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Consciousness and welfare subjectivity

Noûs 57 (4):905-921 (2022)

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  1. (1 other version)Counting Subjects.Joseph Gottlieb & Bob Fischer - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    We normally assume that there’s just one conscious individual per animal. Some question this, suggesting that there may be nonhuman taxonomic groups whose normal, adult members house more than one conscious subject. Call this the multitudes view (“MV)”. Our aim is methodological: we hope to understand how we might assess whether MV is true. To that end, we distinguish two strategies for counting conscious subjects: the duplication strategy and the mind-first strategy. We use human split-brain patients and octopuses to illustrate (...)
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  • Susan Schneider on Artificial Consciousness and Moral Standing.A. Vaidya & R. Krishnaswamy - forthcoming - Analysis.
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  • Hedonic Consciousness and Moral Status.Declan Smithies - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind.
    Which beings have moral status? I argue that moral status requires some capacity for hedonic feelings of pleasure or displeasure. David Chalmers rejects this view on the grounds that it denies moral status to Vulcans, which are defined as conscious creatures with no capacity for hedonic feelings. On his more inclusive view, all conscious beings have moral status. We agree that only conscious beings have moral status, but we disagree about how to explain this. I argue that we cannot explain (...)
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  • The Sublime of Consciousness.Takuya Niikawa & Uriah Kriegel - forthcoming - British Journal of Aesthetics.
    The aesthetic tradition has identified as paradigmatically sublime such objects as imposing mountains and intense storms, as well as monumental art. But the tradition also acknowledges less paradigmatic cases, including sometimes mathematical structures or abstract concepts. In this paper, we argue that there is also a case for considering phenomenal consciousness – the experiential quality of subjective awareness – as a sublime phenomenon. One appreciates this, we argue, when one is struck by (fitting) awe upon contemplating (a) the perplexing existence (...)
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  • Sentience, Vulcans, and Zombies: The Value of Phenomenal Consciousness.Joshua Shepherd - forthcoming - AI and Society:1-11.
    Many think that a specific aspect of phenomenal consciousness – valenced or affective experience – is essential to consciousness’s moral significance (valence sentientism). They hold that valenced experience is necessary for well-being, or moral status, or psychological intrinsic value (or all three). Some think that phenomenal consciousness generally is necessary for non-derivative moral significance (broad sentientism). Few think that consciousness is unnecessary for moral significance (non-necessitarianism). In this paper I consider the prospects for these views. I first consider the prospects (...)
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  • AI Wellbeing.Simon Goldstein & Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini - forthcoming - Asian Journal of Philosophy.
    Under what conditions would an artificially intelligent system have wellbeing? Despite its clear bearing on the ethics of human interactions with artificial systems, this question has received little direct attention. Because all major theories of wellbeing hold that an individual’s welfare level is partially determined by their mental life, we begin by considering whether artificial systems have mental states. We show that a wide range of theories of mental states, when combined with leading theories of wellbeing, predict that certain existing (...)
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  • Sentientism, Motivation, and Philosophical Vulcans.Luke Roelofs - 2023 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 104 (2):301-323.
    If moral status depends on the capacity for consciousness, what kind of consciousness matters exactly? Two popular answers are that any kind of consciousness matters (Broad Sentientism), and that what matters is the capacity for pleasure and suffering (Narrow Sentientism). I argue that the broad answer is too broad, while the narrow answer is likely too narrow, as Chalmers has recently argued by appeal to ‘philosophical Vulcans’. I defend a middle position, Motivational Sentientism, on which what matters is motivating consciousness: (...)
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  • The Value of Consciousness to the One Who Has It.Uriah Kriegel - forthcoming - In Geoffrey Lee & Adam Pautz (eds.), The Importance of Being Conscious. Oxford University Press.
    There is a strong intuition that a zombie’s life is never good or bad for the zombie. What explains this? In this paper, I consider five possible explanations of the intuition that a zombie’s life is never worth living, plus the option of rejecting the intuition. I point out the considerable costs of each option, though making clear which option strikes me as least problematic.
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  • Prudential Value and Impersonal Value.Eden Lin - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Prudential value is the kind of value that something has when it is good for someone, in the sense that is conceptually tied to welfare or well‐being. Impersonal value is the kind of value that something has when it is good simply, absolutely, or “from the point of view of the universe.” According to the Moorean position on prudential value, the concept of prudential value can be analyzed in terms of that of impersonal value and is unintelligible if it is (...)
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  • Phenomenal consciousness and moral status: taking the moral option.Joseph Gough - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    Intuitively, there is a close link between moral status and phenomenal consciousness. Taking the link seriously can serve as the basis of a proposal that appears to have a surprising number of theoretical benefits. This proposal is the moral option, according to which moral status is partly determinative of phenomenal consciousness, and phenomenal consciousness is sufficient for possession of a moral property I refer to as “moral status.” I argue for this view on the basis of its ability to shed (...)
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  • Abhinavagupta, the hard problem of consciousness, and the moral grounding problem. [REVIEW]Anand Jayprakash Vaidya - 2024 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 95 (1):93-101.
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  • A Critical Notice on the Moral Grounding Question in David Chalmers’ Reality+.Anand Jayprakash Vaidya - 2023 - Sophia 62 (1):195-200.
    In this critical discussion, I evaluate David Chalmers’ position on the moral grounding question from his (2022) Reality +. The moral grounding question asks: in virtue of what does an entity x have moral standing? Chalmers argues for the claim that phenomenal consciousness is a necessary condition for moral standing. After a brief introduction to his book, I evaluate his position on the moral grounding question from the perspective of access consciousness as opposed to phenomenal consciousness, as well as the (...)
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  • Consciousness Ain’t All That.Neil Levy - 2024 - Neuroethics 17 (2):1-14.
    Most philosophers think that phenomenal consciousness underlies, or at any rate makes a large contribution, to moral considerability. This paper argues that many such accounts invoke question-begging arguments. Moreover, they’re unable to explain apparent differences in moral status across and within different species. In the light of these problems, I argue that we ought to take very seriously a view according to which moral considerability is grounded in functional properties. Phenomenal consciousness may be sufficient for having a moral value, but (...)
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