Transcendental Pragmatics and Discourse Ethics. Elements and Perspectives of Apel's Discourse-Philosophy. The author follows Apel's intellectual biography and shows the conception of a critique of meaning qua ‘reflection upon the discourse within the discourse’ to be the centre of Apel's language-pragmatic ‘Transformation of Philosophy’. Beginning with an explication of the situation of a speaker/thinker, especially of the situation of a philosophising speaker/thinker, Apel reconstructs a two fold apriori of communication: Every thought is situated within the context of a particular, historically (...) evolved, community of language and interaction. At the same time, however, the validity-claims of thoughts transcend the context of their origin towards an unlimited community of argumentation. On the basis of the first apriori Apel criticises the methodical solipsism as well as the objectivism of modern philosophy and theory of science. Drawing upon the second apriori he develops a universalist critique of meaning of relativism and contextualism. In the sixties and seventies Apel worked out a differentiated theory of the – more or less – communicatively cognizing humanities and set it apart from the theory of the causal-explanatory natural sciences, thus challenging the objectivism of a Theory of Unified Science. Building upon this work Transcendental Pragmatics, as developed by Apel and others, sets philosophy primarily two tasks: firstly, a internal reconstruction of argumentative discourse as the situation of speech and thought which seeks to elucidate the conditions of the meaningfulness, i. e. the presuppositions, of discourse. These presuppositions comprise, thus Apel with Habermas, the four validity-claims to intelligibility, sincerety/credibility, truth and normative rightness/legitimacy. Their moral content consists, thus Apel, not only in the recognition of the equality of all beings capable of discursive reasoning but also in their recognition of a co-responsibility for the realizability of discourses and of responsibility. The author argues that the existence of a co-responsibility of this kind is indisputable because the discursive claims to validity are intertwined with a set of ‘primordial promises of dialogue’. Only with the elucidation and explication of these promises can the reconstruction of the internal conditions of discourse be completed.The second task of a pragmatics of argumentation isthe strict resp. actual reflection of the thinker upon the presuppositions of the discourse in which he currently engages. This reflection has a Socratic character and can only be done in the form of discussion and debate with critics of the reconstruction. In this context, the author proposes a method of Socratic reflection upon the presuppositions of dialogue which suspends the usual, theoretically oriented, attitude of the scientist and the philosopher in favour of an actual reflective attitude. Within a dialogue with a sceptic who doubts one of the results of the internal reconstruction of dialogical presuppositions, say X, it is tested whether his doubt as to the unrestricted validity of X can be understood as a sincere contribution to the current dialogue or whether this particular sceptical thesis does not make sense, because it is incompatible with the role of a sincere participant of argumentation which, after all, the sceptic cannot refuse to claim for himself.Finally the author explains Apel's characterization of the tension between “Discourse and Responsibility”. In the course of discussions with Max Weber, Lawrence Kohlberg, Hans Jonas et al., Apel formulates and justifies an ethics of responsibility and gives an affirmative answer to the crucial question of whether the fulfilment of the moral obligations connected with the recognition of co-responsibility can be demanded within the non-dialogical circumstances of social reality. Apel's answer employs the idea of counter-strategies which are morally legitimate in virtue of their being worthy of argumentative consensus. (shrink)

