Switch to: References

Citations of:

Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment

Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press (1994)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Defending realism on the proper ground.Athanassios Raftopoulos - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (1):47-77.
    'Epistemological constructivism' holds that vision is mediated by background preconceptions and is theory-laden. Hence, two persons with differing theoretical commitments see the world differently and they could agree on what they see only if they both espoused the same conceptual framework. This, in its turn, undermines the possibility of theory testing and choice on a common theory-neutral empirical basis. In this paper, I claim that the cognitive sciences suggest that a part of vision may be only indirectly penetrated by cognition (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • De la identidad humana a las identidades sociopolíticas: el rol del pensamiento wittgensteiniano en un desplazamiento crucial.Miguel Ángel Quintana Paz - 2020 - Anales de la Cátedra Francisco Suárez 54:7-31.
    Today, the notion of identity is usually linked with ethical-political discussions like multiculturalism, gender or sexual diversity, recognition of plurality, etc. Nevertheless, the flourishing of this vision that interprets “identity” mainly in its plural form (as “identities”) contrasts sharply with the sense that “identity” has had during most of the history of philosophy (in which identity was understood in connection with “unity” or “selfsameness”, not with “diversity” or “otherness”). In order to explain the passage from one notion of identity to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Dog whistles, covertly coded speech, and the practices that enable them.Anne Quaranto - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-34.
    Dog whistling—speech that seems ordinary but sends a hidden, often derogatory message to a subset of the audience—is troubling not just for our political ideals, but also for our theories of communication. On the one hand, it seems possible to dog whistle unintentionally, merely by uttering certain expressions. On the other hand, the intention is typically assumed or even inferred from the act, and perhaps for good reason, for dog whistles seem misleading by design, not just by chance. In this (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • The Origins of Walter Benjamin's Concept of Philosophical Critique.Alexei Procyshyn - 2013 - Metaphilosophy 44 (5):655-681.
    Focusing on Walter Benjamin's earliest pieces dedicated to school reform and the student movement, this article traces the basic critical approaches informing his mature thought back to his struggle to critically implement and transform the theory of concept formation and value presentation developed by his Freiburg teacher, Heinrich Rickert. It begins with an account of Rickert's work, specifically of the concept of Darstellung (presentation) and its central role in Rickert's postmetaphysical theory of historical research (which he characterizes as exclusively concerned (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Robert Brandom on Communication, Reference, and Objectivity.Bernd Prien - 2010 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (3):433-458.
    The two main challenges of the theory of conceptual content presented by Robert Brandom in Making It Explicit are to account for a referential dimension of conceptual content and to account for the objectivity of conceptual norms. Brandom tries to meet both these challenges in chapter 8 of his book. I argue that the accounts presented there can only be understood if seen against the background of Brandom's theory of communication developed in chapter 7. This theory is motivated by the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Disagreement, Error and Two Senses of Incompatibility—The Relational Function of Discursive Updating.Tanja Pritzlaff - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (1):121-138.
    In Between Saying and Doing: Towards an Analytic Pragmatism , Robert B. Brandom puts forward a general method of formally representing relations between meaning and use (between vocabularies and practices-or-abilities) and shows how discursive intentionality can be understood as a pragmatically mediated semantic relation. In this context, the activity that pragmatically mediates the semantic relations characteristic of discursive intentionality is specified as a practice of discursive updating —a practice of rectifying commitments and removing incompatibilities. The aim of the paper is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The way things go: moral relativism and suspension of judgment.Eduardo Pérez-Navarro - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):49-64.
    A popular accusation against moral relativism is that it goes too far in its vindication of tolerance. The idea behind accusations like this can be summarized in the slogan, frequently attributed to relativism, that “anything goes”. The aim of this paper is to defend moral relativism from the accusation that it is an “anything goes” view; from the accusation that it forces us to suspend our judgment in cases in which we do not think we should even be allowed to. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Structured Thoughts: The Spatial-Motor View.Benoit Hardy-Vallée & Pierre Poirier - 2005 - In Gerhard Schurz, Edouard Machery & Markus Werning (eds.), Applications to Linguistics, Psychology and Neuroscience. De Gruyter. pp. 229-250.
    Is thinking necessarily linguistic? Do we think with words, to use Bermudez’s (2003) phrase? Or does thinking occur in some other, yet to be determined, representational format? Or again do we think in various formats, switching from one to the other as tasks demand? In virtue perhaps of the ambiguous na- ture of first-person introspective data on the matter, philosophers have tradition- ally disagreed on this question, some thinking that thought had to be pictorial, other insisting that it could not (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Giving Up on “the Rest of the Language".Adam C. Podlaskowski - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (3):293-304.
    In this essay, the tension that Benacerraf identifies for theories of mathematical truth is used as the vehicle for arguing against a particular desideratum for semantic theories. More specifically, I place in question the desideratum that a semantic theory, provided for some area of discourse, should run in parallel with the semantic theory holding for the rest of the language. The importance of this desideratum is also made clear by means of tracing out the subtle implications of its rejection.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Which Concepts Should We Use?: Metalinguistic Negotiations and The Methodology of Philosophy.David Plunkett - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (7-8):828-874.
    This paper is about philosophical disputes where the literal content of what speakers communicate concerns such object-level issues as ground, supervenience, or real definition. It is tempting to think that such disputes straightforwardly express disagreements about these topics. In contrast to this, I suggest that, in many such cases, the disagreement that is expressed is actually one about which concepts should be employed. I make this case as follows. First, I look at non-philosophical, everyday disputes where a speaker employs a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   116 citations  
  • Meaning and dialogue coherence: A proof-theoretic investigation.Paul Piwek - 2007 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 16 (4):403-421.
    This paper presents a novel proof-theoretic account of dialogue coherence. It focuses on an abstract class of cooperative information-oriented dialogues and describes how their structure can be accounted for in terms of a multi-agent hybrid inference system that combines natural deduction with information transfer and observation. We show how certain dialogue structures arise out of the interplay between the inferential roles of logical connectives (i.e., sentence semantics), a rule for transferring information between agents, and a rule for information flow between (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Meaning and Dialogue Coherence: A Proof-theoretic Investigation.Paul Piwek - 2008 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 17 (3):383-383.
    This paper presents a novel proof-theoretic account of dialogue coherence. It focuses on an abstract class of cooperative information-oriented dialogues and describes how their structure can be accounted for in terms of a multi-agent hybrid inference system that combines natural deduction with information transfer and observation. We show how certain dialogue structures arise out of the interplay between the inferential roles of logical connectives (i.e., sentence semantics), a rule for transferring information between agents, and a rule for information flow between (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Dialogue structure and logical expressivism.Paul Piwek - 2011 - Synthese 183 (S1):33-58.
    This paper aims to develop the implications of logical expressivism for a theory of dialogue coherence. I proceed in three steps. Firstly, certain structural properties of cooperative dialogue are identified. Secondly, I describe a variant of the multi-agent natural deduction calculus that I introduced in Piwek (J Logic Lang Inf 16(4):403–421, 2007 ) and demonstrate how it accounts for the aforementioned structures. Thirdly, I examine how the aforementioned system can be used to formalise an expressivist account of logical vocabulary that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • The Question of System: How to Read the Development from Kant to Hegel.Pirmin Stekeler‐Weithofer - 2006 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):80-102.
    In order to understand Hegel's approach to philosophy, we need to ask why, and how, he reacts to the well-known criticism of German Romantics, like Novalis and Friedrich Schlegel, against philosophical system building in general, and against Kant's system in particular. Hegel's encyclopedic system is a topical ordering of categorically different ontological realms, corresponding to different conceptual forms of representation and knowledge. All in all it turns into a systematic defense of Fichte's doctrine concerning the primacy of us as actors (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Brandom's Hegel.Robert B. Pippin - 2005 - European Journal of Philosophy 13 (3):381–408.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • The Uses of Argument in Communicative Contexts.Robert C. Pinto - 2003 - Argumentation 24 (2):227-252.
    This paper challenges the view that arguments are (by definition, as it were) attempts to persuade or convince an audience to accept (or reject) a point of view by presenting reasons for (or against) that point of view. I maintain, first, that an arguer need not intend any effect beyond that of making it manifest to readers or hearers that there is a reason for doing some particular thing (e.g., for believing a certain proposition, or alternatively for rejecting it), and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  • The Problem of the Question About Animal Ethics: Discussion with Mark Coeckelbergh and David Gunkel.Michał Piekarski - 2016 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 29 (4):705-715.
    In this article I discuss the thesis put forward by David Gunkel and Mark Coeckelbergh in their essay Facing Animals:A Relational, Other-Oriented Approach to Moral Standing. The authors believe that the question about the status of animals needs to be reconsidered. In their opinion, traditional attempts to justify the practice of ascribing rights to animals have been based on the search for what is common to animals and people. This popular conviction rests on the intuition according to which we tend (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Utterance content, speaker’s intentions and linguistic liability.Claudia Picazo Jaque - 2017 - Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 32 (3):329.
    According to contextualists, communication has to do with pragmatically adjusted content, not with conventional meaning. This pragmatic content is sometimes identified with speaker meaning or with the thought the speaker intends to express. I will argue that given the sociolinguistic role of utterance content—the fact it provides reasons for action, liabilities and entitlements—locutionary content should not be modelled as a variety of speaker meaning.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Rorty, sorge and truth.Eva Picardi - 2001 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (3):431 – 439.
    Rorty's assessment of the origins of the analytic/continental divide is discussed and criticized on several grounds. Rorty's plea in favour of the philosophical quietism implicit in the pragmatists' dismissal of metaphysics rests on an uncritical faith in scientific progress. To emphasize the tensions implicit in the ideal of progress a novel interpretation of the significance of Faust's encounter with Sorge (Care) is offered and compared with Heidegger's construal of Sorge in Sein und Zeit . A better understanding of the analytic/continental (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Functionalism, computationalism, and mental contents.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (3):375-410.
    Some philosophers have conflated functionalism and computationalism. I reconstruct how this came about and uncover two assumptions that made the conflation possible. They are the assumptions that (i) psychological functional analyses are computational descriptions and (ii) everything may be described as performing computations. I argue that, if we want to improve our understanding of both the metaphysics of mental states and the functional relations between them, we should reject these assumptions. # 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   41 citations  
  • Proof-Theoretic Semantics,by Nissim Francez.Ivo Pezlar - 2016 - Mind:fzw056.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Practical belief and philosophical theory.Philip Pettit - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1):15 – 33.
    Philosophy invariably starts with the attempt to spell out ideas and beliefs that we already hold, whether on topics like time or causality, colour or value, consciousness or free will, democracy or justice or freedom. It may go well beyond such pre-philosophical assumptions in its further developments, regimenting them in unexpected ways, revising them on novel lines, even discarding them entirely in favour of other views. But philosophy always begins with the articulation of ordinary ideas and beliefs. This is where (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • Looks as powers.Philip Pettit - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):221-52.
    Although they may differ on the reason why, many philosophers hold that it is a priori that an object is red if and only if it is such as to look red to normal observers in normal conditions.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   61 citations  
  • What is the Logic of Inference?Jaroslav Peregrin - 2008 - Studia Logica 88 (2):263-294.
    The topic of this paper is the question whether there is a logic which could be justly called the logic of inference. It may seem that at least since Prawitz, Dummett and others demonstrated the proof-theoretical prominency of intuitionistic logic, the forthcoming answer is that it is this logic that is the obvious choice for the accolade. Though there is little doubt that this choice is correct (provided that inference is construed as inherently single-conclusion and complying with the Gentzenian structural (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • The "natural" and the "formal".Jaroslav Peregrin - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (1):75-101.
    The paper presents an argument against a "metaphysical" conception of logic according to which logic spells out a specific kind of mathematical structure that is somehow inherently related to our factual reasoning. In contrast, it is argued that it is always an empirical question as to whether a given mathematical structure really does captures a principle of reasoning. (More generally, it is argued that it is not meaningful to replace an empirical investigation of a thing by an investigation of its (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Rules as the Impetus of Cultural Evolution.Jaroslav Peregrin - 2014 - Topoi 33 (2):531-545.
    In this paper I put forward a thesis regarding the anatomy of “cultural evolution”, in particular the way the “cultural” transmission of behavioral patterns came to piggyback, through us humans, on the transmission effected by genetic evolution. I claim that what grounds and supports this new kind of transmission is a complex behavioral “meta-pattern” that makes it possible to grasp a pattern as something that “ought to be”, i.e. that transforms the pattern into what we can call a rule. (Here (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Meaning as an inferential role.Jaroslav Peregrin - 2006 - Erkenntnis 64 (1):1-35.
    While according to the inferentialists, meaning is always a kind of inferential role, proponents of other approaches to semantics often doubt that actual meanings, as they see them, can be generally reduced to inferential roles. In this paper we propose a formal framework for considering the hypothesis of the.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  • Logic Reduced To (Proof-Theoretical) Bare Bones.Jaroslav Peregrin - 2015 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 24 (2):193-209.
    What is a minimal proof-theoretical foundation of logic? Two different ways to answer this question may appear to offer themselves: reduce the whole of logic either to the relation of inference, or else to the property of incompatibility. The first way would involve defining logical operators in terms of the algebraic properties of the relation of inference—with conjunction $$\hbox {A}\wedge \hbox {B}$$ A ∧ B as the infimum of A and B, negation $$\lnot \hbox {A}$$ ¬ A as the minimal (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Inferentializing Semantics.Jaroslav Peregrin - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (3):255 - 274.
    The entire development of modern logic is characterized by various forms of confrontation of what has come to be called proof theory with what has earned the label of model theory. For a long time the widely accepted view was that while model theory captures directly what logical formalisms are about, proof theory is merely our technical means of getting some incomplete grip on this; but in recent decades the situation has altered. Not only did proof theory expand into new (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Inferentialism and the Normativity of Meaning.Jaroslav Peregrin - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (1):75-97.
    There may be various reasons for claiming that meaning is normative, and additionally, very different senses attached to the claim. However, all such claims have faced fierce resistance from those philosophers who insist that meaning is not normative in any nontrivial sense of the word. In this paper I sketch one particular approach to meaning claiming its normativity and defend it against the anti-normativist critique: namely the approach of Brandomian inferentialism. However, my defense is not restricted to inferentialism in any (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  • ‘Fregean’ logic and ‘Russellian’ logic.Jaroslav Peregrin - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (4):557 – 574.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Do Computers "Have Syntax, But No Semantics"?Jaroslav Peregrin - 2021 - Minds and Machines 31 (2):305-321.
    The heyday of discussions initiated by Searle's claim that computers have syntax, but no semantics has now past, yet philosophers and scientists still tend to frame their views on artificial intelligence in terms of syntax and semantics. In this paper I do not intend to take part in these discussions; my aim is more fundamental, viz. to ask what claims about syntax and semantics in this context can mean in the first place. And I argue that their sense is so (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • An inferentialist approach to semantics: Time for a new kind of structuralism?Jaroslav Peregrin - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1208-1223.
    The perennial question – What is meaning? – receives many answers. In this paper I present and discuss inferentialism – a recent approach to semantics based on the thesis that to have ( such and such ) a meaning is to be governed by ( such and such ) a cluster of inferential rules . I point out that this thesis presupposes that looking for meaning requires seeing language as a social institution (rather than, say, a psychological reality). I also (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Adversariality in Argumentation: Shortcomings of Minimal Adversariality and A Possible Reconstruction.Iñaki Xavier Larrauri Pertierra - 2021 - Argumentation 36 (1):17-34.
    Minimal adversariality consists in the opposition of contradictory conclusions in argumentation, and its usual metaphorical expression as a game between combating arguers has seen it be criticized from a number of perspectives: the language used, whether cooperation best attains the argumentative telos of epistemic betterment, and the ideal nature of the metaphor itself. This paper explores primarily the idealization of deductive argumentation, which is problematic due to its attenuated applicability to a dialectic involving premises and justificatory biases that are left (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Keeping track of individuals: Brandom's analysis of Kripke's puzzle and the content of belief.Carlo Penco - 2005 - Pragmatics and Cognition 13 (1):177-201.
    This paper gives attention to a special point in Brandom.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Frege: Two theses, two senses.Carlo Penco - 2003 - History and Philosophy of Logic 24 (2):87-109.
    One particular topic in the literature on Frege’s conception of sense relates to two apparently contradictory theses held by Frege: the isomorphism of thought and language on one hand and the expressibility of a thought by different sentences on the other. I will divide the paper into five sections. In (1) I introduce the problem of the tension in Frege’s thought. In (2) I discuss the main attempts to resolve the conflict between Frege’s two contradictory claims, showing what is wrong (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Trying slips: Can Davidson and Hornsby account for mistakes and slips?Kay Peabody - 2005 - Philosophia 33 (1-4):173-216.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Reasons, Causes, and the Extended Mind Hypothesis.Daniel Pearlberg & Timothy Schroeder - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (1):41-57.
    In this paper we develop a novel argument against the extended mind hypothesis. Our argument constitutes an advance in the debate, insofar as we employ only premises that are acceptable to a coarse-grained functionalist, and we do not rely on functional disanalogies between putative examples of extended minds and ordinary human beings that are just a matter of fine detail or degree. Thus, we beg no questions against proponents of the extended mind hypothesis. Rather, our argument consists in making use (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Knowing a rule.Carlotta Pavese - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):165-188.
    In this essay, I provide a new argument for Intellectualism about knowing how, one that does not rest on controversial assumptions about how knowing how is ascribed in English. In particular, I argue that the distinctive intentionality of the manifestations of knowing how ought to be explained in terms of a propositional attitude of belief about how to perform an action.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   35 citations  
  • Indicative Conditionals and the Expressive Conception of Logic.Spencer Paulson - 2022 - Journal of Transcendental Philosophy 3 (1):33-48.
    It is often thought that the test for whether an indicative conditional is assertible is to first suppose the antecedent and then check to see if the consequent is probable on that supposition. Call this procedure the “Ramsey Test”. Some influential accounts of indicative conditionals hold that the Ramsey Test works because indicative conditionals are used to express a high credence in the consequent conditional on the antecedent. In this paper I will argue that a different expressivist account, one inspired (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • On the determination argument against deflationism.Douglas Patterson - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2):243–250.
