A number of researchers today make an appeal to quantum physics when trying to develop a satisfactory account of the mind, an appeal still felt to be controversial by many. Often these "quantum approaches" try to explain some well-known features of conscious experience (or mental processes more generally), thus using quantum physics to enrich the explanatory framework or explanans used in consciousness studies and cognitive science. This paper considers the less studied question of whether quantum physical intuitions could help us (...) to draw attention to new or neglected aspects of the mind in introspection, and in this way change our view about what needs explanation in the first place. Although prima facie implausible, it is suggested that this could happen, for example, if there were analogies between quantum processes and mental processes (e.g., the process of thinking). The naive idea is that such analogies would help us to see mental processes and conscious experience in a new way. It has indeed been proposed long ago that such analogies exist, and this paper first focuses at some length on David Bohm's formulation of them from 1951. It then briefly considers these analogies in relation to Smolensky's more recent analogies between cognitive science and physics, and Pylkko's aconceptual view of the mind. Finally, Bohm's early analogies will be briefly considered in relation to the analogies between quantum processes and the mind he proposed in his later work. -/- [This article is a modified version of an article that was first published in the anthology Being and Brain: At the Boundary between Science, Philosophy, Language and Arts, ed. by G. Globus, K. Pribram and G. Vitiello, Advances in Consciousness Research 58, John Benjamins, Amsterdam 2004, pp. 165-195.]. (shrink)

Can the neo-Aristotelian uphold a pluralist substance ontology while taking seriously the recent arguments in favour of monism based on quantum holism and other arguments from quantum mechanics? In this article, Jonathan Schaffer’s priority monism will be the main target. It will be argued that the case from quantum mechanics in favour of priority monism does face some challenges. Moreover, if the neo-Aristotelian is willing to consider alternative ways to understand ‘substance’, there may yet be hope for a pluralist substance (...) ontology. A speculative case for such an ontology will be constructed based on primitive incompatibility. (shrink)

An essay on the connection between the mind-body-problem and quantum mechanics.

Quantum blobs are the smallest phase space units of phase space compatible with the uncertainty principle of quantum mechanics and having the symplectic group as group of symmetries. Quantum blobs are in a bijective correspondence with the squeezed coherent states from standard quantum mechanics, of which they are a phase space picture. This allows us to propose a substitute for phase space in quantum mechanics. We study the relationship between quantum blobs with a certain class of level sets defined by (...) Fermi for the purpose of representing geometrically quantum states. (shrink)

We show that the Bohmian approach in terms of persisting particles that move on continuous trajectories following a deterministic law can be literally applied to quantum field theory. By means of the Dirac sea model—exemplified in the electron sector of the standard model neglecting radiation—we explain how starting from persisting particles, one is led to standard QFT employing creation and annihilation operators when tracking the dynamics with respect to a reference state, the so-called vacuum. Since on the level of wave (...) functions, both formalisms are mathematically equivalent, this proposal provides for an ontology of QFT that includes a dynamics of individual processes, solves the measurement problem, and explains the appearance of creation and annihilation events. 1Bohmian Mechanics from Quantum Mechanics to Quantum Field Theory2The Dirac Sea Model3Equilibrium States and the Vacuum4Excitations of the Vacuum and the Fock Space Formalism5The Appearance of Particle Creations and Annihilations6The Merits of the Bohmian Approach. (shrink)

A source of much difficulty and confusion in the interpretation of quantum mechanics is a naive realism about operators. By this we refer to various ways of taking too seriously the notion of operator-as-observable, and in particular to the all too casual talk about measuring operators that occurs when the subject is quantum mechanics. Without a specification of what should be meant by measuring a quantum observable, such an expression can have no clear meaning. A definite specification is provided by (...) Bohmian mechanics, a theory that emerges from Schrödinger's equation for a system of particles when we merely insist that particles means particles. Bohmian mechanics clarifies the status and the role of operators as observables in quantum mechanics by providing the operational details absent from standard quantum mechanics. It thereby allows us to readily dismiss all the radical claims traditionally enveloping the transition from the classical to the quantum realm — for example, that we must abandon classical logic or classical probability. The moral is rather simple: Beware naive realism, especially about operators! (shrink)

