Since the earliest formalisation of default logic by Reiter many contributions to this appealing approach to nonmonotonic reasoning have been given. The different formalisations are here presented in a general framework that gathers the basic notions, concepts and constructions underlying default logic. Our view is to interpret defaults as special rules that impose a restriction on the juxtaposition of monotonic Hubert-style proofs of a given logicL. We propose to describe default logic as a logic where the juxtaposition of default proofs (...) is subordinate to a restriction condition . Hence a default logic is a pair (L, ) where properties of the logic , like compactness, can be interpreted through the restriction condition . Different default systems are then given a common characterization through a specific condition on the logicL. We also prove cumulativity for any default logic (L, ) by slightly modifying the notion of default proof. We extend, in fact, the language ofL in a way close to that followed by Brewka in the formulation of his cumulative default system. Finally we show the existence of infinitely many intermediary default logics, depending on and called linear logics, which lie between Reiter's and ukaszewicz' versions of default logic. (shrink)

The volume analyses and develops David Makinson’s efforts to make classical logic useful outside its most obvious application areas. The book contains chapters that analyse, appraise, or reshape Makinson’s work and chapters that develop themes emerging from his contributions. These are grouped into major areas to which Makinsons has made highly influential contributions and the volume in its entirety is divided into four sections, each devoted to a particular area of logic: belief change, uncertain reasoning, normative systems and the resources (...) of classical logic. Among the contributions included in the volume, one chapter focuses on the “inferential preferential method”, i.e. the combined use of classical logic and mechanisms of preference and choice and provides examples from Makinson’s work in non-monotonic and defeasible reasoning and belief revision. One chapter offers a short autobiography by Makinson which details his discovery of modern logic, his travels across continents and reveals his intellectual encounters and inspirations. The chapter also contains an unusually explicit statement on his views on the role of logic in philosophy. (shrink)

There is consensus among computer scientists, logicians, and philosophers that good reasoning with qualitative beliefs must have the structural property of cumulative transitivity or, for short, cut. This consensus is typically explicitly argued for partially on the basis of practical and mathematical considerations. But the consensus is also implicit in the approach philosophers take to almost every puzzle about reasoning that involves multiple steps: philosophers typically assume that if each step in reasoning is acceptable considered on its own, the whole (...) chain of reasoning must also acceptable. In this paper I focus on whether there are good philosophical reasons for thinking that the consensus that good reasoning must satisfy cut is true. My central claim is that we should not accept the consensus—good reasoning might not satisfy cut. In particular, I consider four arguments for the consensus and explain why they are unpersuasive. (§2-5). I then show that the issue of whether good reasoning is cut turns on a substantive yet until now unnoticed question in epistemology (§6). (shrink)

Modern belief revision theory is based to a large extent on partial meet contraction that was introduced in the seminal article by Carlos Alchourrón, Peter Gärdenfors, and David Makinson that appeared in 1985. In the same year, Alchourrón and Makinson published a significantly different approach to the same problem, called safe contraction. Since then, safe contraction has received much less attention than partial meet contraction. The present paper summarizes the current state of knowledge on safe contraction, provides some new results (...) and offers a list of unsolved problems that are in need of investigation. (shrink)

In recent years there has been a growing consensus that ordinary reasoning does not conform to the laws of classical logic, but is rather nonmonotonic in the sense that conclusions previously drawn may well be removed upon acquiring further information. Even so, rational belief formation has up to now been modelled as conforming to some fundamental principles that are classically valid. The counterexample described in this paper suggests that a number of the most cherished of these principles should not be (...) regarded as valid for commonsense reasoning. An explanation of this puzzling failure is given, arguing that a problem in the theory of rational choice transfers to the realm of belief formation. (shrink)

Most of the work in default logic is about default theories that are completely specified. In this category are the proposals of appropriate semantics for default logic, the characterizations of the complexity of reasoning with a default theory, the algorithms for finding consequences of default theories, etc. Relatively little attention has been paid to the process of building a default theory, and most of the work on this topic is about translating knowledge bases from other formalisms (such as circumscription, autoepistemic (...) logic, and action description languages) into default logic. This paper is about expressing knowledge in default logic. In particular, we assume that defaults are initially formulated as normal, and are then corrected using specific inference examples. (shrink)

