Philosophical conceptions of educational justice are centered at the intersection of political philosophy and philosophy of education. They justify moral‐political rights to education and sometimes also determine who is responsible for their realization through which kinds of pedagogical practices or systemic educational reform. This article concentrates on contemporary conceptions of educational justice in primary and secondary education and highlights central practical implications that the various conceptions of educational justice have under non‐ideal circumstances. Section 2 explains the conceptions of fair and (...) luck‐egalitarian equal educational opportunity, Section 3 the conception of educational priority for the least‐advantaged students, and Section 4 the conception of democratically adequate education. Finally, Section 5 presents a philosophical conception of global justice in school education. Section 6 concludes. (shrink)

The ideal of educational equality is fundamentally grounded in the egalitarian principle that social and institutional arrangements should be designed to give equal consideration to all. However, beyond this broad stipulation, the precise content of the ideal of educational equality is more difficult to determine. In this article, I aim to contribute to the debate on equality in education by dealing with the current, contentious issue of provision for students with disabilities and special educational needs. Thus, the paper addresses the (...) question of what constitutes a just provision for these students, and it provides an answer in terms of the capability approach, as developed by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. (shrink)

The ideal of educational equality is fundamentally grounded in the egalitarian principle that social and institutional arrangements should be designed to give equal consideration to all. However, beyond this broad stipulation, the precise content of the ideal of educational equality is more difficult to determine. In this article, I aim to contribute to the debate on equality in education by dealing with the current, contentious issue of provision for students with disabilities and special educational needs. Thus, the paper addresses the (...) question of what constitutes a just provision for these students, and it provides an answer in terms of the capability approach, as developed by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn this paper I address the distributive, inclusive, and relational dimensions of educational justice individually in relation to transnational migration. First, I thematize distributive issues with regard to immigrant students, the central question being whether these students are entitled to more or less educational resources as non-immigrant students. Second, I discuss to which extent and in which sense enabling immigrant students to participate fully in the social and political life of their receiving country is a demand of educational justice. Third, (...) I elaborate on which kinds of educational interactions – in the first place, which types of teaching – could perpetuate unjust treatment of those students in the form of disrespect. I claim that educational justice with regard to immigrated students consists in their enabling to full social and political participation by a mode of teaching that positively addresses students’ biographical experiences with migration, and by constructing school curricula which encourage inter-lingual, inter-cultural, and inter-contextual translations in the classroom. That is to say, that educational justice in context of migration is to be ultimately understood as relational justice, or more specific – as a matter of just pedagogical relations. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The academic discussion concerning justice in education tends to center around questions of equal educational opportunity and the distribution of educational resources. This paper responds to a special issue which collects different approaches to educational justice that move beyond the boundaries set by traditional, hegemonic perspectives in the field. I point to some important strands in which the different papers converge and outline how they attempt to produce a shift in the understanding of educational justice; how they bring into (...) view and touch upon ways of thinking through educational justice which have previously not received attention or been obscured by more conventional paradigms. Different papers do this in different ways, but there is a joint effort to self-critically turn philosophy onto itself as well as a common tendency towards what could be called a shift beyond discourse towards more worldly, materialistic, bodily and embodied notions of justice and injustice. (shrink)

This paper is on the paradox of a right, the right to education that is almost universally declared as compulsory. The reason for the compulsion seems to be in its nature as a right. Within a Hohfeldian framework, any claim-right has a corresponding duty. Given that making education compulsory equates to establishing a duty, the possible candidates to the duty generating right-bearers are considered.The rationales for compulsion from the points of view of positive (for one’s own good), negative (no compulsion (...) at all), and republican liberty (society right) are analyzed, and the conclusion is reached that none of the three can produce sufficient justification for compulsion. The main conclusion is that education is a right, not an obligation. Therefore, neither the children nor their families can be legally forced to an unrestricted exercise of this right without even being heard. The law must reflect, in its progressive flexibility, the growing possibilities of choice for right-holders who are adults ‘in fieri’. (shrink)

In this paper I make a contribution to three distinct, but deeply interwoven subjects. Firstly, I argue that, at the level of ideal theory, the distribution of educational goods should follow a sufficientarian pattern and that the evaluative space of children’s advantage should be inspired by the capability approach. Secondly, the paper is delving into the more policy-oriented debates on the desirability of school choice. I argue that, given the non-ideal circumstances in which decision makers have to act, giving parents (...) the opportunity to choose the school for their children is a sine qua non condition for even approaching the ideals of sufficientarian justice. Lastly, I move the discussion on more empirical grounds, advancing a criticism of the Romanian educational legislation. I argue that the sufficiency-constrained school choice system that I envision could solve some of the problems that the Romanian educational system faces today. (shrink)