This paper extends Mori’s (IEEE Robot Autom Mag 19:98–100, 2012) uncanny valley-hypothesis to include technologies that fail its basic criterion that uncanniness arises when the subject experiences a discrepancy in a machine’s human likeness. In so doing, the paper considers Mori’s hypothesis about the uncanny valley as an instance of what Heidegger calls the ‘challenging revealing’ nature of modern technology. It introduces seeming autonomy and heteronomy as phenomenological categories that ground human being-in-the-world including our experience of things and people. It (...) is suggested that this categorical distinction is more foundational than Heidegger’s existential structures and phenomenological categories. Having introduced this novel phenomenological distinction, the paper considers the limits of Mori’s hypothesis by drawing on an example from science fiction that showcases that uncanniness need not only be caused by machines that resemble human beings. In so doing, it explores how the seeming autonomy-heteronomy distinction clarifies (at least some of) the uncanniness that can arise when humans encounter advanced technology which is irreducible to the anthropocentrism that shapes Mori’s original hypothesis. (shrink)

Trends in corporate governance to minimize employee participation and to promote shareholder rights, in both the EU and US contexts, evidence the practical efficacy of the separation thesis and the dominance of models of corporate governance founded upon decision theory. Giving expression to a vision of human agency in terms of instrumental rationality, such models of corporate governance, presuppose clearly defined objectives. Drawing on the work of Talbot Brewer, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Robert Brandom, this paper offers an alternative practice-based model (...) of corporate governance that emphasizes the role of socially and historically embodied forms of reasoning in promoting a better understanding of the aims or objectives of the corporation, particularly with respect to the social, environmental, and economic context of the firm. After reviewing recent empirical literature concerning employee participation, criteria are offered concerning effective employee participation programs, as a means of implementing a practice-based model of corporate governance. (shrink)

I trace back the relation between phenomenology and pragmatism from contemporary discussions about a pragmatic turn in embodied-enactive cognitive science to the earliest associations between the phenomenologies of Husserl and Peirce. I argue against the claim that there has been a pragmatic turn per se in either phenomenology or cognitive science. Pragmatism, and a form of phenomenological pragmatism had already been informing debates in cognitive science from the very beginning. On the one hand, the recent phenomenological and pragmatic emphases in (...) embodied-enactive cognitive science represent more of a phenomenological turn in cognitive science than a pragmatic turn. On the other hand, since various versions of phenomenology were already operating in cognitive science, even if they were operating in opposition to the establishment view, embodied-enactive views do not involve a phenomenological turn. It may be better to say that such views continue and build upon the phenomenology and pragmatism that had been informing ongoing debates in the study of the mind. Not only can we trace a close connection between phenomenology and pragmatism all the way back to the beginnings of these philosophical approaches, they continue to operate in a dialectical fashion throughout their history. (shrink)

The confusion surrounding Heidegger's account of death in Being and Time has led to severe criticisms, some of which dismiss his analysis as incoherent and obtuse. I argue that Heidegger's critics err by equating Heidegger's concept of death with our ordinary concept. As I show, Heidegger's concept of death is not the same as the ordinary meaning of the term, namely, the event that ends life. But nor does this concept merely denote the finitude of Dasein's possibilities or the groundlessness (...) of existence, as William Blattner and Hubert Dreyfus have suggested. Rather, I argue, the concept of death has to be understood both as temporal finitude and as finitude of possibility. I show how this reading addresses the criticisms directed at Heidegger's death analysis as well as solving textual problems generated by more limited interpretations of the concept. (shrink)

Joseph Rouse has drawn from Heidegger’s early philosophy to develop what he calls a “practical hermeneutics of science.” With this, he has not only become an important player in the recent trend towards practice-based conceptualisations of science, he has also emerged as the predominant expositor of Heidegger’s philosophy of science. Yet, there are serious shortcomings in both Rouse’s theory of science and his interpretation of Heidegger. In the first instance, Rouse’s practical hermeneutics appears confused on the topic of realism. In (...) the second instance, Rouse suppresses Heidegger’s distinction between existence and essence, and hence fails to grasp the latter’s corollary distinction between scientic research and everyday practice. I argue that, by accepting a correction in his interpretation of Heidegger, Rouse would find the means to resolve the debilitating tensions in his stance towards realism. (shrink)

