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Rational beliefs in extensive games

Giacomo Bonanno

Theory and Decision 33 (2):153-176 (1992)

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Belief system foundations of backward induction.Antonio Quesada - 2002 - Theory and Decision 53 (4):393-403.details Two justifications of backward induction (BI) in generic perfect information games are formulated using Bonanno's (1992; Theory and Decision 33, 153) belief systems. The first justification concerns the BI strategy profile and is based on selecting a set of rational belief systems from which players have to choose their belief functions. The second justification concerns the BI path of play and is based on a sequential deletion of nodes that are inconsistent with the choice of rational belief functions. Download Export citation Bookmark
Synchronic information, knowledge and common knowledge in extensive games.Giacomo Bonanno - 1999 - Research in Economics 53 (1):77-99.details Restricting attention to the class of extensive games defined by von Neumann and Morgenstern with the added assumption of perfect recall, we specify the information of each player at each node of the game-tree in a way which is coherent with the original information structure of the extensive form. We show that this approach provides a framework for a formal and rigorous treatment of questions of knowledge and common knowledge at every node of the tree. We construct a particular information (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 5 citations

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