This paper develops De Morgan-Płonka sums, which generalise Płonka sums to contexts in which negation is not topically transparent but still respects De Morgan duality. We give a general theory of De Morgan-Płonka sums, on the model of the general theory of Płonka sums. Additionally, we describe free De Morgan-Płonka sums and apply our construction to give an algebraic proof of completeness for Kit Fine’s truthmaker semantics for Angell’s logic of analytic containment.

Multiple-conclusion Hilbert-style systems allow us to finitely axiomatize every logic defined by a finite matrix. Having obtained such axiomatizations for Paraconsistent Weak Kleene and Bochvar–Kleene logics, we modify them by replacing the multiple-conclusion rules with carefully selected single-conclusion ones. In this way we manage to introduce the first finite Hilbert-style single-conclusion axiomatizations for these logics.

In one of his papers, JC Beall advanced a new and interesting interpretation of Weak Kleene logic, in terms of on-topic/off-topic. In brief, Beall suggests to read the third value as _off-topic_, whereas the two classical values are read as _true and on-topic_ and _false and on-topic_. Building on Beall’s new interpretation, the aim of this paper is threefold. First, we discuss two motivations to enrich Beall’s interpretation, and offer an alternative semantic framework that reflects our motivations. Second, by making (...) use of our new framework, we will offer a new interpretation of the logic of Catuskoti which combines Beall’s proposal of having _FDE_ as the correct logic with the on-topic/off-topic divide. Finally, we will offer a general result that will allow us to make sense of a family of infectious logics in terms of Beall’s on-topic/off-topic reading. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to discuss pure variable inclusion logics, that is, logical systems where valid entailments require that the propositional variables occurring in the conclusion are included among those appearing in the premises, or vice versa. We study the subsystems of Classical Logic satisfying these requirements and assess the extent to which it is possible to characterise them by means of a single logical matrix. In addition, we semantically describe both of these companions to Classical Logic in (...) terms of appropriate matrix bundles and as semilattice-based logics, showing that the notion of consequence in these logics can be interpreted in terms of truth (or non-falsity) and meaningfulness (or meaninglessness) preservation. Finally, we use Płonka sums of matrices to investigate the pure variable inclusion companions of an arbitrary finitary logic. -/- . (shrink)

In the logical context, ignorance is traditionally defined recurring to epistemic logic. In particular, ignorance is essentially interpreted as “lack of knowledge”. This received view has - as we point out - some problems, in particular we will highlight how it does not allow to express a type of content-theoretic ignorance, i.e. an ignorance of φ that stems from an unfamiliarity with its meaning. Contrarily to this trend, in this paper, we introduce and investigate a modal logic having a primitive (...) epistemic operator I, modeling ignorance. Our modal logic is essentially constructed on the modal logics based on weak Kleene three-valued logic introduced by Segerberg (Theoria, 33(1):53–71, 1997). Such non-classical propositional basis allows to define a Kripke-style semantics with the following, very intuitive, interpretation: a formula φ is ignored by an agent if φ is neither true nor false in every world accessible to the agent. As a consequence of this choice, we obtain a type of content-theoretic notion of ignorance, which is essentially different from the traditional approach. We dub it severe ignorance. We axiomatize, prove completeness and decidability for the logic of reflexive (three-valued) Kripke frames, which we find the most suitable candidate for our novel proposal and, finally, compare our approach with the most traditional one. (shrink)

The paper aims at studying, in full generality, logics defined by imposing a variable inclusion condition on a given logic $$\vdash $$. We prove that the description of the algebraic counterpart of the left variable inclusion companion of a given logic $$\vdash $$ is related to the construction of Płonka sums of the matrix models of $$\vdash $$. This observation allows to obtain a Hilbert-style axiomatization of the logics of left variable inclusion, to describe the structure of their reduced models, (...) and to locate them in the Leibniz hierarchy. (shrink)

In this paper, first, we determine the number of sublogics of variable inclusion of an arbitrary finitary logic ⊢ with a composition term. Then, we investigate their position into the lattice of co...