Being and Time’s emphasis on practical activities has attracted much attention as an approach to meaning not modelled exclusively on language. However, understanding this emphasis is made more difficult by Heidegger’s notion of Rede, which he routinely characterizes as both language-like and basic to all disclosure. This paper assesses whether this notion can be both interpreted coherently and reconciled with Heidegger’s emphasis on intelligent nonlinguistic behaviours. It begins by identifying two functions of Articulacy – the demonstrative and articulatory – and (...) a potential source of incoherence in Heidegger’s analysis. Having reviewed some standard approaches to Heideggerian Articulacy, I show how Heidegger’s discussion of predicative judgements implies that language can be linked with different kinds of content. This allows Heidegger’s analysis to be read coherently, provided Articulacy is understood as having distinct purposive and predicative modes. The final section shows how this reading preserves a close connection between Articulacy and language while accommodating intelligent nonlinguistic behaviours. (shrink)

Recent literature comparing the works of Heidegger and Davidson suggests that one of the main differences between these two thinkers is that the latter lacks any notion of non-linguistic interpretation and understanding; the only way of making sense of a domain of entities for Davidson is theory. I argue against this common perspective and show that Davidson is committed to a primitive, pre-conceptual form of understanding that is socially mediated. This primitive form of understanding is essential to the functioning of (...) what Davidson calls 'primitive triangulation'. Properly understood, primitive triangulation shares many structural features with Dasein's comportment. (shrink)

En este artículo pretendo mostrar como la ontologización de la praxis, operada por Martin Heidegger en el período abarcado por sus Lecciones de Friburgo y Marburgo, puede contribuir en forma positiva a la fundamentación de una filosofía de técnica. La reformulación de la fenomenología vía la hermenéutica y la interpretación fenomenológica de Aristóteles que ofrece Heidegger es de una relevancia fundamental para el desarrollo de una hermenéutica de la acción técnica. El análisis de los comportamientos fundamentales descubridores de la vida (...) (theoría, poíesis, praxis) y sus correspondientes tipos de saberes (sophía, tékne, phrónesis), y la nueva interpretación de oúsia y kínesis son de importancia fundamental para este intento. El objetivo principal es localizar una filosofía de la técnica implícita en la obra temprana de Heidegger y elaborar una tesis del trato operativo que reconstruye la problemática filosófica de la técnica desde un nuevo punto de partida. (shrink)

This paper tries to read some structure into the perplexing diversity of the literature on Heidegger ’s concept of authenticity. It argues that many of the interpretations available rely on views that are false and cannot be Heidegger ’s. It also shows that the only correct interpretation of Heidegger ’s concept of authenticity emerges from a synthesis of Dreyfus ’ later interpretation and Haugeland’s interpretation of this concept. A synthesis of these interpretations yields an interpretation, according to which Dasein’s being (...) is authentic only if it is capable of using tools or language in radically new ways. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to begin to try to understand the extent to which ethnomethodology (EM) might be informed by some concepts and ideas from the work of the philosopher Martin Heidegger. This is done in two parts. The first looks at Heidegger's later work and compares his conception of the ontological difference with Garfinkel's work on the difference between EM and formal sociological analysis (FA). The second part turns to Heidegger's earlier work (around Being and Time) and (...) works through a number of affinities between the analysis of Dasein and ethnomethodological versions of everydayness. (shrink)