Terminale Sedierung ist unter bestimmten Umständen ethisch rechtfertigbar: Mit dem Wissen um die Begrenztheit des eigenen Lebens ist auch der Sterbeprozess ein bewusst zu gestaltender, dem eigenen Willen unterworfener Bestandteil des Lebens. Das schließt auch die (paradoxe) Möglichkeit ein, bewusst auf das Bewusstsein beim eigenen Sterben zu verzichten. Anhand eigener Studien kann der Autor zeigen, dass sich der Wunsch nach Sterbehilfe bei terminal kranken Menschen als die Folge einer konsequenten Einordnung in das System der Medizin deuten lässt. Infolgedessen begreifen Patienten (...) auch das Sterben als eine Aufgabe des Medizinsystems, so dass sie ärztliche Sterbehilfe als Ausdruck für ein menschenwürdiges Sterben, paradoxerweise sogar als natürlichen Tod auffassen können. In dieser Situation ermöglicht die terminale Sedierung einen Fortschritt: Das Medizinsystem kann der von ihm erwarteten Zuständigkeit für den Prozess des Sterbens nachkommen, ohne direkt und intentional zu töten. Trotzdem bleiben bezüglich der Missbrauchsmöglichkeiten, der Rollenkonfusion der Ärzte und der Grenzen menschlicher Handlungsräume Zweifel. Vor der „Illusion der glatten Lösungen“ (H. Thielicke) wird gewarnt und für den Versuch geworben, das jeweils Beste für die einzelnen Betroffenen zu erreichen. (shrink)

Faced with the ongoing tragedy of poverty, ethicists call for effective measures of global justice to set up just institutional structures. Their arguments for a transnational obligation to help however remain contested, one of the main reasons for that being the lack of motivational support for trans-national visions of global justice. This articles suggests that the debate will gain new and helpful insights if it studies the motivational mechanisms at work in the dominant religious and cultural traditions, asking: How do (...) these particular traditions conceive of social justice; how do they motivate their adherents to extend solidarity? And how can the similarities surfacing in their motivational strategies be informative for the quest to devise a motivationally saturated account of global justice? The article demonstrates the potential of such an concrete-universal discourse in an exemplary manner by staging a dialogue between public Christian Social Ethics and African Ubuntu Ethics. (shrink)

This essay pursues two goals: First, the appropriateness of Dabrock's point of departure is highlighted; his emphasis on God's address of man appropriately defines the axiological core of any societal or bioethical judgment. Secondly, this essay argues that Dabrock has not sufficiently exploited the potential offered by this point of departure and that he disregards its social policy and bioethical potential. The further criterion introduced by Dabrock (incarnate reason) is shown to be not sufficiently helpful because of its vagueness and (...) problematic implications. The essay concludes that Dabrock's goals could be better realized by focusing more thoroughly on his language- and communication-theology approach, namely God's address to man. Here, after all, bioethical conclusions can be derived that would allow Dabrock's account to offer the needed societal and bioethical orientation. (shrink)

Die Suche nach einem angemessenen Umgang mit Moral und ihrem rhetorisch-strategischen Einsatz in Diskursen führt unweigerlich zu der Frage, welche Perspektiven verschiedene Wissenschaftsdisziplinen aufmachen, wenn sie sich mit Moral und Moralisierung beschäftigen. Mit der Erörterung verschiedener Disziplinenzugänge ist auch das Spannungsverhältnis zwischen einem deskriptiven Erörterungsansatz und Aspekten der Bewertung inklusive der ihr zugrundeliegenden Werte angesprochen. Die Beiträge des Bandes geben auf diese Fragen keine abschließenden Antworten. Sie beginnen allerdings damit, ein multi- und interdisziplinäres Bild von Moralisierung zu zeichnen, das geschichts- (...) und politikwissenschaftliche, linguistische, philosophische und theologische Sichtweisen einbezieht und miteinander ins Gespräch bringt. Das komplementäre Bild ist einerseits gekennzeichnet durch die kritische Auseinandersetzung mit Moralisierung als einer rhetorischen Strategie, der ein nicht unbeträchtliches diskursprägendes und sogar -schädigendes Potenzial innewohnt. Andererseits sperrt es sich gegen eine grundsätzliche Moralisierungsskepsis und weist stattdessen darauf hin, dass gesellschaftliche Debatten sich notwendigerweise zwischen Moralisierung und Entmoralisierung bewegen. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is to consider how the dominant moral theories can be applied to the discourse of disaster situations. In specific times, specific values take priority. Therefore, this article will consider how moral theory deals with time. Kant’s moral philosophy has influenced ethics enormously, but rejects the idea of a temporal dimension in ethics; consequently, modern ethics has not devoted sufficient attention to the temporal dimension. Nonetheless, Kantian ethics established the basic principles of respect for human beings (...) as ends in themselves, and for autonomy of rational beings; thus it cannot be ignored. In political decision-making, simply having good intentions does not suffice; they must be accompanied by responsibility. Both the ethics of consequentialism and virtue ethics (the virtue of wisdom) deal with responsibility for the future. Hans Jonas developed a concept of responsibility concerned particularly with the risks associated with new technologies and the ethical requirement to avoid disasters. “Uncertainty may be our permanent fate - which has moral consequences” (Jonas). Public policy should be precautionary. The ethics of disaster preparation planning is distinct from the ethics of disaster response planning. (shrink)

