined. Second, the ex-ante rejection of the defense line “I was following orders” or Führerprinzip (the principle of the duty to obey every order given by the military leader). In the first part of this paper, (...) I will present in brief, the historical and legal context of the rejection of Führerprinzip as a defense line of the Nazi defendants in Nuremberg trials as also in Eichmann’s trial in Jerusalem, where the same legal context was enacted. Next, I will expose a short history of conscientious objection in war ethics and the International Law on Human Rights that supports it. This exposition reveals that objection to criminal orders has the status not only of a right, but also of a duty for the soldiers on either side of the war. In the third part, the Rawlsian view on conscientious objector will be exposed as the meeting point of a broadly Kantian conception of war ethics and the existing International Law frame. In the final part I will present some philosophical aspects of jus in bello theory, as also the critique of its importance, and its contribution to the reification of the moral importance of conscientious objection in wartime and the rejection of Führerprinzip. (shrink)

In this article, the author argues that the works of Immanuel Kant and Henry David Thoreau can help reframe current political discussions about violence and nonviolence within revolutionary movements. For both of them, the means and ends of political change must coincide. Since they seek a nonviolent state of affairs, each argues against violent political change. However, they are also concerned to articulate a relationship between armed and unarmed struggle. After all, Kant and Thoreau worked to find what was positive (...) in violent acts: the French Revolution and John Brown’s raid on Harpers Ferry, respectively. They suggest that one of the ethical acts of revolutionary nonviolence is the sympathetic spectatorship of comrades in struggle who have chosen violent means. This opens up a theory of revolutionary nonviolence as a dual injunction to remain resolutely opposed to violence, but also to be capable of finding within violent acts a deeper desire for the end of violence. (shrink)

Kant’s doctrine of aesthetic ideas, along with his brief treatment of ugliness, has been the focus of some recent literature. In this paper, I employ an original approach, which nonetheless draws from Kant’s oeuvre, to pin down the phenomenological complexity of a spectacular event that took place at the inception of the French Terror—the decapitation of Louis the XVI. To this end, the first section of the essay fleshes out an interpretative framework explicating how seeing the guillotine as an aesthetic (...) idea could serve as a means to actualise the revolutionary ideal. The second section introduces a reading of Schwärmerei and argues that this unruly genius is accountable for the creation of aesthetic idols, rendering a spurious aesthetic experience. Finally, in the last section, I argue that there is a significant distinction between Kant’s account of ugliness and loathing, and that the latter stands for neither a moral nor an aesthetic response to a morally repellent object, but rather is an extraordinary sensible response. (shrink)

The thesis of my dissertation is that Kant's theory of the social contract, which is the central concept of his political philosophy, provides, when suitably reconstructed, an adequate theoretical foundation for liberal democracy. I take liberal democracy to consist of three components: first, the rule of law; second, democratic self-rule ; and third, the recognition and institutional guarantee of the rights of individuals. ;In the dissertation, I take as my starting point Kant's conception of autonomy. For Kant, the idea of (...) the social contract explains how individual moral agents can maintain their autonomy in the context of community. The social contract resolves the conflict between moral autonomy and political authority by defining a model of civil society in which free, equal, and independent rational agents collectively legislate the public laws that are to govern their external relations, which are essentially property relations. Ideal civil society, then, is a condition of maximum equal freedom for rational agents who interact with one another. (shrink)

It is often argued that Kant’s understanding of the right to revolution is contradictory. On the one hand, he expresses enthusiasm for the French Revolution and the ideas on which it rests, while on the other, he openly denies the existence of a legal right to revolution. This paper aims to make Kant’s position plausible by showing that he does not deny the right to revolution in all states, but only in those that fulfill the purpose for which they were (...) created, which is to protect the rights and freedoms of all citizens. (shrink)

In “On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy,” Kant holds the seemingly untenable position that lying is always prohibited, even if the lie is addressed to a murderer in an attempt to save the life of an innocent man. This article argues that Kant's position on lying should be placed back in its original context, namely a response to Benjamin Constant about the responsibility of individual agents toward political principles in post-revolutionary times. I show that Constant's theory of political (...) responsibility, which sanctions the lie, is not based on expediency, but on principled realism, whereas Kant endorses a position that I describe as ‘political juridicism.’ This analysis enables us to uncover two plausible Republican theories of political responsibility in post-revolutionary times behind an apparently strictly ethical debate. (shrink)

_Explores the relationship between philosophy and politics in the work of Kant, Fichte, Hegel, and Marx._.

