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  1. Paternalism and evaluative shift.Ben Davies - 2017 - Moral Philosophy and Politics 4 (2):325-346.
    Many people feel that respecting a person’s autonomy is not sufficiently important to obligate us to stay out of their affairs in all cases; but the ground for interference may often turn out to be a hunch that the agent cannot really be competent, or cannot really know what her decision implies; for if she were both of these things, surely she would not make such a foolish decision. This paper suggests a justification of paternalism that does not rely on (...)
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  • Get Old or Die Trying: Longevity Justice in Social Insurance.Manuel Sá Valente - forthcoming - Politics, Philosophy and Economics.
    Of all the risks we face in life, ranging from unemployment to old age, early death is among the most tragic and yet most neglected by modern states. Liberal egalitarians might find it easy to dismiss social insurance against early death, but I argue they should not. Early in this paper, I explain why social insurance should include the risk of premature death by replying to four common criticisms. What follows is a case for a novel form of insurance that (...)
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  • Ageing as Equals: Distributive Justice in Retirement Pensions.Manuel Sá Valente - 2022 - Dissertation, Université Catholique de Louvain
    Despite being increasingly available to us all, retirement pensions remain unequally distributed: between rich and poor, young and old, men and women, and possibly different generations. As this topic receives little attention in moral and political philosophy, the articles in this thesis aim to deliver an original account of justice in retirement pensions along liberal egalitarian lines. The first part defends retirement pensions as a distribution of free time. It shows that including free time in the list of goods that (...)
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  • From Sufficient Health to Sufficient Responsibility.Ben Davies & Julian Savulescu - 2020 - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 17 (3):423-433.
    The idea of using responsibility in the allocation of healthcare resources has been criticized for, among other things, too readily abandoning people who are responsible for being very badly off. One response to this problem is that while responsibility can play a role in resource allocation, it cannot do so if it will leave those who are responsible below a “sufficiency” threshold. This paper considers first whether a view can be both distinctively sufficientarian and allow responsibility to play a role (...)
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  • Health(care) and the temporal subject.Ben Davies - 2018 - Les Ateliers de l'Éthique / the Ethics Forum 13 (3):38-64.
    Many assume that theories of distributive justice must obviously take people’s lifetimes, and only their lifetimes, as the relevant period across which we distribute. Although the question of the temporal subject has risen in prominence, it is still relatively underdeveloped, particularly in the sphere of health and healthcare. This paper defends a particular view, “momentary sufficientarianism,” as being an important element of healthcare justice. At the heart of the argument is a commitment to pluralism about justice, where theorizing about just (...)
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  • Proportionality without Inequality: Defending Lifetime Political Equality through Storable Votes.Manuel Sá Valente - 2022 - Res Publica 28 (4):715-732.
    Political egalitarians tend to defend equal distributions of voting power at specific times, as in ‘one election, one vote’. Appealing as it is, the principle seems incompatible with distributing power proportionally to the stakes voters have at different elections, as in ‘one stake, one vote’. This article argues that the tension above stems from the temporal scope ascribed to political equality, as at specific moments of democratic decision-making instead of over entire lives. More specifically, ascribing a lifetime view to political (...)
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  • Making sense of age-group justice.Juliana Bidadanure - 2016 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 15 (3):234-260.
    This article brings together two debates in contemporary political philosophy: on the one hand, the dispute between the distributive and relational approaches to equality and, on the other hand, the field of intergenerational equality. I offer an original contribution to the second domain and by doing so, I inform the first. The aim of this article is thus twofold: (1) shedding some light on an under-researched and yet crucial question – ‘which inequalities between generations matter?’ and (2) contributing to a (...)
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  • Equality of resources and the demands of authenticity.Paul Bou-Habib & Serena Olsaretti - 2016 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 19 (4):434-455.
    One of the most distinctive features of Ronald Dworkin’s egalitarian theory is its commitment to holding individuals responsible for the costs to others of their ambitions. This commitment has received much criticism. Drawing on Dworkin’s latest statement of his position in Justice for Hedgehogs (2011), we suggest that it seems to be in tension with another crucial element of Dworkin’s own theory, namely, its endorsement of the importance of people leading authentic lives – lives that reflect their own values. We (...)
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  • Basic Income and Unequal Longevity.Manuel Sá Valente - 2022 - Basic Income Studies 17 (1):1-14.
    Universal basic income proposes providing instalments of constant magnitude to all. One problem with a stable basic income across life is that it seems unfair to shorter-lived persons, who are worst-off due to premature death and receive less over their whole lives. Basic capital solves this problem by providing a one-off grant to the young, but I argue that it mistreats long-lived persons, as it does not guarantee their real freedom across life. There is a dilemma between these proposals regarding (...)
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