O artigo examina a afirmação, feita por Heidegger em Ser e tempo, segundo a qual o nascimento de um existente humano é um outro fim para o Dasein. A afirmação é analisada a partir do conceito de possibilidade existencial. Assim como a morte é interpretada existencialmente, também o nascimento ganha uma análise em termos de possibilidade. Na medida em que a possibilidade existencial é definida pela instauração de ser, e a finitude do ser-para-a-morte qualifica a morte existencial como um fim (...) , o mesmo pode ser dito do nascimento. Ou seja, o nascimento é um fim, no sentido de que determina a qualificação finita do estar em possibilidades. Natalidade e mortalidade não são apenas características de um ente vivo, mas qualificações superiores da possibilidade existencial.The paper examines Heidegger's statement in Being and Time, according to with the birth of a human existent is another end to Dasein. The statement should be analized through the concept of possibility. In the same way that death is existential interpretaded, so becomes birth an analysis by the notion of possibility. In the extent that existential possibility is definid by instauration of being, and the finitude of Sein-zum-Tode qualifies existential death as an end , the same can also be held of birth. That is, birth is an end in the sense of the finite qualifying of being thrown into possibilities. Natality and mortality are not only marks of a living being, but higher qualifications of existential possibility. (shrink)

Neste artigo, o autor examina a abordagem da ciência e da técnica que foi apresentada por Martin Heidegger no seu curso de inverno de 1928, intitulado Introdução à filosofia. A tese central examinada é a de que a ciência e a técnica mostram a impotência originária do ente humano. O conceito de impotência é circunscrito pela determinação concreta da transcendência do Dasein, a cujas determinações negativas acrescenta-se, ainda, aquela que resulta da interpretação ontológica do conceito de jogo.In this paper the (...) author examines Heidegger's account of science and technology, that is presented in Winter course of 1928 Introduction to Philosophy. The main examined thesis says that science and technology display the primordial impotence of human being. The concept of impotence is circumscribed by the concrete determination of transcendence of Dasein, to which negative determinations adds, yet, that resulting from the ontological interpretation of concept of game. (shrink)

Recognition is a fundamental good that corporations ought to give to employees, a good that is essential to their well-being, and thus, recognition should be among the central notions in our understanding of organizations and in any theory of business ethics. Drawing upon the work of Philip Pettit and Robert Brandom as well as themes from instrumental stakeholder theory, I develop a complex notion of recognition involving both status recognition and capacity recognition and argue that this account meets three fundamental (...) desiderata of any adequate account of business ethics: It makes salient key normative features of the practice of business. It articulates a genuine ethical demand that is not reducible to the economic imperatives typical of self-interested actors. And it is compatible with the strategic demands that organizations face to remain competitive. Status recognition involves treating others as persons whose rights are legally enshrined. Capacity recognition involves treating others as persons possessing specific capacities. When corporations accord these forms of recognition to employees, they promote their well-being in a fundamental way and they promote the long-term success of the firm. Thus, recognition represents an underappreciated concept that may further contribute to theory development in business ethics and organization studies and more ethical business practice. (shrink)

Though there are few more pervasive features of the social world than the ebb and flow of individual participation, the literature only provides hints as to its phenomenology. The phenomenological investigation of social participation presented in this paper indicates that it essentially entails: 1. Attunement to the others' "stock of knowledge at hand" . 2. Emotional and motivational attunement to the group's concerns. 3. Taking for granted that one can contribute appropriately. 4. Being able to assume that one's identity is (...) not under threat. Though the implications can only be touched on in this paper, the phenomenological clarification of participation is a valuable resource, grounding many lines of research of contemporary significance-for instance, in education and the other "person professions" and in social policy and political science-and suggesting fruitful new perspectives. (shrink)

