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Mind and Common Sense: Philosophical Essays on Common Sense Psychology

New York: Cambridge University Press (1991)

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  1. Special access lies down with theory-theory.Sydney Shoemaker - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):78-79.
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  • On leaving your children wrapped in thought.James Russell - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):76-77.
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  • Why presume analyses are on-line?Georges Rey - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):74-75.
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  • Representational development and theory-of-mind computations.David C. Plaut & Annette Karmiloff-Smith - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):70-71.
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  • Heuristics and counterfactual self-knowledge.Adam Morton - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):63-64.
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  • Mismatching categories?William Edward Morris & Robert C. Richardson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):62-63.
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  • The fallibility of first-person knowledge of intentionality.Peter Ludlow & Norah Martin - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):60-60.
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  • Functionalism can explain self-ascription.Brian Loar - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):58-60.
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  • Self-attributions help constitute mental types.Bernard W. Kobes - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):54-56.
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  • Even a theory-theory needs information processing: ToMM, an alternative theory-theory of the child's theory of mind.Alan M. Leslie, Tim P. German & Francesca G. Happé - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):56-57.
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  • Analytic functionalism without representational functionalism.Terence Horgan - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):51-51.
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  • First-person current.Paul L. Harris - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):48-49.
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  • Qualitative characteristics, type materialism and the circularity of analytic functionalism.Christopher S. Hill - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):50-51.
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  • Competing accounts of belief-task performance.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):43-44.
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  • There's more to mental states than meets the inner “l”.Kimberly Wright Cassidy - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):34-35.
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  • How we know our minds: The illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):1-14.
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  • Functionalism, the theory-theory and phenomenology.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):101-108.
    The ordinary understanding and ascription of mental states is a multiply complex subject. Widely discussed approaches to the subject, such as functionalism and the theory-theory (TT), have many variations and interpretations. No surprise, then, that there are misunderstandings and disagreements, which place many items on the agenda. Unfortunately, the multiplicity of issues raised by the commentators and the limitations of space make it impossible to give a full reply to everyone. My response is divided into five topics: (1) Which version(s) (...)
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  • Three questions for Goldman.Andrew Woodfield - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):86-87.
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  • The psychologist's fallacy.Philip David Zelazo & Douglas Frye - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):89-90.
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  • Why Alison Gopnik should be a behaviorist.Nicholas S. Thompson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):83-84.
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  • Where's the person?Michael Tomasello - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):84-85.
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  • The developmental history of an illusion.Keith E. Stanovich - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):80-81.
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  • Categories, categorisation and development: Introspective knowledge is no threat to functionalism.Kim Sterelny - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):81-83.
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  • Reporting on Past Psychological States: Beliefs, Desires, and Intentions.Alfred Mele - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):61.
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  • Eliminative materialism.William Ramsey - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Eliminative materialism (or eliminativism) is the radical claim that our ordinary, common-sense understanding of the mind is deeply wrong and that some or all of the mental states posited by common-sense do not actually exist. Descartes famously challenged much of what we take for granted, but he insisted that, for the most part, we can be confident about the content of our own minds. Eliminative materialists go further than Descartes on this point, since they challenge of the existence of various (...)
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  • Intentionality, mind and folk psychology.Winand H. Dittrich & Stephen E. G. Lea - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):39-41.
    The comment addresses central issues of a "theory theory" approach as exemplified in Gopnik' and Goldman's BBS-articles. Gopnik, on the one hand, tries to demonstrate that empirical evidence from developmental psychology supports the view of a "theory theory" in which common sense beliefs are constructed to explain ourselves and others. Focusing the informational processing routes possibly involved we would like to argue that his main thesis (e.g. idea of intentionality as a cognitive construct) lacks support at least for two reasons: (...)
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  • The psychology of folk psychology.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):15-28.
    The central mission of cognitive science is to reveal the real nature of the mind, however familiar or foreign that nature may be to naive preconceptions. The existence of naive conceptions is also important, however. Prescientific thought and language contain concepts of the mental, and these concepts deserve attention from cognitive science. Just as scientific psychology studies folk physics (McCloskey 1983, Hayes 1985), viz., the common understanding (or misunderstanding) of physical phenomena, so it must study folk psychology, the common understanding (...)
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  • The architectural nonchalance of commonsense psychology.Radu J. Bogdan - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (2):189-205.
    Eliminativism assumes that commonsense psychology describes and explains the mind in terms of the internal design and operation of the mind. If this assumption is invalidated, so is eliminativism. The same conditional is true of intentional realism. Elsewhere (Bogdan 1991) I have argued against this 'folk- theory-theory' assumption by showing that commonsense psychology is not an empirical prototheory of the mind but a biosocially motivated practice of coding, utilizing, and sharing information from and about conspecifics. Here, without presupposing a specific (...)
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  • Qualities and relations in folk theories of mind.Lance J. Rips - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):75-76.
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  • Theories of mind: Some methodological/conceptual problems and an alternative approach.Sam S. Rakover - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):73-74.
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  • Theory-theory theory.Howard Rachlin - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):72-73.
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  • Matching and mental-state ascription.Ian Pratt - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):71-72.
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  • Limitations on first-person experience: Implications of the “extent”.Bradford H. Pillow - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):69-69.
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  • First-person authority and beliefs as representations.Paul M. Pietroski - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):67-69.
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  • A plea for the second functionalist model and the insufficiency of simulation.Josef Perner - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):66-67.
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  • The role of concepts in perception and inference.David R. Olson & Janet Wilde Astington - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):65-66.
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  • Developmental evidence and introspection.Shaun Nichols - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):64-65.
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  • Knowledge of the psychological states of self and others is not only theory-laden but also data-driven.Chris Moore & John Barresi - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):61-62.
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  • Three inferential temptations.Alexander Levine & Georg Schwarz - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):57-58.
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  • Qualia for propositional attitudes?Frank Jackson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):52-52.
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  • Unraveling introspection.John Heil - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):49-50.
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  • Goldman has not defeated folk functionalism.James H. Fetzer - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):42-43.
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  • The naked truth about first-person knowledge.Michael Chandler & Jeremy Carpendale - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):36-37.
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  • Knowing levels and the child's understanding of mind.Robert L. Campbell & Mark H. Bickhard - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):33-34.
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  • The concept of intentionality: Invented or innate?Simon Baron-Cohen - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):29-30.
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  • Causes are perceived and introspected.D. M. Armstrong - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):29-29.
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  • Intentionality, theoreticity and innateness.Deborah Zaitchik & Jerry Samet - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):87-89.
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  • Common sense, functional theories and knowledge of the mind.Max Velmans - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):85-86.
    A commentary on a target article by Alison Gopnik (1993) How we know our minds: the illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality. Focusing on evidence of how children acquire a theory of mind, this commentary argues that there are internal inconsistencies in theories that both argue for the functional role of conscious experiences and the irreducibility of those experiences to third-person viewable information processing.
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  • Self-ascription without qualia: A case study.David J. Chalmers - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):35-36.
    In Section 5 of his interesting article, Goldman suggests that the consideration of imaginary cases can be valuable in the analysis of our psychological concepts. In particular, he argues that we can imagine a system that is isomorphic to us under any functional description, but which lacks qualitative mental states, such as pains and color sensations. Whether or not such a being is empirically possible, it certainly seems to be logically possible, or conceptually coherent. Goldman argues from this possibility to (...)
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  • Disenshrining the Cartesian self.Barbara A. C. Saunders - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):77-78.
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