It is generally believed that Bohm's version of quantum mechanics is observationally equivalent to standard quantum mechanics. A more careful statement is that the two theories will always make the same predictions for any question or problem that is well posed in both interpretations. The transit time of a “particle” between two points in space is not necessarily well defined in standard quantum mechanics, whereas it is in Bohm's theory since there is always a particle following a definite trajectory. For (...) this reason tunneling times (in a scattering configuration through a potential barrier may be a situation in which Bohm's theory can make a definite prediction when standard quantum mechanics can make none at all. I summarize some of the theoretical and experimental prospects for an unambiguous comparison in the hope that this question will engage the attention of more physicists, especially those experimentalists who now routinely actually do gedanken experiments. (shrink)

In this paper, we aim at an exercise that is transdisciplinary, involving science and religion, and interdisciplinary, involving disciplines and theories which appeared in the second half of the 20th century. The latter required the reformulation of quantum mechanics theories starting with the beginning of the century, based on the substance-energy-information triangle. We focus on information and we also attempt a transdisciplinary approach to the imaginary from a psychological - physical - mathematical perspective, but the religious perspectives find their place (...) along with the philosophical or even philological vision. (shrink)

We examine, in the context of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bohm gedankenexperiment, problems associated with state reduction and with nonlocal influences according to different interpretations of quantum mechanics, when attempts are made to apply these interpretations in the relativistic domain. We begin by considering the significance of retrodiction within four different interpretations of quantum mechanics, and show that three of these interpretations, if applied in a relativistic context, can lead to ambiguities in their description of a process. We consider ways of dealing with (...) these ambiguities, in particular focussing on the “preferred frame” hypothesis. We then re-examine an argument involving nonlocal measurements which claimed that the preferred frame hypothesis is not tenable, and show that this argument does not in fact necessitate a rejection of the preferred frame. We then suggest that, to avoid confusion, the preferred frame could be extended to cover unitary interactions as well as state reductions. We conclude with a brief examination of a proposal that state reduction should take effect across the backward light cone of a measurement event. (shrink)

Recently various gedankenexperiments have been formulated which argue that the assumption that “elements of reality” are Lorentz invariant cannot be reconciled with standard quantum mechanics. Two of these gedankenexperiments were subsequently analyzed using the notion of pre- and postselected quantum systems, and it was claimed that elements of reality can be made Lorentz invariant if the “product rule” of standard quantum mechanics is abandoned. In this paper we show that the apparent violations of the product rule in these gedankenexperiments are (...) not as significant as they appeared to be in the previous analysis. We conclude that the problems with Lorentz invariance which arise in these gedankenexperiments are essentially unrelated to the product rule violations. (shrink)

We discuss the issue of quantum-classical transition in a system of a single particle with and without external potential. This is done by elaborating the notion of self-trapped wave function recently developed by the author. For a free particle, we show that there is a subset of self-trapped wave functions which is particle-like. Namely, the spatially localized wave packet is moving uniformly with undistorted shape as if the whole wave packet is indeed a classical free particle. The length of the (...) spatial support of the wave packet is given by the Compton wavelength so that the wave packet is more localized for particle with larger mass. Whereas for a particle of mass m in a macroscopic external potential, we show that the time needed by the corresponding self-trapped wave function to depart from a classical trajectory is of the order ∼m 2 c/ℏ. We argue that it is the Compton wavelength that matters and not the de Broglie wavelength as in conventional semiclassical approach. (shrink)

I argue that quantum mechanics is fundamentally a theory about the representation and manipulation of information, not a theory about the mechanics of nonclassical waves or particles. The notion of quantum information is to be understood as a new physical primitive—just as, following Einstein’s special theory of relativity, a field is no longer regarded as the physical manifestation of vibrations in a mechanical medium, but recognized as a new physical primitive in its own right.

I consider to what extent the phenomenon of interference precludes the possibility of attributing simultaneously determinate values to noncommuting observables, and I show that, while all observables can in principle be taken as simultaneously determinate, it suffices to take a suitable privileged observable as determinate to solve the measurement problem.

