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  1. Knowability and bivalence: intuitionistic solutions to the Paradox of Knowability.Julien Murzi - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (2):269-281.
    In this paper, I focus on some intuitionistic solutions to the Paradox of Knowability. I first consider the relatively little discussed idea that, on an intuitionistic interpretation of the conditional, there is no paradox to start with. I show that this proposal only works if proofs are thought of as tokens, and suggest that anti-realists themselves have good reasons for thinking of proofs as types. In then turn to more standard intuitionistic treatments, as proposed by Timothy Williamson and, most recently, (...)
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  • The Bishop’s Church: Berkeley’s Master Argument and the Paradox of Knowability.Stephen Kearns - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (3):175-190.
    We can find in the passages that set out the Master Argument a precursor to the paradox of knowability. That paradox shows that if all truths are knowable, all truths are known. Similarly, Berkeley might be read as proposing that if all sensible objects are (distinctly) conceivable, then all sensible objects are conceived.
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  • Intuitionistic epistemic logic.Sergei Artemov & Tudor Protopopescu - 2016 - Review of Symbolic Logic 9 (2):266-298.
    We outline an intuitionistic view of knowledge which maintains the original Brouwer–Heyting–Kolmogorov semantics for intuitionism and is consistent with the well-known approach that intuitionistic knowledge be regarded as the result of verification. We argue that on this view coreflectionA→KAis valid and the factivity of knowledge holds in the formKA→ ¬¬A‘known propositions cannot be false’.We show that the traditional form of factivityKA→Ais a distinctly classical principle which, liketertium non datur A∨ ¬A, does not hold intuitionistically, but, along with the whole of (...)
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  • Possible knowledge of unknown truth.Dorothy Edgington - 2010 - Synthese 173 (1):41 - 52.
    Fitch’s argument purports to show that for any unknown truth, p , there is an unknowable truth, namely, that p is true and unknown; for a contradiction follows from the assumption that it is possible to know that p is true and unknown. In earlier work I argued that there is a sense in which it is possible to know that p is true and unknown, from a counterfactual perspective; that is, there can be possible, non-actual knowledge, of the actual (...)
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  • Diamonds are a philosopher's best friends.Heinrich Wansing - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (6):591-612.
    The knowability paradox is an instance of a remarkable reasoning pattern (actually, a pair of such patterns), in the course of which an occurrence of the possibility operator, the diamond, disappears. In the present paper, it is pointed out how the unwanted disappearance of the diamond may be escaped. The emphasis is not laid on a discussion of the contentious premise of the knowability paradox, namely that all truths are possibly known, but on how from this assumption the conclusion is (...)
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  • Analogues of knowability.David DeVide & Tim Kenyon - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):481 – 495.
    An interesting recent reply to the Paradox of Knowability is Neil Tennant's proposal: to restrict the anti-realist's knowability thesis to truths the knowing of which is logically consistent. However, this proposal is egregiously ad hoc unless motivated by something other than the wish to save anti-realism from embarrassment. We examine Tennant's argument that his restriction is motivated by parallel considerations in cases that are neutral with respect to debates about realism. We conclude that the cases are not neutral, nor the (...)
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  • Actual truth, possible knowledge.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Krister Segerberg - 1994 - Topoi 13 (2):101-115.
    The well-known argument of Frederick Fitch, purporting to show that verificationism (= Truth implies knowability) entails the absurd conclusion that all the truths are known, has been disarmed by Dorothy Edgington''s suggestion that the proper formulation of verificationism presupposes that we make use of anactuality operator along with the standardly invoked epistemic and modal operators. According to her interpretation of verificationism, the actual truth of a proposition implies that it could be known in some possible situation that the proposition holds (...)
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  • What can we learn from the paradox of knowability?Cesare Cozzo - 1994 - Topoi 13 (2):71--78.
    The intuitionistic conception of truth defended by Dummett, Martin Löf and Prawitz, according to which the notion of proof is conceptually prior1 to the notion of truth, is a particular version of the epistemic conception of truth. The paradox of knowability (first published by Frederic Fitch in 1963) has been described by many authors2 as an argument which threatens the epistemic, and the intuitionistic, conception of truth. In order to establish whether this is really so, one has to understand what (...)
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  • From the Knowability Paradox to the existence of proofs.W. Dean & H. Kurokawa - 2010 - Synthese 176 (2):177 - 225.
    The Knowability Paradox purports to show that the controversial but not patently absurd hypothesis that all truths are knowable entails the implausible conclusion that all truths are known. The notoriety of this argument owes to the negative light it appears to cast on the view that there can be no verification-transcendent truths. We argue that it is overly simplistic to formalize the views of contemporary verificationists like Dummett, Prawitz or Martin-Löf using the sort of propositional modal operators which are employed (...)
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  • The mathematical philosophy of Charles Parsons. [REVIEW]J. M. B. Moss - 1985 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (4):437-457.
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  • A Church–Fitch proof for the universality of causation.Christopher Gregory Weaver - 2013 - Synthese 190 (14):2749-2772.
    In an attempt to improve upon Alexander Pruss’s work (The principle of sufficient reason: A reassessment, pp. 240–248, 2006), I (Weaver, Synthese 184(3):299–317, 2012) have argued that if all purely contingent events could be caused and something like a Lewisian analysis of causation is true (per, Lewis’s, Causation as influence, reprinted in: Collins, Hall and paul. Causation and counterfactuals, 2004), then all purely contingent events have causes. I dubbed the derivation of the universality of causation the “Lewisian argument”. The Lewisian (...)
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  • Verificationists Versus Realists: The Battle Over Knowability.Peter Marton - 2006 - Synthese 151 (1):81-98.
    Verificationism is the doctrine stating that all truths are knowable. Fitch’s knowability paradox, however, demonstrates that the verificationist claim (all truths are knowable) leads to “epistemic collapse”, i.e., everything which is true is (actually) known. The aim of this article is to investigate whether or not verificationism can be saved from the effects of Fitch’s paradox. First, I will examine different strategies used to resolve Fitch’s paradox, such as Edgington’s and Kvanvig’s modal strategy, Dummett’s and Tennant’s restriction strategy, Beall’s paraconsistent (...)
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  • Superassertibility and the Equivalence Schema: A Dilemma for Wright’s Antirealist.Deborah C. Smith - 2007 - Synthese 157 (1):129-139.
    In _Truth and Objectivity_, Crispin Wright argues that the notion of superassertibility affords the antirealist (with respect to a given range of discourse) a viable alternative to the realist’s more robust notion of truth. Toward this end, he endeavors to prove that a superassertibility predicate can satisfy the traditional equivalence schema: it is true that P iff P. (Wright takes satisfaction of this schema to be a criterion of adequacy for any viable truth predicate.) In this paper, I will argue (...)
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