Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time.Theodore Sider - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
    Four- Dimensionalism defends the thesis that the material world is composed of temporal as well as spatial parts. This defense includes a novel account of persistence over time, new arguments in favour of the four-dimensional ontology, and responses to the challenges four- dimensionalism faces." "Theodore Sider pays particular attention to the philosophy of time, including a strong series of arguments against presentism, the thesis that only the present is real. Arguments offered in favour of four- dimensionalism include novel arguments based (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   443 citations  
  • Scientific Thought.C. D. Broad - 1923 - Routledge and Kegan Paul.
    First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   93 citations  
  • Endurance and Indiscernibility.Trenton Merricks - 1994 - Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):165-184.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   64 citations  
  • Persistence, Parts, and Presentism.Trenton Merricks - 1999 - Noûs 33 (3):421-438.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   62 citations  
  • Critique of Pure Reason.I. KANT - 1787/1998 - Philosophy 59 (230):555-557.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   862 citations  
  • The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness.Edmund Husserl & Martin Heidegger - 1964 - University Microfilms International.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   73 citations  
  • Critique of Pure Reason.Immanuel Kant - 1991 - In Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe, Richard McCarty, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya (eds.), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Blackwell. pp. 449-451.
    One of the cornerstone books of Western philosophy, Critique of Pure Reason is Kant's seminal treatise, where he seeks to define the nature of reason itself and builds his own unique system of philosophical thought with an approach known as transcendental idealism. He argues that human knowledge is limited by the capacity for perception and attempts a logical designation of two varieties of knowledge: a posteriori, the knowledge acquired through experience; and a priori, knowledge not derived through experience. This accurate (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   701 citations  
  • Naming the Stages.Achille C. Varzi - 2003 - Dialectica 57 (4):387–412.
    Standard lore has it that a proper name is a temporally rigid designator. It picks out the same entity at every time at which it picks out an entity at all. If the entity in question is an enduring continuant then we know what this means, though we are also stuck with a host of metaphysical puzzles concerning endurance itself. If the entity in question is a perdurant then the rigidity claim is trivial, though one is left wondering how it (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • On the Incompatibility of Enduring and Perduring Entities.Trenton Merricks - 1995 - Mind 104 (415):521-531.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   52 citations  
  • The Principles of Psychology.William James - 1890 - Dover Publications.
    This first volume contains discussions of the brain, methods for analyzing behavior, thought, consciousness, attention, association, time, and memory.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   942 citations  
  • Temporal Experience.L. A. Paul - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (7):333-359.
    The question I want to explore is whether experience supports an antireductionist ontology of time, that is, whether we should take it to support an ontology that includes a primitive, monadic property of nowness responsible for the special feel of events in the present, and a relation of passage that events instantiate in virtue of literally passing from the future, to the present, and then into the past.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   68 citations  
  • Edmund Husserl, The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness. [REVIEW]C. W. K. Mundle - 1966 - Philosophical Quarterly 16 (63):185.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  • Time and Tense in Perceptual Experience.Christoph Hoerl - 2009 - Philosophers' Imprint 9:1-18.
    We can not just see, hear or feel how things are at a time, but we also have perceptual experiences as of things moving or changing. I argue that such temporal experiences have a content that is tenseless, i.e. best characterized in terms of notions such as 'before' and 'after' (rather than, say, 'past', 'present' and 'future'), and that such experiences are essentially of the nature of a process that takes up time, viz., the same time as the process that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • Metaphysics: The Big Questions.Peter van Inwagen & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.) - 1991 - Wiley-Blackwell.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  • The Principles of Psychology.William James - 1890 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 11 (3):506-507.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   777 citations  
  • Temporal Consciousness.Barry Dainton - unknown
    In ordinary conscious experience, consciousness of time seems to be ubiquitous. For example, we seem to be directly aware of change, movement, and succession across brief temporal intervals. How is this possible? Many different models of temporal consciousness have been proposed. Some philosophers have argued that consciousness is confined to a momentary interval and that we are not in fact directly aware of change. Others have argued that although consciousness itself is momentary, we are nevertheless conscious of change. Still others (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  • The Puzzle of Temporal Experience.Sean D. Kelly - 2005 - In Andrew Brook (ed.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 208--238.
    There you are at the opera house. The soprano has just hit her high note – a glassshattering high C that fills the hall – and she holds it. She holds it. She holds it. She holds it. She holds it. She holds the note for such a long time that after a while a funny thing happens: you no longer seem only to hear it, the note as it is currently sounding, that glass-shattering high C that is loud and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  • Time in Experience: Reply to Gallagher.Barry F. Dainton - 2003 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 9.
    Consciousness exists in time, but time is also to be found within consciousness: we are directly aware of both persistence and change, at least over short intervals. On reflection this can seem baffling. How is it possible for us to be immediately aware of phenomena which are not (strictly speaking) present? What must consciousness be like for this to be possible? In "Stream of Consciousness" I argued that influential accounts of phenomenal temporality along the lines developed by Broad and Husserl (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Sensing Change.Barry Dainton - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):362-384.
    We can anticipate what is yet to happen, remember what has already happened, but our immediate experience is confined to the present, the here and now. So much seems common sense. So much so that it is no surprise to see Thomas Reid, that pre-eminent champion of common sense in philosophy, advocating precisely this position.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • Indiscriminability and Experience of Change.Ian Phillips - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (245):808 - 827.
    It is obvious both that some changes are too small for us to perceive and that we can perceive constant motion. Yet according to Fara, these two facts are in conflict, and one must be rejected. I show that conflict arises only from accepting a `zoëtrope conception' of change experience, according to which change experience is analysed in terms of a series of very short-lived sensory atoms, each lacking in dynamic content. On pain of denying the phenomenologically obvious, we must (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • The Case for Idealism.John A. Foster - 1982 - Routledge.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   42 citations