Properties sometimes attributed to the “particle” aspect of a neutron, e.g., mass and magnetic moment, cannot straightforwardly be regarded in the Bohm interpretation of quantum mechanics as localized at the hypothetical position of the particle. This is shown by examining a series of effects in neutron interferometry. A related thought-experiment also provides a variation of a recent demonstration that which-way detectors can appear to behave anomolously in the Bohm theory.

This work seeks to explain intuitive perception - those perceptions that are not based on reason or logic or on memories or extrapolations from the past, but are based, instead, on accurate foreknowledge of the future. Often such intuitive foreknowledge involves perception of implicit information about nonlocal objects and/or events by the body's psychophysiological systems. Recent experiments have shown that intuitive perception of a future event is related to the degree of emotional significance of that event, and a new study (...) shows that both the brain and the heart are involved in processing a pre-stimulus emotional response to the future event. Drawing on this research and on the principles of quantum holography, I develop a theory of intuition that views the perception of things remote in space or ahead in time (nonlocal communication) as involving processes of energetic resonance connecting the body's psychophysiological systems to the quantum level. The theory explains how focused emotional attention directed to the nonlocal object of interest attunes the bio-emotional energy generated by the body's psychophysiological systems to a domain of quantum-holographical information, which contains implicit information about the object. The body's perception of such implicit information about things distant in space/time is experienced as an intuition. (shrink)

(1997). The anticipation of order in biosocial collectives. World Futures: Vol. 49, The Dialatic of Evolution: Essays in Honor of David Loye, pp. 65-88.

The principles of classical and quantum holography are used to develop the theoretical basis for a non-phonemic method of detecting membership in secret social groups, such as cults, criminal gangs, drug cartels, and terrorist cells. Grounded in the basic sociological premise that every group develops a distinctive sociocultural order, the theory postulates that the primary features of a group's collective identity will be encoded, via a multilevel socio-psycho-physiological process, into the field of bio-emotional relations connecting group members. The principles of (...) classical holography (Gabor 1948) are used to describe how this information is recorded in the members' brains and communicated in interaction by a holographic-like process as a tacit signature of group affiliation —a constancy in group-related interactions. It is hypothesized that the identity signature is enfolded as a hologram in the energy spectra of vocal interactions among group members. The principles of quantum holography (Gabor 1946) are used to provide a description of the group's ongoing interactions as a dynamic process—a continuous, quantized series of snapshots (quantum holograms). Linked together, two forms of holography provide a model of how the group's collective identity evolves and is communicated over time to its members, as the group adapts to the ever-changing reality of its endogenous and exogenous circumstances. Using spectral analysis techniques, it should be possible to detect the group's identity signature in the recordings of relatively small samples of vocal interactions. In clandestine groups, the effort to remain hidden actually enhances the signal strength of the identity signature. It is predicted, therefore, that detection of unknown members can be achieved by using the spectral commonality identified in the analysis of recordings of vocal interactions among known members as a reference signature for comparison with those of the vocal spectra of suspected or potential members. (shrink)

The standard means of seeking the classical limit in Bohmian mechanics is through the imposition of vanishing quantum force and quantum potential for pure states. We argue that this approach fails, and that the Bohmian classical limit can be realized only by combining narrow wave packets, mixed states, and environmental decoherence.

How can we disentangle the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from the neural machinery of the cognitive access that underlies reports of phenomenal consciousness? We can see the problem in stark form if we ask how we could tell whether representations inside a Fodorian module are phenomenally conscious. The methodology would seem straightforward: find the neural natural kinds that are the basis of phenomenal consciousness in clear cases when subjects are completely confident and we have no reason to doubt their (...) authority, and look to see whether those neural natural kinds exist within Fodorian modules. But a puzzle arises: do we include the machinery underlying reportability within the neural natural kinds of the clear cases? If the answer is ‘Yes’, then there can be no phenomenally conscious representations in Fodorian modules. But how can we know if the answer is ‘Yes’? The suggested methodology requires an answer to the question it was supposed to answer! The paper argues for an abstract solution to the problem and exhibits a source of empirical data that is relevant, data that show that in a certain sense phenomenal consciousness overflows cognitive accessibility. The paper argues that we can find a neural realizer of this overflow if assume that the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness does not include the neural basis of cognitive accessibility and that this assumption is justified by the explanations it allows. (shrink)

