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  1. The Evolution of Cooperative Strategies for Asymmetric Social Interactions.Jörg Rieskamp & Peter M. Todd - 2006 - Theory and Decision 60 (1):69-111.
    How can cooperation be achieved between self-interested individuals in commonly-occurring asymmetric interactions where agents have different positions? Should agents use the same strategies that are appropriate for symmetric social situations? We explore these questions through the asymmetric interaction captured in the indefinitely repeated investment game (IG). In every period of this game, the first player decides how much of an endowment he wants to invest, then this amount is tripled and passed to the second player, who finally decides how much (...)
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  • Third party sanctions in games with communication.Jan Obłój & Katarzyna Abramczuk - 2017 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 50 (1):109-138.
    This paper discusses the relation between communication and preservation of social norms guarded by third-party sanctions. In 2001 Jonathan Bendor and Piotr Swistak derived deductively the existence of such norms from a simple boundedly rational choice model. Their analysis was based on a perfect public information case. We take into account communication and analyse at the micro level the process of production and interpretation of information on which decisions are based. We show that when information is fully private and we (...)
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  • Common Interest and Signaling Games: A Dynamic Analysis.Manolo Martínez & Peter Godfrey-Smith - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (3):371-392.
    We present a dynamic model of the evolution of communication in a Lewis signaling game while systematically varying the degree of common interest between sender and receiver. We show that the level of common interest between sender and receiver is strongly predictive of the amount of information transferred between them. We also discuss a set of rare but interesting cases in which common interest is almost entirely absent, yet substantial information transfer persists in a *cheap talk* regime, and offer a (...)
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