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  1. I—The Virtues of Relativism.Maria Baghramian - 2019 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 93 (1):247-269.
    What is it about relativism that justifies, or at least explains, its continued appeal in the face of relentless attacks through the history of philosophy? This paper explores a new answer to this old question, casting the response in metaphilosophical terms. § i introduces the problem. § ii argues that one part of the answer is that some of the well-known defences of relativism take it to be a philosophical stance—that is, a broad perspective or orientation with normative consequences—rather than (...)
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  • What is the Relation Between a Philosophical Stance and Its Associated Beliefs?Sandy C. Boucher - 2018 - Dialectica 72 (4):509-524.
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  • Stances and Epistemology: Values, Pragmatics, and Rationality.Sandy Boucher - 2018 - Metaphilosophy 49 (4):521-547.
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  • An Empiricist Conception of the Relation Between Metaphysics and Science.Sandy C. Boucher - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-24.
    It is widely acknowledged that metaphysical assumptions, commitments and presuppositions play an important role in science. Yet according to the empiricist there is no place for metaphysics as traditionally understood in the scientific enterprise. In this paper I aim to take a first step towards reconciling these seemingly irreconcilable claims. In the first part of the paper I outline a conception of metaphysics and its relation to science that should be congenial to empiricists, motivated by van Fraassen’s work on ‘stances’. (...)
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  • Functionalism and Structuralism as Philosophical Stances: Van Fraassen Meets the Philosophy of Biology.Sandy C. Boucher - 2015 - Biology and Philosophy 30 (3):383-403.
    I consider the broad perspectives in biology known as ‘functionalism’ and ‘structuralism’, as well as a modern version of functionalism, ‘adaptationism’. I do not take a position on which of these perspectives is preferable; my concern is with the prior question, how should they be understood? Adapting van Fraassen’s argument for treating materialism as a stance, rather than a factual belief with propositional content, in the first part of the paper I offer an argument for construing functionalism and structuralism as (...)
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