The necessary appearance of Clifford algebras in the quantum description of fermions has prompted us to re-examine the fundamental role played by the quaternion Clifford algebra, C 0,2 . This algebra is essentially the geometric algebra describing the rotational properties of space. Hidden within this algebra are symplectic structures with Heisenberg algebras at their core. This algebra also enables us to define a Poisson algebra of all homogeneous quadratic polynomials on a two-dimensional sub-space, $\mathbb{F}^{a}$ of the Euclidean three-space. This enables (...) us to construct a Poisson Clifford algebra, ℍ F , of a finite dimensional phase space which will carry the dynamics. The quantum dynamics appears as a realisation of ℍ F in terms of a Clifford algebra consisting of Hermitian operators. (shrink)

(1999). Information self‐organization and consciousness—towards a holoinformational theory of consciousness. World Futures: Vol. 53, No. 4, pp. 309-327.

Single-case and long-run propensity theories are among the main objective interpretations of probability. There have been various objections to these theories, e.g. that it is difficult to explain why propensities should satisfy the probability axioms and, worse, that propensities are at odds with these axioms, that the explication of propensities is circular and accordingly not informative, and that single-case propensities are metaphysical and accordingly non-scientific. We consider various propensity theories of probability and their prospects in light of these objections. We (...) argue that while propensity theories face challenges, these challenges do not undermine their validity as prospective interpretations of probability in science. (shrink)

It has been suggested in the literature that spatial coherence of the wave function can be dynamically suppressed by fluctuations in the spacetime geometry. These fluctuations represent the minimal uncertainty that is present when one probes spacetime geometry with a quantum probe. Two similar models have been proposed, one by Diósi and one by Karolyhazy and collaborators, based on apparently unrelated minimal spacetime bounds. The two models arrive at somewhat different expressions for the dependence of the localization coherence length on (...) the mass and size of the quantum object. In the present article we compare and contrast the two models from three aspects: comparison of the spacetime bounds, method of calculating decoherence time, comparison of noise correlation. We show that under certain conditions the minimal spacetime bounds in the two models can be derived one from the other. We argue that the methods of calculating the decoherence time are equivalent. We re-derive the two-point correlation for the fluctuation potential in the K-model, and confirm the earlier result of Diósi and Lukács that it is non-white noise, unlike in the D-model, where the corresponding correlation is white noise in time. This seems to be the origin of the different results in the two models. We derive the non-Markovian master equation for the K-model. We argue that the minimal spacetime bound cannot predict the noise correlation uniquely, and additional criteria are necessary to accurately determine the effects of gravitationally induced decoherence. (shrink)

Greenberger. Horne. Shimony, and Zeilinger gave a new version of the Bell theorem without using inequalities (probabilities). Mermin summarized it concisely; but Bohm and Hiley criticized Mermin's proof from contextualists' point of view. Using the branching space-time language, in this paper a proof will be given that is free of these difficulties. At the same time we will also clarify the limits of the validity of the theorem when it is taken as a proof that quantum mechanics is not compatible (...) with a deterministic world nor with a world that permits correlated space-related events without a common cause. (shrink)

There has been a lot of interest over the last fifteen years or so in no-collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics. The Bohm interpretation of quantum mechanics has received several thorough accounts, perhaps most notably by Bohm himself.

The aim of this paper is to show that quantum mechanics can be interpreted according to a pragmatist approach. The latter consists, first, in giving a pragmatic definition to each term used in microphysics, second, in making explicit the functions any theory must fulfil so as to ensure the success of the research activity in microphysics, and third, in showing that quantum mechanics is the only theory which fulfils exactly these functions.

