Switch to: References

Citations of:

Externalist theories of empirical knowledge

In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: readings in contemporary epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press (2000)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Communist Conventions for Deductive Reasoning.Sinan Dogramaci - 2013 - Noûs 49 (4):776-799.
    In section 1, I develop epistemic communism, my view of the function of epistemically evaluative terms such as ‘rational’. The function is to support the coordination of our belief-forming rules, which in turn supports the reliable acquisition of beliefs through testimony. This view is motivated by the existence of valid inferences that we hesitate to call rational. I defend the view against the worry that it fails to account for a function of evaluations within first-personal deliberation. In the rest of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   36 citations  
  • Reverse Engineering Epistemic Evaluations.Sinan Dogramaci - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):513-530.
    This paper begins by raising a puzzle about what function our use of the word ‘rational’ could serve. To solve the puzzle, I introduce a view I call Epistemic Communism: we use epistemic evaluations to promote coordination among our basic belief-forming rules, and the function of this is to make the acquisition of knowledge by testimony more efficient.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   54 citations  
  • JFGI: From distributed cognition to distributed reliabilism.Kourken Michaelian - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):314-346.
    While, prima facie, virtue/credit approaches in epistemology would appear to be in tension with distributed/extended approaches in cognitive science, Pritchard () has recently argued that the tension here is only apparent, at least given a weak version of distributed cognition, which claims merely that external resources often make critical contributions to the formation of true belief, and a weak virtue theory, which claims merely that, whenever a subject achieves knowledge, his cognitive agency makes a significant contribution to the formation of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Unreasonable Knowledge.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):1-21.
    It is common orthodoxy among internalists and externalists alike that knowledge is lost or defeated in situations involving misleading evidence of a suitable kind. But making sense of defeat has seemed to present a particular challenge for those who reject an internalist justification condition on knowledge. My main aim here is to argue that externalists ought to take seriously a view on which knowledge can be retained even in the face of strong seemingly defeating evidence. As an instructive example, I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   194 citations  
  • Entitlement, Justification, and the Bootstrapping Problem.Jon Altschul - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (4):345-366.
    According to the bootstrapping problem, any view that allows for basic knowledge (knowledge obtained from a reliable source prior to one’s knowing that that source is reliable) is forced to accept that one can utilize a track-record argument to acquire justification for believing that one’s belief source is reliable; yet, we tend to think that acquiring justification in this way is too easy. In this paper I argue, first, that those who respond to the bootstrapping problem by denying basic knowledge (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Epistemic Entitlement.Peter J. Graham - 2012 - Noûs 46 (3):449-482.
    What is the best account of process reliabilism about epistemic justification, especially epistemic entitlement? I argue that entitlement consists in the normal functioning (proper operation) of the belief-forming process when the process has forming true beliefs reliably as an etiological function. Etiological functions involve consequence explanation: a belief-forming process has forming true beliefs reliably as a function just in case forming-true beliefs reliably partly explains the persistence of the process. This account paves the way for avoiding standard objections to process (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   119 citations  
  • Does Knowledge Entail Belief?Masaharu Mizumoto - 2008 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 41 (1):59-78.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Epistemic Internalism.Bjc Madison - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (10):840-853.
    The internalism /externalism debate is of interest in epistemology since it addresses one of the most fundamental questions in the discipline: what is the basic nature of knowledge and epistemic justification? It is generally held that if a positive epistemic status obtains, this is not a brute fact. Rather if a belief is, for example, justified, it is justified in virtue of some further condition obtaining. What has been called epistemic internalism holds, as the label suggests, is that all the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  • How to make the generality problem work for you.Christopher Lepock - 2009 - Acta Analytica 24 (4):275-286.
    Reliabilist theories of knowledge face the “generality problem”; any token of a belief-forming processes instantiates types of different levels of generality, which can vary in reliability. I argue that we exploit this situation in epistemic evaluation; we appraise beliefs in different ways by adverting to reliability at different levels of generality. We can detect at least two distinct uses of reliability, which underlie different sorts of appraisals of beliefs and believers.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • The ontology of epistemic reasons.John Turri - 2009 - Noûs 43 (3):490-512.
    Epistemic reasons are mental states. They are not propositions or non-mental facts. The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 1 introduces the topic. Section 2 gives two concrete examples of how our topic directly affects the internalism/externalism debate in normative epistemology. Section 3 responds to an argument against the view that reasons are mental states. Section 4 presents two problems for the view that reasons are propositions. Section 5 presents two problems for the view that reasons are non-mental facts. Section 6 (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   93 citations  
  • Perception and virtue reliabilism.Jack C. Lyons - 2009 - Acta Analytica 24 (4):249-261.
    In some recent work, Ernest Sosa rejects the “perceptual model” of rational intuition, according to which intuitions (beliefs formed by intuition) are justified by standing in the appropriate relation to a nondoxastic intellectual experience (a seeming-true, or the like), in much the way that perceptual beliefs are often held to be justified by an appropriate relation to nondoxastic sense experiential states. By extending some of Sosa’s arguments and adding a few of my own, I argue that Sosa is right to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • What lottery problem for reliabilism?Juan Comesaña - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (1):1-20.
    It can often be heard in the hallways, and occasionally read in print, that reliabilism runs into special trouble regarding lottery cases. My main aim in this paper is to argue that this is not so. Nevertheless, lottery cases do force us to pay close attention to the relation between justification and probability.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • Epistemic justification and psychological realism.James E. Taylor - 1990 - Synthese 85 (2):199 - 230.
    The main thesis of this paper is that it is not possible to determine the nature of epistemic justification apart from scientific psychological investigation. I call this view the strong thesis of methodological psychologism. Two sub-theses provide the primary support for this claim. The first sub-thesis is that no account of epistemic justification is correct which requires for the possession of at least one justified belief a psychological capacity which humans do not have. That is, the correct account of epistemic (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Foundationalism, coherentism, and the levels gambit.David Shatz - 1983 - Synthese 55 (1):97 - 118.
    A central problem in epistemology concerns the justification of beliefs about epistemic principles, i.e., principles stating which kinds of beliefs are justified and which not. It is generally regarded as circular to justify such beliefs empirically. However, some recent defenders of foundationalism have argued that, within a foundationalist framework, one can justify beliefs about epistemic principles empirically without incurring the charge of vicious circularity. The key to this position is a sharp distinction between first- and second-level justifiedness.In this paper I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Doxastic voluntarism and forced belief.Murray Clarke - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 50 (1):39 - 51.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  • A Reliabilist Foundationalist Coherentism.Sanford Goldberg - 2012 - Erkenntnis 77 (2):187-196.
    While Process Reliabilism has long been regarded by many as a version of Foundationalism, this paper argues that there is a version of Process Reliabilism that can also been seen as at least a partial vindication of Coherentism as well. The significance of this result lies in what it tells us both about the prospects for a plausible Process Reliabilism, but also about the old-school debate between Foundationalists and Coherentists.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Scepticism, perceptual knowledge, and doxastic responsibility.Alan Millar - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):353-372.
    Arguments for scepticism about perceptual knowledge are often said to have intuitively plausible premises. In this discussion I question this view in relation to an argument from ignorance and argue that the supposed persuasiveness of the argument depends on debatable background assumptions about knowledge or justification. A reasonable response to scepticism has to show there is a plausible epistemological perspective that can make sense of our having perceptual knowledge. I present such a perspective. In order give a more satisfying response (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Nomic reliabilism: Weak reliability is not enough.Frederick Adams & David Kline - 1987 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):433-443.
    Reliabilism has received its share of bad press of late both as a theory of knowledge and as a theory of epistemic justification. We believe its credibility as a theory of knowledge may have been unjustly tarnished and we plan to defend it. However, we hasten to add that we shall defend reliabilism from attack only upon its credentials as a basis for a theory of knowledge. We shall not defend it as a theory of epistemic justification, although we do (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Doxastic agency.John Heil - 1983 - Philosophical Studies 43 (3):355 - 364.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   40 citations