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  1. There is No Logical Negation: True, False, Both, and Neither.Jc Beall - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Logic 14 (1).
    In this paper I advance and defend a very simple position according to which logic is subclassical but is weaker than the leading subclassical-logic views have it.
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  • On Material Exclusion and Absolute Contradiction.Jonas Rafael Becker Arenhart - 2019 - Axiomathes 29 (4):413-425.
    Francesco Berto has argued that a primitive concept of material exclusion could be employed to formulate a notion of absolute contradiction that not even dialetheists could accept. The machinery of material exclusion and absolute contradiction could then be employed as a common ground by both dialetheists as well as their opponents in debates about negation and truth. In this paper, we first put the idea on a clear basis, and then present some criticism to it. We shall argue that the (...)
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  • Classicality Lost: K3 and LP After the Fall.Matthias Jenny - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (4).
    It is commonly held that the ascription of truth to a sentence is intersubstitutable with that very sentence. However, the simplest subclassical logics available to proponents of this view, namely K3 and LP, are hopelessly weak for many purposes. In this paper, I argue that this is much more of a problem for proponents of LP than for proponents of K3. The strategies for recapturing classicality offered by proponents of LP are far less promising than those available to proponents of (...)
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  • DLEAC: A Dialetheic Logic with Exclusive Assumptions and Conclusions.Massimiliano Carrara & Enrico Martino - 2019 - Topoi 38 (2):379-388.
    This paper proposes a new dialetheic logic, a Dialetheic Logic with Exclusive Assumptions and Conclusions ), including classical logic as a particular case. In \, exclusivity is expressed via the speech acts of assuming and concluding. In the paper we adopt the semantics of the logic of paradox extended with a generalized notion of model and we modify its proof theory by refining the notions of assumption and conclusion. The paper starts with an explanation of the adopted philosophical perspective, then (...)
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  • Negation on the Australian Plan.Franz Berto & Greg Restall - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 1:1-26.
    We present and defend the Australian Plan semantics for negation. This is a comprehensive account, suitable for a variety of different logics. It is based on two ideas. The first is that negation is an exclusion-expressing device: we utter negations to express incompatibilities. The second is that, because incompatibility is modal, negation is a modal operator as well. It can, then, be modelled as a quantifier over points in frames, restricted by accessibility relations representing compatibilities and incompatibilities between such points. (...)
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  • Against a Metaphysical Understanding of Rejection.Mariela Rubin & Ariel Roffé - 2018 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 22 (1):189-202.
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  • Foreword: Consistency, Contradiction, and Consequence.Abílio Rodrigues & Federico Matías Pailos - 2018 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 22 (1):01-05.
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  • A Modality Called ‘Negation’.Francesco Berto - 2015 - Mind 124 (495):761-793.
    I propose a comprehensive account of negation as a modal operator, vindicating a moderate logical pluralism. Negation is taken as a quantifier on worlds, restricted by an accessibility relation encoding the basic concept of compatibility. This latter captures the core meaning of the operator. While some candidate negations are then ruled out as violating plausible constraints on compatibility, different specifications of the notion of world support different logical conducts for negations. The approach unifies in a philosophically motivated picture the following (...)
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  • Classical Negation Strikes Back: Why Priest’s Attack on Classical Negation Can’T Succeed.Jonas R. Becker Arenhart & Ederson Safra Melo - 2017 - Logica Universalis 11 (4):465-487.
    Dialetheism is the view that some true sentences have a true negation as well. Defending dialetheism, Graham Priest argues that the correct account of negation should allow for true contradictions and \) without entailing triviality. A negation doing precisely that is said to have ‘surplus content’. Now, to defend that the correct account of negation does have surplus content, Priest advances arguments to hold that classical Boolean negation does not even make sense without begging the question against the dialetheist. We (...)
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  • Classicality Lost: K3 and LP After the Fall.Matthias Jenny - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):43-53.
    It is commonly held that the ascription of truth to a sentence is intersubstitutable with that very sentence. However, the simplest subclassical logics available to proponents of this view, namely K3 and LP, are hopelessly weak for many purposes. In this article, I argue that this is much more of a problem for proponents of LP than for proponents of K3. The strategies for recapturing classicality offered by proponents of LP are far less promising than those available to proponents of (...)
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  • Shrieking, Just False and Exclusion.Gareth Young - 2015 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (4):269-276.
    In a recent paper, Jc Beall has employed what he calls ‘shriek rules’ in a putative solution to the long-standing ‘just false’ problem for glut theory. The purpose of this paper is twofold: firstly, I distinguish the ‘just false’ problem from another problem, with which it is often conflated, which I will call the ‘exclusion problem’. Secondly, I argue that shriek rules do not help glut theorists with either problem.
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