This paper is a contribution to a discussion in philosophy of technology by focusing on the epistemological status of the example. Of the various developments in the emerging, inchoate field of philosophy of technology, the “empirical turn” stands out as having left the most enduring mark on the trajectory contemporary research takes. From a historical point of view, the empirical turn can best be understood as a corrective to the overly “transcendentalizing” tendencies of “classical” philosophers of technology, such as Heidegger. (...) Empirically oriented philosophy of technology emphasizes actual technologies through case-study research into the formation of technical objects and systems and how they, for example, transform our perceptions and conceptions or pass on and propagate relations of power. This paper explores the point of convergence of classical and contemporary approaches by means of the notion of the “example” or “paradigm.” It starts with a discussion of the quintessential modern philosopher of technology, Martin Heidegger, and his thinking about technology in terms of the ontological difference. Heidegger’s framing of technology in terms of this difference places the weight of intelligibility entirely on the side of being, to such an extent that his examples become heuristic rather than constitutive. The second part of the paper discusses the methodological and epistemological import of the “example” and the form of intelligibility it affords. Drawing on the work of Wittgenstein, Foucault, and Agamben, we argue that the example offers an alternative way of understanding the study of technologies from that of empirical case studies. (shrink)

This paper is a contribution to a discussion in philosophy of technology by focusing on the epistemological status of the example. Of the various developments in the emerging, inchoate field of philosophy of technology, the “empirical turn” stands out as having left the most enduring mark on the trajectory contemporary research takes. From a historical point of view, the empirical turn can best be understood as a corrective to the overly “transcendentalizing” tendencies of “classical” philosophers of technology, such as Heidegger. (...) Empirically oriented philosophy of technology emphasizes actual technologies through case-study research into the formation of technical objects and systems (constructivist studies) and how they, for example, transform our perceptions and conceptions (the phenomenological tradition) or pass on and propagate relations of power (critical theory). This paper explores the point of convergence of classical and contemporary approaches by means of the notion of the “example” or “paradigm.” It starts with a discussion of the quintessential modern philosopher of technology, Martin Heidegger, and his thinking about technology in terms of the ontological difference. Heidegger’s framing of technology in terms of this difference places the weight of intelligibility entirely on the side of being, to such an extent that his examples become heuristic rather than constitutive. The second part of the paper discusses the methodological and epistemological import of the “example” and the form of intelligibility it affords. Drawing on the work of Wittgenstein (standard metre), Foucault (panopticism), and Agamben (paradigm), we argue that the example offers an alternative way of understanding the study of technologies from that of empirical case studies. (shrink)

Neste artigo apresento os traços gerais da doutrina heideggeriana da temporalidade, em Ser e Tempo. Além de destacar os aspectos ontológicos que caracterizam tal abordagem, acentuo uma característica central da assim chamada cronologia fenomenológica, a saber: a identificação de modos do tempo e o a determinação de uma relação de dependência explicativa entre eles. A finitude da temporalidade e a gênese dos modos do tempo a partir da temporalidade originária do Dasein são analisadas com maior ênfase. O artigo é encerrado (...) com uma breve consideração de quatro tópicos que certamente devem ser abordados com maior detalhe em uma posterior análise da cronologia fenomenológica de Heidegger.Fenomenologia. Heidegger. Temporalidade. Heidegger: Time's Origin and Finitude AbstractIn this paper I present the general lines of Heidegger's doctrine of temporality in Being and Time. Besides the ontological aspects that distinguish such approach, I also stress a main feature of the so-called phenomenological chronology, that is: the identification of modes of time, and the determination of an explanatory dependency relation between them. The finitude of temporality and the genesis of the modes of time from Dasein's originary temporality are both analyzed with more emphasis. The paper ends with a short review of four issues that a further analysis of Heidegger's phenomenological chronology surely must address in detail.Phenomenology. Heidegger. Temporality. (shrink)

Heidegger's Being and Time sets out a view of ourselves that shows in positive terms how a reification of ourselves as minded beings can be avoided. Heidegger thereby provides a view of ourselves that fits into one of the main strands of today's philosophy of mind: the intentional vocabulary in which we describe ourselves is indispensable and in principle irreducible to a naturalistic vocabulary. However, as far as ontology is concerned, there is no commitment to the position that being minded (...) is something beyond the physical. In particular, this paper shows how Heidegger's claim that being minded is tied to being-in-the-world links up with (a) externalism and (b) a social theory of intentionality. (shrink)