The aim of this paper is to give a systematic account of the so-called “measurement problem” in the frame of the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics. It is argued that there is not one but five distinct formulations of this problem. Each of them depends on what is assumed to be a “satisfactory” description of the measurement process in the frame of the standard interpretation. Moreover, the paper points out that each of these formulations refers not to a unique problem, (...) but to a set of sub-problems. (shrink)

argued that there are two options for what he called a realistic solution to the quantum measurement problem: (1) select a preferred set of observables for which definite values are assumed to exist, or (2) attempt to assign definite values to all observables simultaneously (1810–1). While conventional wisdom has it that the second option is ruled out by the Kochen-Specker theorem, Vink nevertheless advocated it. Making every physical quantity determinate in quantum mechanics carries with it significant conceptual costs, but it (...) also provides a way of addressing the preferred basis problem that arises if one chooses to pursue the first option. The potential costs and benefits of a formulation of quantum mechanics where every physical quantity is determinate are herein examined. The preferred-basis problem How to solve the preferred-basis problem Relativistic constraints Conclusion. (shrink)

On Bohm''s formulation of quantum mechanics particles always have determinate positions and follow continuous trajectories. Bohm''s theory, however, requires a postulate that says that particles are initially distributed in a special way: particles are randomly distributed so that the probability of their positions being represented by a point in any regionR in configuration space is equal to the square of the wave-function integrated overR. If the distribution postulate were false, then the theory would generally fail to make the right statistical (...) predictions. Further, if it were false, then there would at least in principle be situations where a particle would approach an eigenstate of having one position but in fact always be somewhere very different. Indeed, we will see how this might happen even if the distribution postulate were true. This will help to show how loose the connection is between the wave-function and the positions of particles in Bohm''s theory and what the precise role of the distribution postulate is. Finally, we will briefly consider two attempts to formulate a version of Bohm''s theory without the distribution postulate. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with the possibility and nature of relativistic hidden-variable formulations of quantum mechanics. Both ad hoc teleological constructions of spacetime maps and frame-dependent constructions of spacetime maps are considered. While frame-dependent constructions are clearly preferable, they provide neither mechanical nor causal explanations for local quantum events. Rather, the hiddenvariable dynamics used in such constructions is just a rule that helps to characterize the set of all possible spacetime maps. But while having neither mechanical nor causal explanations of (...) the values of quantummechanical measurement records is a significant cost, it may simply prove too much to ask for such explanations in relativistic quantum mechanics. (shrink)

On Bohm's formulation of quantum mechanics particles always have determinate positions and follow continuous trajectories. Bohm's theory, however, requires a postulate that says that particles are initially distributed in a special way: particles are randomly distributed so that the probability of their positions being represented by a point in any regionR in configuration space is equal to the square of the wave-function integrated overR. If the distribution postulate were false, then the theory would generally fail to make the right statistical (...) predictions. Further, if it were false, then there would at least in principle be situations where a particle would approach an eigenstate of having one position but in fact always be somewhere very different. Indeed, we will see how this might happen even if the distribution postulate were true. This will help to show how loose the connection is between the wave-function and the positions of particles in Bohm's theory and what the precise role of the distribution postulate is. Finally, we will briefly consider two attempts to formulate a version of Bohm's theory without the distribution postulate. (shrink)

In order to judge whether a theory is empirically adequate one must have epistemic access to reliable records of past measurement results that can be compared against the predictions of the theory. Some formulations of quantum mechanics fail to satisfy this condition. The standard theory without the collapse postulate is an example. Bell's reading of Everett's relative-state formulation is another. Furthermore, there are formulations of quantum mechanics that only satisfy this condition for a special class of observers, formulations whose empirical (...) adequacy could only be judged by an observer who records her measurement results in a special way. Bohm's theory is an example. It is possible to formulate hidden-variable theories that do not suffer from such a restriction, but these encounter other problems. (shrink)

