Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Presentism and the Specious Present: From Temporal Experience to Meta‐Metaphysics.Olla Solomyak - 2019 - Dialectica 73 (1-2):247-266.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Presentism and Temporal Experience.Akiko Frischhut - 2017 - In Ian B. Phillips (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Temporal Experience. Routledge.
    Abstract- Presentism And Temporal Experience Intuitively, we all believe that we experience change and the passage of time. Presentism prides itself as the most intuitive theory of time. However, a closer look at how we would experience temporality if presentism was true reveals that this is far from obvious. For if presentism was really so intuitive, then it would do justice to these intuitions. In the course of this article I examine how presentism fares when combined with various leading theories (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Structure of Audio–Visual Consciousness.Błażej Skrzypulec - forthcoming - Synthese:1-27.
    It is commonly believed that human perceptual experiences can be, and usually are, multimodal. What is more, a stronger thesis is often proposed that some perceptual multimodal characters cannot be described simply as a conjunction of unimodal phenomenal elements. If it is the case, then a question arises: what is the additional mode of combination that is required to adequately describe the phenomenal structure of multimodal experiences? The paper investigates what types of audio–visual experiences have phenomenal character that cannot be (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • I Am a Lot of Things: A Pluralistic Account of the Self.Jiri Benovsky - 2014 - Metaphysica 15 (1).
    When I say that I am a lot of things, I mean it literally and metaphysically speaking. The Self, or so I shall argue, is a plurality (notwithstanding the fact that ordinary language takes "the Self" to be a singular term – but, after all, language is only language). It is not a substance or a substratum, and it is not a collection or a bundle. The view I wish to advocate for is a kind of reductionism, in line with (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations