Reductive Evidentialism seeks to explain away all structural requirements of rationality – including norms of logical coherence – in terms of substantive norms of rationality, i.e., responsiveness to evidence. While this view constitutes a novel take on the source of the normativity of logic, I argue that it faces serious difficulties. My argument, in a nutshell, is that, on the assumption that individuals with the same evidence can have different rational responses (interpersonal permissivism), the view lacks the resources to maintain (...) its central tenant that an individual’s body of evidence cannot make it rationally permissible for the individual to believe logical inconsistencies (intrapersonal non-permissivism). (shrink)

If you ought to do something, does it follow that you are able to do it? The Kantian thesis that ought-implies-can seems intuitive and is widely accepted. Nevertheless, there are several powerful purported counterexamples. In this paper I will apply an independently motivated contextualism about ‘ought’ to make sense of the intuitions on both sides of the argument. Contextualism explains why ought-implies-can seems compelling despite being false in many contexts. The result will be that philosophers cannot in general appeal to (...) ought-implies-can in their arguments. (shrink)

Logic appears to be normative for rational belief. The thesis of the normativity of logic holds that indeed logic has such a normative status. Gilbert Harman has questioned it, thereby giving rise to what has been called “Harman's skeptical challenge”. MacFarlane has clarified that in order to answer this challenge and support the normativity of logic, one needs a “bridge principle” that appropriately connects logical entailments and norms for belief, as well as relevant desiderata for the evaluation of candidate bridge (...) principles. Steinberger has identified a list of desiderata, on the basis of which he has proposed his own bridge principle and shown the inadequacy of previous proposals. This paper argues that Steinberger's list is in need of revision and his principle is unsatisfactory, and then puts forward a revised list of desiderata and a new bridge principle in support of the normativity of logic. (shrink)

Abstract‘Reductive Evidentialism’ seeks to explain away all ‘structural’ requirements of rationality—including norms of logical coherence—in terms of ‘substantive’ norms of rationality, i.e., responsiveness to evidence. While this view constitutes a novel take on the source of the normativity of logic, I argue that it faces serious difficulties. My argument, in a nutshell, is that on the assumption that individuals with the same evidence can have different rational responses (interpersonal permissivism), the view lacks the resources to maintain its central tenet that (...) an individual’s body of evidence cannot make it rationally permissible for the individual to believe logical inconsistencies (intrapersonal nonpermissivism). (shrink)