This paper considers the empirical evidence that we currently have for various kinds of determinism that might be relevant to the thesis that human beings possess libertarian free will. Libertarianism requires a very strong version of indeterminism, so it can be refuted not just by universal determinism, but by some much weaker theses as well. However, it is argued that at present, we have no good reason to believe even these weak deterministic views and, hence, no good reason—at least from (...) this quarter—to doubt that we are libertarian free. In particular, the paper responds to various arguments for neural and psychological determinism, arguments based on the work of people like Honderich, Tegmark, Libet, Velmans, Wegner, and Festinger. (shrink)

Quantum mechanics is a fundamentally probabilistic theory (at least so far as the empirical predictions are concerned). It follows that, if one wants to properly understand quantum mechanics, it is essential to clearly understand the meaning of probability statements. The interpretation of probability has excited nearly as much philosophical controversy as the interpretation of quantum mechanics. 20th century physicists have mostly adopted a frequentist conception. In this paper it is argued that we ought, instead, to adopt a logical or Bayesian (...) conception. The paper includes a comparison of the orthodox and Bayesian theories of statistical inference. It concludes with a few remarks concerning the implications for the concept of physical reality. (shrink)

The action-reaction principle (AR) is examined in three contexts: (1) the inertial-gravitational interaction between a particle and space-time geometry, (2) protective observation of an extended wave function of a single particle, and (3) the causal-stochastic or Bohm interpretation of quantum mechanics. A new criterion of reality is formulated using the AR principle. This criterion implies that the wave function of a single particle is real and justifies in the Bohm interpretation the dual ontology of the particle and its associated wave (...) function. But it is concluded that the Bohm theory is not dynamically complete because the particle and its associated wave function do not satisfy the AR principle. (shrink)

Bohmian mechanics and the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber theory provide opposite resolutions of the quantum measurement problem: the former postulates additional variables (the particle positions) besides the wave function, whereas the latter implements spontaneous collapses of the wave function by a nonlinear and stochastic modification of Schrödinger's equation. Still, both theories, when understood appropriately, share the following structure: They are ultimately not about wave functions but about 'matter' moving in space, represented by either particle trajectories, fields on space-time, or a discrete set of (...) space-time points. The role of the wave function then is to govern the motion of the matter. (shrink)

It is still a matter of controversy whether the Principle of the Common Cause (PCC) can be used as a basis for sound causal inference. It is thus to be expected that its application to quantum mechanics should be a correspondingly controversial issue. Indeed the early 90’s saw a flurry of papers addressing just this issue in connection with the EPR correlations. Yet, that debate does not seem to have caught up with the most recent literature on causal inference generally, (...) which has moved on to consider the virtues of a generalised PCC-inspired condition, the so-called Causal Markov Condition (CMC). In this paper we argue that the CMC is an appropriate benchmark for debating possible causal explanations of the EPR correlations. But we go on to take issue with some pronouncements on EPR by defenders of the CMC. (shrink)

Divided into eight sections, each with introductory essays, the selections offer rich and detailed insights into a diverse multinational philosophical landscape. Revealed in this pathbreaking work is the way in which traditional philosophical issues related to ethics, metaphysics, and epistemology, for instance, take on specific forms in Africa's postcolonial struggles. Much of its moral, political, and social philosophy is concerned with the turbulent processes of embracing modern identities while protecting ancient cultures.

The paper first sketches out a reply to the underdetermination challenge and the incommensurability challenge that rebuts the sceptical conclusions of these challenges and that is sufficient to lay the ground for the project of a metaphysics of nature. That metaphysics is as hypothetical as are our scientific theories. The paper then explains how can one can argue for certain views in the metaphysics of nature based on our current fundamental physical theories, namely the commitments to a tenseless theory of (...) time and existence instead of a tensed one, to events instead of substances, and to relations instead of intrinsic properties. Finally, the paper mentions the themes of causation, laws and dispositions. (shrink)

