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Davidsons's Objections to Quine's Empiricism

In P. Pagin P. Kotatko (ed.), Interpreting Davidson. CSLI Publications (2001)

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  1. Sobre a possibilidade de pensarmos o mundo: o debate entre John McDowell e Donald Davidson.Marco Aurelio Sousa Alves - 2008 - Dissertation, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais
    The thesis evaluates a contemporary debate concerning the very possibility of thinking about the world. In the first chapter, McDowell's critique of Davidson is presented, focusing on the coherentism defended by the latter. The critique of the myth of the given (as it appears in Sellars and Wittgenstein), as well as the necessity of a minimal empiricism (which McDowell finds in Quine and Kant), lead to an oscillation in contemporary thinking between two equally unsatisfactory ways of understanding the empirical content (...)
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  • The Davidson–Quine Dispute on Meaning and Knowledge: A Concise Guide.Tomáš Marvan - 2007 - Teorie Vědy / Theory of Science 29 (1):113-128.
    The paper adresses the debate between Donald Davidson and W. V. O. Quine on the nature of meanings and knowledge. It is argued that Davidson’s misgivings, though interesting, are not devastating for Quine’s version of empiricism, which is not easily translateble into traditional philosophical categories.
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  • Quine’s Naturalized Epistemology and the Third Dogma of Empiricism.Robert Sinclair - 2007 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (3):455-472.
    This essay reconsiders Davidson’s critical attribution of the scheme–content distinction to Quine’s naturalized epistemology. It focuses on Davidson’s complaint that the presence of this distinction leads Quine to mistakenly construe neural input as evidence. While committed to this distinction, Quine’s epistemology does not attempt to locate a justificatory foundation in sensory experience and does not then equate neural intake with evidence. Quine’s central epistemological task is an explanatory one that attempts to scientifically clarify the route from stimulus to science. Davidson’s (...)
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  • Quine's Relativism.Lars Bergström - 2006 - Theoria 72 (4):286-298.
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