As part of a religiously-oriented analysis, Martin Buber associates Martin Heidegger’s later philosophy with magic. The present article is dedicated to explicating and evaluating this association. It does so, first, by fleshing out how Buber comes to depict Heidegger as an advocate of magic. Then, by examining other appearances of the category of magic in the wider context of Buber’s dialogical oeuvre, it demonstrates that what he has in mind when he invokes this category is a specific manner of human (...) appeal to the divine marked by manipulation, utility and control. Finally, it evaluates the affiliation of Heidegger with magic: first, by comparing the metaphysical presuppositions undergirding the logic of magic—specifically the conceptions of, and interrelations between, ‘language’ and ‘being’—with Heidegger’s views, and second, by judging whether the claim that Heidegger promotes manipulative, utilitarian, and power-laden attitudes can be justified in light of his analysis of ‘technology’. The article ultimately argues that Buber misattributes magic to Heidegger, and that this misattribution better reflects the theoretical framework through which Buber justifies his dialogical position than an apt assessment of Heidegger’s thought. (shrink)

While avoiding relativism, Rorty claims that: (1) truth is just for a time and a place; (2) ?truth? and ?rationality? are indexed to a community's standards of warranted assertibility; and (3) there is nothing more to be said about truth and rationality than is contained, in a community's procedures for evaluating claims. He makes these assertions because he believes that the cautionary uses of ?true? and ?rational? crucially depend upon the endorsing uses of these terms. I argue that Rorty is (...) wrong in this belief and that the principle of charity assures us that in their cautionary uses ?true? and ?rational? are independent of any idiosyncracies associated with any community's current standards of justification. (shrink)

La politique culturelle L’expression « politique culturelle » désigne, entre autres, les discussions concernant le choix des mots que l’on utilise. Quand nous disons que les Français devraient cesser de parler des Allemands comme de « Boches » ou que les blancs devraient cesser de parler des noirs comme de « nègres », nous pratiquons la politique culturelle. En effet, l’abandon de ces pratiques linguistiques facilitera nos buts socio-politiques (accroître le degré de tolérance réciproque entr...

An important shift occurs in Martin Heidegger’s thinking one year after the publication of Being and Time , in the Appendix to the Metaphysical Foundations of Logic . The shift is from his project of fundamental ontology—which provides an existential analysis of human existence on an ontological level—to metontology . Metontology is a neologism that refers to the ontic sphere of human experience and to the regional ontologies that were excluded from Being and Time. It is within metontology, Heidegger states, (...) that “the question of ethics may be raised for the first time.” This paper makes explicit both Heidegger’s argument for metontology , and the relation between metontology and ethics. In examining what he means by “the art of existing,” the paper argues that there is an ethical dimension to Heidegger’s thinking that corresponds to a moderate form of moral particularism. In order to justify this position, a comparative analysis is made between Heidegger, Aristotle, and Bernard Williams. (shrink)

Esta contribución elabora la concepción del “Un-zuhause-sein” en Heidegger en su relación con la experiencia del exilio, como es descripta por Mario Benedetti. En la experiencia del exilio, cuando se quiebra la familiaridad tranquilizadora con el mundo, se accede al «fenómeno más original desde el punto de vista ontológico existenciario» de la absoluta negación del estar en casa. Mientras la angustia despertada por la soledad fáctica conduce a una ruptura con el mundo cotidiano, el extrañamien-to nos desnuda y nos revela (...) al mundo en su inhospitalidad originaria. Es la angustia la que tanto abre a este modo de ser originario y propio del “ser ahí”, la que hace patente su ser-en-el-mundo, la que lo singulariza y lo aísla de los demás seres. El exilio, como experiencia paradigmática de la in-hospitalidad, demuestra que la experiencia del Un-zuhause-sein es un rasgo ontológico-existencial del Dasein. (shrink)