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

The following essay argues that Transnational Civil Disobedience may be justified when it is applied to questions relating to global climate change. Civil Disobedience as a politically motivated form of lawbreaking posits questions regarding political obligation and citizenship and such questions are amplified when applied to the transnational level.Furthermore, this essay focuses on the influential account of Civil Disobedience as it has been formulated by John Rawls. The writer argues that there are potential issues with this formulation when it is (...) applied outside of the greater scope of Rawls’s work. Instead, the essay argues for a formulation of Civil Disobedience that includes a politicizing feature, and to view it as an extra institutional form of political discourse that is detached from notions of state belonging.Finally, it is argued that the All Affected Principle may be used as a necessary condition for justifying acts of Transnational Civil Disobedience. The nature of Global Climate change as an event that affects the human race as a whole, gives rise to the potential for non-citizens to claim a level of political agency in matters that affect them despite lacking formal representation. (shrink)

This paper examines the conceptual development of the philosophical justifications for tyrannicide. It posits that the political philosophy of tyrannicide can be categorised into three distinct periods or models, the classical, medieval, and liberal, respectively. It argues that each model contained unique themes and principles that justified tyrannicide in that period; the classical, through the importance attached to public life and the functional role of leadership; the medieval, through natural law doctrine; and the liberal, through the postulates of social contract (...) theory. Subsequent analysis of these different models however, reveals that these historical models are unable to provide a sufficient philosophical basis for a contemporary justification of tyrannicide. In Part II, it will be contended that a reinvigorated conception of self-defence, a theme common to all three models, when coupled with the modern notion of universal human rights, may provide the foundation for a contemporary theory of tyrannicide. (shrink)

El presente ensayo tiene por finalidad mostrar que el rechazo de Kant a un pretendido derecho a la revolución no implica que una situación de injusticia deba ser necesariamente tolerada. En su lugar, el rechazo kantiano a un derecho a la revolución es explicado aquí por medio de la categoría de comunidad entendida como una construcción de relaciones de coexistencia recíprocas. El énfasis sobre el tipo de vínculo que implica la categoría de comunidad permite sostener que el requisito para cualquier (...) restitución de justicia legítima es que dicha acción debe considerar a todos los integrantes de la comunidad. La revolución no puede cumplir con este requisito pues siempre supone un uso unilateral de la violencia que, aunque cuente con el apoyo mayoritario de un determinado grupo social, es tan sólo un tipo de coacción parcial que no puede representar legítimamente a una comunidad. (shrink)

Based on Kant’s political thought, this article deals with the relationship between a ruler’s power and freedom, law and morality. The assumed external freedom is to be guaranteed to individuals by a valid political authority (sovereign); however, the authorities do not have to obey the law, which means that the freedom of citizens is threatened. Thus, a tension appears between the freedom of the individual and obedience to an unjust law. From an authority’s perspective, peace is more important than moral (...) development, and from a moral perspective, the rule of law is less important than ethical perfection. This leads to the question of whether revolutionary changes to the system can be justified on the basis of Kant’s assumptions, as some liberal interpretations of Kant’s thought propose. In this article, I argue that although the revolutionary moment is possible within Kant’s political philosophy, it is in a different place than most liberal authors point out and has no link to the common understanding of revolution. (shrink)

This chapter examines a foundational democratic practice by considering how it expresses concepts of the Enlightenment. The practice is that of the vote or plebiscite as it appears in governance. The leading enlightenment concept is rationality as it is expounded by Kant. Kant did not participate in national democratic processes. He expected decisions of any consequence to be made in Berlin and thrived when his City was invaded by the Russians and their officers became his students, until they left suddenly (...) in 1762 (Kuehn, 2001, p.126). Kant participated in political debate where the issues were in the main constitutional and about the processes of government reform. He became known for his theory of natural law and the justification of positive law. He advocated the separation of powers, but denied the right of revolution. This latter onclusion was in apparent contradiction of his support for republicanism, including the French, English, and American revolutions (Beck, 1971, p.413). The term “republican” in Kant’s writings is sometimes interpreted to mean “parliamentary democracy”. This is probably a mistake, and Reiss suggests Kant’s term does not carry the “connotation” of modern Western democracy (Reiss's "Introduction" in Kant, 1991a, p.25). Kant himself wrote that he wanted to prevent “the republican constitution from being confused with the democratic one, as commonly happens” (Kant, 1991a, .100). So it is that, whilst Kant wrote about the interaction of morality and politics, he did not write on the topic of the present chapter which focuses on those mechanisms or mechanics that democracy displays when it works. (shrink)

It is generally acknowledged that Kant's political philosophy stands on a par with the great works of the Western liberal tradition. It is also a matter of agreement that the rational principles on which it rests represent an adequate philosophical expression of the progressive agenda that was inaugurated by the Enlightenment and fulfilled, with varying degrees of success, by the French Revolution. Yet Kant's philosophical position is ambiguous when it comes to evaluating that momentous event in modern history. We know, (...) from anecdotal evidence, some surviving letters, several cryptic references in his published works, as well as a number of posthumously published reflections, that Kant was enthusiastic about and strongly approved of the changes that were taking place in France at the time. He certainly condemned, in strong and unequivocal terms, the execution of Louis XVI. But this did not translate into a repudiation of his support for the revolution. And he seems to have found even in this case mitigating circumstances that explained the revolutionaries' decision to execute the monarch, thus in fact excusing their action. Moreover, he argued that all post-revolutionary governments ought to command the same kind of loyalty from their subjects as the ones they replaced, which appears to justify Kant's contention in the Idea for a Universal History that political violence can be a vehicle of progress. Furthermore, in the Contest of Faculties Kant went so far as to identify in the enthusiastic response of the ‘spectators’ to the French Revolution a clear sign of the moral disposition of humankind. (shrink)