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  1. Pretending and Disbelieving.Andrea Sauchelli - 2024 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 67 (6):1991-2004.
    I formulate and criticise a condition that captures some recent ideas on the nature of pretence, namely, the disbelief condition. According to an initial understanding of this condition, an agent who is pretending that P must also disbelieve that P. I criticise this idea by proposing a counterexample showing that an agent may be in a state of pretence that does not imply disbelief in what is pretended. I also draw some general conclusions about the nature of pretence.
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  • Prospecting performance: rehearsal and the nature of imagination.Shaun Gallagher & Zuzanna Rucińska - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):4523-4541.
    In this paper we explore the notion of rehearsal as a way to develop an embodied and enactive account of imagining. After reviewing the neuroscience of motor imagery, we argue, in the context of performance studies, that rehearsal includes forms of imagining that involve motor processes. We draw on Sartre’s phenomenology of imagining which also suggests that imagining involves motor processes. This research in neuroscience and phenomenology, supports the idea of an embodied and enactive account of imagination.
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  • Inside loops: Developmental premises of self-ascriptions.Radu J. Bogdan - 2007 - Synthese 159 (2):235-252.
    Self-ascriptions of thoughts and attitudes depend on a sense of the intentionality of one’s own mental states, which develops later than, and independently of, the sense of the intentionality of the thoughts and attitudes of others. This sense of the self-intentionality of one’s own mental states grows initially out of executive developments that enable one to simulate one’s own actions and perceptions, as genuine off-line thoughts, and to regulate such simulations.
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  • Pretend play: More imitative than imaginative.Heather V. Adair & Peter Carruthers - 2023 - Mind and Language 38 (2):464-479.
    Pretense is generally thought to constitutively involve imagination. We argue that this is a mistake. Although pretense often involves imagination, it need not; nor is it a kind of imagination. The core nature of pretense is closer to imitation than it is to imagination, and likely shares some of its motivation with the former. Three main strands of argument are presented. One is from the best explanation of cross‐cultural data. Another is from task‐analysis of instances of pretend play. And the (...)
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  • Praxeological Enactivism vs. Radical Enactivism: Reply to Hutto.Martin Weichold & Zuzanna Rucińska - 2022 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (5):1177-1182.
    In his recent paper “Getting Real About Pretense: A Radical Enactivist Proposal”, Daniel Hutto raises several objections against our so-called praxeological enactivist account of pretense (Weichold & Rucińska 2022). He argues that one should, instead, adopt his radical enactivist explanation of pretend play. In this short reply, we defend our praxeological enactivist account against his objections, and argue that it has crucial advantages over his radical enactivist alternative.
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  • (1 other version)Pretense as alternative sense-making: a praxeological enactivist account.Martin Weichold & Zuzanna Rucińska - 2022 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (5):1131-1156.
    The project of this paper is to synthesize enactivist cognitive science and practice theory in order to develop a new account of pretend play. Pretend play is usually conceived of as a representationalist phenomenon where a pretender projects a fictional mental representation onto reality. It thus seems that pretense can only be explained in representationalist terms. In this paper, we oppose this usual approach. We instead propose not only new explanatory tools for pretend play, but also a fundamental reconceptualization of (...)
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