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  1. The Evolution of Cooperation.Robert M. Axelrod - 1984 - Basic Books.
    The 'Evolution of Cooperation' addresses a simple yet age-old question; If living things evolve through competition, how can cooperation ever emerge? Despite the abundant evidence of cooperation all around us, there existed no purely naturalistic answer to this question until 1979, when Robert Axelrod famously ran a computer tournament featuring a standard game-theory exercise called The Prisoner's Dilemma. To everyone's surprise, the program that won the tournament, named Tit for Tat, was not only the simplest but the most "cooperative" entrant. (...)
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  • Passions Within Reason: The Strategic Role of Emotions.Robert H. Frank - 1988 - Norton.
    In this book, I make use of an idea from economics to suggest how noble human tendencies might not only have survived the ruthless pressures of the material world, but actually have been nurtured by them.
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  • Spatialization and Greater Generosity in the Stochastic Prisoner's Dilemma.Patrick Grim - 1996 - Biosystems 37:3-17.
    The iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma has become the standard model for the evolution of cooperative behavior within a community of egoistic agents, frequently cited for implications in both sociology and biology. Due primarily to the work of Axelrod (1980a, 198Ob, 1984, 1985), a strategy of tit for tat (TFT) has established a reputation as being particularly robust. Nowak and Sigmund (1992) have shown, however, that in a world of stochastic error or imperfect communication, it is not TFT that finally triumphs in (...)
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  • The Greater Generosity of the Spatialized Prisoner's Dilemma.Patrick Grim - 1995 - Journal of Theoretical Biology 173:353-359.
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  • Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria.Eric van Damme - 1987 - Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
    This book discusses the main shortcomings of the classical solution concept from noncooperative game theory and provides a comprehensive study of the more refined concepts that have been introduced to overcome these drawbacks. The plausibility of the assumptions underlying each such concept are discussed, desirable properties as well as deficiencies are illustrated, characterizations are derived and the relationships between the various concepts are studied. The first six chapters provide an informal discussion with many examples as well as a comprehensive overview (...)
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  • The Selfish Gene. [REVIEW]Gunther S. Stent & Richard Dawkins - 1977 - Hastings Center Report 7 (6):33.
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  • Rationality and Coordination.Cristina Bicchieri - 1996 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (4):627-629.
    This book explores how individual actions coordinate to produce unintended social consequences. In the past this phenomenon has been explained as the outcome of rational, self-interested individual behaviour. Professor Bicchieri shows that this is in no way a satisfying explanation. She discusses how much knowledge is needed by agents in order to coordinate successfully. If the answer is unbounded knowledge, then a whole variety of paradoxes arise. If the answer is very little knowledge, then there seems hardly any possibility of (...)
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  • Gaps in Harley's argument on evolutionarily stable learning rules and in the logic of “tit for tat”.Reinhard Selten & Peter Hammerstein - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (1):115.
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  • Norms of cooperation.Cristina Bicchieri - 1990 - Ethics 100 (4):838-861.
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