Reasoning is a goal-oriented activity. The logical steps are at best the median part of a full reasoning: before them, a language has to be defined, and a model of the goal in this language has to be developed; after them, their result has to be checked in the real world with respect to the goal. Both the prior and the subsequent steps can be conducted rationally; none of them has a logical counterpart. Furthermore, Logic aims at prescribing what a (...) correct reasoning is. But correct with respect to what? If the answer is: with respect to truth, the next question is whether the truth in everyday life, physics, economy, is the same as the truth that logicians have in mind. Resorting to Logic is justified only if an idealization in terms of true propositions in the logical sense is compatible with the goal. If such an idealization is legitimate, so is the use of classical Logic. If not, there is no authority forbidding to skew Logic in order to better reflect the nature of the reasoning required for the task. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Reiter's default logic is one of the most prominent and well-studied approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning. Its evolution has resulted in diverse variants enjoying many interesting properties. This process however seems to be diverging because it has led to default logics that are difficult to compare due to different formal characterizations—sometimes even dealing with different objects of discourse. This problem is addressed in this paper in two ways. One the one hand, we elaborate on the relationships between different types of (...) default logics and discuss their differences wrt some basic properties. In particular, we show how two recently proposed variants, namely rational and CA-default logic, are related to each other and existing default logics. As an interesting byproduct, we obtain a cumulative counterpart to Lukasiewicz' variant of default logic. The resulting system is insofar surprising since it necessitates to refine the canonical way of assuring cumulativity in default logics. On the other hand, we pursue an integrating approach. We give a translation embedding rational and CA-default logic into a recently developed framework for default logics. This allows us not only to classify these variants, but it moreover provides us with semantical underpinnings that have been lacking so far. (shrink)

This paper presents statistical default logic, an expansion of classical (i.e., Reiter) default logic that allows us to model common inference patterns found in standard inferential statistics, including hypothesis testing and the estimation of a populations mean, variance and proportions. The logic replaces classical defaults with ordered pairs consisting of a Reiter default in the first coordinate and a real number within the unit interval in the second coordinate. This real number represents an upper-bound limit on the probability of accepting (...) the consequent of an applied default and that consequent being false. A method for constructing extensions is then defined that preserves this upper bound on the probability of error under a (skeptical) non-monotonic consequence relation. (shrink)

We define an order independent version of default unification on typed feature structures. The operation is one where default information in a feature structure typed with a more specific type, will override default information in a feature structure typed with a more general type, where specificity is defined by the subtyping relation in the type hierarchy. The operation is also able to handle feature structures where reentrancies are default. We provide a formal semantics, prove order independence and demonstrate the utility (...) of this version of default unification in several linguistic applications. First, we show how it can be used to define multiple orthogonal default inheritance in the lexicon in a fully declarative fashion. Secondly, we show how default lexical specifications (introduced via default lexical inheritance) can be made to usefully persist beyond the lexicon and interact with syntagmatic rules. Finally, we outline how persistent default unification might underpin default feature propagation principles and a more restrictive and constraint-based approach to lexical rules. (shrink)

Contemporary epistemological and cognitive studies, as well as recent trends in computer science and game theory have revealed an increasingly important and intimate relationship between Information, Interaction, and Agency. Agents perform actions based on the available information and in the presence of other interacting agents. From this perspective Information, Interaction, and Agency neatly ties together classical themes like rationality, decision-making and belief revision with games, strategies and learning in a multi-agent setting. Unified by the central notions Information, Interaction, and Agency, (...) the essays in this volume provide refreshing methodological perspectives on belief revision, dynamic epistemic logic, von Neumann games, and evolutionary game theory; all of which in turn are central approaches to understanding our own rationality and that of other agents. (shrink)

A consistency default is a propositional inference rule that asserts the consistency of a formula in its consequence. Consistency defaults allow for a straightforward encoding of domains in which it is explicitely known when something is possible. The logic of consistency defaults can be seen as a variant of cumulative default logic or as a generalization of justified default logic; it is also able to simulate Reiter default logic in the seminormal case. A semantical characterization of consistency defaults in terms (...) of processes and in terms of a fixpoint equation is given, as well as a normal form. (shrink)