    (Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 2007) > Another look at Bar-On, Horisk and Lycan’s criticism of deflationism. I claim that their argument turns on a simple confusion about definitions and thereby fails to establish that deflationism somehow requires meaning to be explained in terms of truth conditions.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Deflationism And The Truth Conditional Theory of Meaning.Douglas Patterson - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 124 (3):271-294.
    Controversy has arisen of late over the claim that deflationism about truth requires that we explain meaning in terms of something other than truth-conditions. This controversy, it is argued, is due to unclarity as to whether the basic deflationary claim that a sentence and a sentence that attributes truth to it are equivalent in meaning is intended to involve the truth- predicate of the object language for which we develop an account of meaning, or is intended to involve the truth- (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Sellars on thoughts and beliefs.Mitch Parsell - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (2):261-275.
    In this paper, I examine Wilfrid Sellars’ famous Myth of Jones. I argue the myth provides an ontologically austere account of thoughts and beliefs that makes sense of the full range of our folk psychological abilities. Sellars’ account draws on both Gilbert Ryle and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Ryle provides Sellars with the resources to make thoughts metaphysically respectable and Wittgenstein the resources to make beliefs rationally criticisable. By combining these insights into a single account, Sellars is able to see reasons as (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • The poverty of analysis.David Papineau - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):1-30.
    I argue that philosophy is like science in three interesting and non-obvious ways. First, the claims made by philosophy are synthetic, not analytic: philosophical claims, just like scientific claims, are not guaranteed by the structure of the concepts they involve. Second, philosophical knowledge is a posteriori, not a priori: the claims established by philosophers depend on the same kind of empirical support as scientific theories. And finally, the central questions of philosophy concern actuality rather than necessity: philosophy is primarily aimed (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   38 citations  
  • The Omissions Account of the Knobe Effect and the Asymmetry Challenge.Katarzyna Paprzycka - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (5):550-571.
    The characteristic asymmetry in intentionality attributions that is known as the Knobe effect can be explained by conjoining an orthodox theory of intentional action with a normative account of intentional omission. On the latter view: omissions presuppose some normative context; there are good reasons why the intentionality of omissions requires agents' knowledge rather than intention. The asymmetry in intentionality attributions in Knobe's cases can be seen to be derivative from an asymmetry in intentional omissions. The omissions account further explains the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Enthymematic parsimony.Fabio Paglieri & John Woods - 2011 - Synthese 178 (3):461 - 501.
    Enthymemes are traditionally defined as arguments in which some elements are left unstated. It is an empirical fact that enthymemes are both enormously frequent and appropriately understood in everyday argumentation. Why is it so? We outline an answer that dispenses with the so called "principle of charity", which is the standard notion underlying most works on enthymemes. In contrast, we suggest that a different force drives enthymematic argumentation—namely, parsimony, i.e. the tendency to optimize resource consumption, in light of the agent's (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • La dynamique des intentions.Élisabeth Pacherie - 2003 - Dialogue 42 (3):447-.
    I argue that in order to solve the main difficulties confronted by the classical versions of the causal theory of action, it is necessary no just to make room for intentions, considered as irreducible to complexes of beliefs and desires, but also to distinguish among several types of intentions. I present a three-tiered theory of intentions that distinguishes among future-directed intentions, present-directed intentions and motor intentions. I characterize each kind of intention in terms of its functions, its type of content, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Belief, normativity and the constitution of agency.Emer O'Hagan - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):39-52.
    In this paper I advance a constitutive argument for the authority of rational norms. Because accountability to reasons is constitutive of rational agency and rational norms are implicit in reasons for action and belief, the justification of rational norms is of a piece with the practice of reasoning. Peter Railton has objected that the constitutive view fails to defend the categorical authority of reason over agents. I respond to his objections, arguing that they presuppose a foundationalist conception of justification that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • The unobservability thesis.Søren Overgaard - 2017 - Synthese 194 (3).
    The unobservability thesis states that the mental states of other people are unobservable. Both defenders and critics of UT seem to assume that UT has important implications for the mindreading debate. Roughly, the former argue that because UT is true, mindreaders need to infer the mental states of others, while the latter maintain that the falsity of UT makes mindreading inferences redundant. I argue, however, that it is unclear what ‘unobservability’ means in this context. I outline two possible lines of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Review of Selene Arfini, Ignorant Cognition, Springer, 2019. [REVIEW]Matías Osta-Vélez - 2021 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 40 (2):231-236.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark