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  1. The Factivity Failure of Contextualist “Knows”.Franck Lihoreau & Manuel Rebuschi - 2008 - The Reasoner 2 (1):4-5.
    In this paper we argue that standard, indexical contextualism about "knows" is unable to account for the factivity of this epistemic expression.
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  • (1 other version)A theory of presentism.Craig Bourne - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):1-23.
    Most of us would want to say that it is true that Socrates taught Plato. According to realists about past facts,1 this is made true by the fact that there is, located in the past, i.e., earlier than now, at least one real event that is the teaching of Plato by Socrates. Presentists, however, in denying that past events and facts exist2 cannot appeal to such facts to make their past-tensed statements true. So what is a presentist to do?
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  • Wondering about the future.Stephan Torre - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (8):2449-2473.
    Will it rain tomorrow? Will there be a sea battle tomorrow? Will my death be painful? Wondering about the future plays a central role in our cognitive lives. It is integral to our inquiries, our planning, our hopes, and our fears. The aim of this paper is to consider various accounts of future contingents and the implications that they have for wondering about the future. I argue that reflecting on the nature of wondering about the future supports an Ockhamist account (...)
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  • Odd Objects: LEM Violations and Indeterminacy.Dana Goswick - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (6):1615-1633.
    I argue there are some objects which do not respect the Law of the Excluded Middle, i.e., which are such that, for some property F, the disjunction Fo v ~Fo fails to be true. I call such objects “odd objects” and present three examples—fictional objects, nonsort objects, and quantum objects. I argue that each of these objects is best understood as violating LEM. I, then, discuss Jessica Wilson’s account of metaphysical indeterminacy. I show how the indeterminacy which arises with odd (...)
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  • Fatalism and Future Contingents.Giacomo Andreoletti - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 60 (3):1-14.
    In this paper I address issues related to the problem of future contingents and the metaphysical doctrine of fatalism. Two classical responses to the problem of future contingents are the third truth value view and the all-false view. According to the former, future contingents take a third truth value which goes beyond truth and falsity. According to the latter, they are all false. I here illustrate and discuss two ways to respectively argue for those two views. Both ways are similar (...)
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  • Future Contingents and Aristotle’s Fantasy.Andrea Iacona - 2007 - Critica 39 (117):45-60.
    This paper deals with the problem of future contingents, and focuses on two classical logical principles, excluded middle and bivalence. One may think that different attitudes are to be adopted towards these two principles in order to solve the problem. According to what seems to be a widely held hypothesis, excluded middle must be accepted while bivalence must be rejected. The paper goes against that line of thought. In the first place, it shows how the rejection of bivalence leads to (...)
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  • God, fatalism, and temporal ontology.David Kyle Johnson - 2009 - Religious Studies 45 (4):435-454.
    Theological incompatibility arguments suggest God's comprehensive foreknowledge is incompatible with human free will. Logical incompatibility arguments suggest a complete set of truths about the future is logically incompatible with human free will. Of the two, most think theological incompatibility is the more severe problem; but hardly anyone thinks either kind of argument presents a real threat to free will. I will argue, however, that sound theological and logical incompatibility arguments exist and that, in fact, logical incompatibly is the more severe (...)
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  • The open future: bivalence, determinism and ontology.Elizabeth Barnes & Ross Cameron - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 146 (2):291-309.
    In this paper we aim to disentangle the thesis that the future is open from theses that often get associated or even conflated with it. In particular, we argue that the open future thesis is compatible with both the unrestricted principle of bivalence and determinism with respect to the laws of nature. We also argue that whether or not the future (and indeed the past) is open has no consequences as to the existence of (past and) future ontology.
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  • Bourne on future contingents and three-valued logic.Daisuke Kachi - 2009 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 18 (1):33-43.
    Recently, Bourne constructed a system of three-valued logic that he supposed to replace Łukasiewicz’s three-valued logic in view of the problems of future contingents. In this paper, I will show first that Bourne’s system makes no improvement to Łukasiewicz’s system. However, finding some good motivations and lessons in his attempt, next I will suggest a better way of achieving his original goal in some sense. The crucial part of my way lies in reconsidering the significance of the intermediate truth-value so (...)
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  • The Trouble with Pollock’s Principle of Agreement.Paul D. Thorn - 2007 - The Reasoner 1 (8):9-10.
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