Three disciplines address the codified forms and rules of human thought and reasoning: logic, available since antiquity; dialectics as a process of logical reasoning; and semiotics which focuses on the epistemological properties of the extant domain. However, both the paradigmatic-historical model of knowledge and the logical-semiotic model of thought tend to incorrectly emphasize the separation and differences between the respective domains vs. their overlap and interactions. We propose a sublation of linguistic logics of objects and static forms by a dynamic (...) logic of real physical-mental processes designated as the Logic in Reality (LIR). In our generalized logical theory, dialectics and semiotics are recovered from reductionist interpretations and reunited in a new synthetic paradigm centered on meaning and its communication. Our theory constitutes a meta-thesis composed of elements from science, logic and philosophy. We apply the theory to gain new insights into the structure and role of semiosis, information and communication and propose the concept of ‘ontolon’ to define the element of reasoning as a real dynamic process. It is part of a project within natural philosophy, which will address broader aspects of the dynamics of the growth of civilizations and their potential implications for the information society. (shrink)

The claim of the freedom of the will (understood as an individual who is transcendent to Nature) in the name of XXth century scientific knowledge, against the perspective of XVIIIth-XIXth century scientific materialism, is analysed and refuted in the present paper. The hypothesis of reductionism finds no obstacle within contemporary natural sciences. Determinism in classical physics is irrefutable, unless classical physics is itself refuted. From quantum mechanics, some authors argue that free will is possible because there is an ontological indeterminism (...) in the natural laws, and that the mind is responsible for the wave function collapse of matter, which leads to a choice among the different possibilities for the body. However, here I defend the opposite thesis because indeterminism does not imply free will, and because the considerations about an autonomous mind sending orders to the body is against neuroscience or evolutionary theories about human beings. The quantum theory of measurement can be interpreted without the intervention of human minds, but other fields of science cannot contemplate the mentalist scenario. A fatalistic or materialist view, which denies the possibility of a free will, makes much more sense in scientific terms. (shrink)

This paper explores the theme “quantum approaches to consciousness” by considering the work of one of the pioneers in the field. The physicist David Bohm not only made important contributions to quantum physics, but also had a long-term interest in interpreting the results of quantum physics and relativity in order to develop a general world view. His idea was further that living and mental processes could be understood in a new, scientifically and philosophically more coherent way in the context of (...) such a new world view. This paper gives a brief overview of different – and sometimes contradictory - aspects of Bohm’s research programme, and evaluates how they can be used to give an account of topics of interest in contemporary consciousness studies, such as analogies between thought and quantum processes, the problem of mental causation, the mind-body problem and the problem of time consciousness. (shrink)

This essay argues a case for viewing Derrida's work in the context of recent French epistemology and philosophy of science; more specifically, the critical‐rationalist approach exemplified by thinkers such as Bachelard and Canguilhem. I trace this line of descent principally through Derrida's essay ‘White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy’. My conclusions are (1) that we get Derrida wrong if we read him as a fargone antirealist for whom there is nothing ‘outside the text'; (2) that he provides some (...) powerful counter‐arguments to this and other items of current postmodern wisdom; (3) that deconstruction is more aptly viewed as continuing the epistemo‐critical approach developed by thinkers like Bachelard; and (4) that it also holds important lessons for philosophy of science in the mainstream Anglo‐ American ‘analytic’ tradition. (shrink)

Nauenberg’s extended critique of Quantum Enigma rests on fundamental misunderstandings.

The meaning of the wave function has been a hot topic of debate since the early days of quantum mechanics. Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in this long-standing question. Is the wave function ontic, directly representing a state of reality, or epistemic, merely representing a state of knowledge, or something else? If the wave function is not ontic, then what, if any, is the underlying state of reality? If the wave function is indeed ontic, then exactly what physical (...) state does it represent? In this book, I aim to make sense of the wave function in quantum mechanics and find the ontological content of the theory. The book can be divided into three parts. The first part addresses the question of the nature of the wave function. After giving a comprehensive and critical review of the competing views of the wave function, I present a new argument for the ontic view in terms of protective measurements. In addition, I also analyze the origin of the wave function by deriving the free Schroedinger equation. The second part analyzes the ontological meaning of the wave function. I propose a new ontological interpretation of the wave function in terms of random discontinuous motion of particles, and give two main arguments supporting this interpretation. The third part investigates whether the suggested quantum ontology is complete in accounting for our definite experience and whether it needs to be revised in the relativistic domain. (shrink)