Faced with the ongoing tragedy of poverty in our world today, many have long called for a common standard of global justice. Such a standard should not be tied to any one particular strand of justice conceptualizations and it should yet be in harmony with the central motivating beliefs of the various concerned moral worldviews. The article reframes global justice thinking by approaching a core problem, namely motivating people to care for distant needy strangers, in a concrete intercultural manner: it (...) sets out to study and compare the motivational underpinnings for an expansion of social justice, in an exemplary fashion, within two long-standing worldview traditions, namely Christian social ethics and contemporary Confucian ethics, in order to gain a more realistic impression of what a commonly shared and motivationally backed notion of global justice may look like. While the former expresses a universal concern for the poor, the latter has recently attracted interest, since Southeast Asian countries managed to lift millions of people out of abject poverty. As both traditions consider loving communal relationships to constitute the foundation of all justice considerations, the article inquires how this quest shapes each tradition’s way to motivate their adherents’ compliance with a vision of global justice. (shrink)

Evangelicals are unconditionally opposed to active euthanasia. Indirect euthanasia is seen as simply belonging to the risks inherent in any medical intervention. Passive euthanasia is accepted if used in order to save the dignity of the dying and is seen as merely ceasing to interfere with an irreversible dying process. The basis of evangelical ethics is the Bible supplemented by science and experience as a kind of natural law. Even though natural law comes under Biblicial revelation, its acceptance is the (...) reason for the similarity of the Evangelical and the Roman-Catholic position of Evangelicals. Evangelicals stress the necessity of a better counseling and investment for the deadly ill patient. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungTerminale Sedierung ist unter bestimmten Umständen ethisch rechtfertigbar: Mit dem Wissen um die Begrenztheit des eigenen Lebens ist auch der Sterbeprozess ein bewusst zu gestaltender, dem eigenen Willen unterworfener Bestandteil des Lebens. Das schließt auch die (paradoxe) Möglichkeit ein, bewusst auf das Bewusstsein beim eigenen Sterben zu verzichten. Anhand eigener Studien kann der Autor zeigen, dass sich der Wunsch nach Sterbehilfe bei terminal kranken Menschen als die Folge einer konsequenten Einordnung in das System der Medizin deuten lässt. Infolgedessen begreifen Patienten (...) auch das Sterben als eine Aufgabe des Medizinsystems, so dass sie ärztliche Sterbehilfe als Ausdruck für ein menschenwürdiges Sterben, paradoxerweise sogar als natürlichen Tod auffassen können. In dieser Situation ermöglicht die terminale Sedierung einen Fortschritt: Das Medizinsystem kann der von ihm erwarteten Zuständigkeit für den Prozess des Sterbens nachkommen, ohne direkt und intentional zu töten. Trotzdem bleiben bezüglich der Missbrauchsmöglichkeiten, der Rollenkonfusion der Ärzte und der Grenzen menschlicher Handlungsräume Zweifel. Vor der „Illusion der glatten Lösungen“ (H. Thielicke) wird gewarnt und für den Versuch geworben, das jeweils Beste für die einzelnen Betroffenen zu erreichen. (shrink)