We discuss Kant’s conception of beneficence against the background of the overdemandingness debate. We argue that Kant’s conception of beneficence constitutes a sweet spot between overdemandingess and undemandingess. To this end we defend four key claims that together constitute a novel interpretation of Kant’s account of beneficence: 1) for the same reason that we are obligated to be beneficent to others we are permitted to be beneficent to ourselves; 2) we can prioritise our own ends; 3) it is more virtuous (...) to do more rather than less when it comes to helping others; and 4) indifference to others is vicious. Finally, we explain how this represents a system of duties that gives our personal ends a moral standing without unacceptably moralising them. (shrink)

Are there limits to what it is morally okay to imagine? More particularly, is imaginatively inhabiting morally suspect perspectives something that is off-limits for truly virtuous people? In this paper, I investigate the surprisingly fraught relation between virtue and a familiar form of imaginative perspective taking I call empathy. I draw out a puzzle about the relation between empathy and virtuousness. First, I present an argument to the effect that empathy with vicious attitudes is not, in fact, something that the (...) fully virtuous person can indulge in. At least one prominent way of thinking about the psychology of the virtuous person excludes the possibility that the virtuous could emotionally apprehend the world in a less than virtuous way, and empathizing with vicious outlooks does seem to run afoul of that restriction. Then, I develop an argument that runs in the contrary direction: virtue in fact requires empathy with vicious outlooks, at least in some situations. There is reason to think that a crucial part of being virtuous is ministering effectively to others’ needs, and there is also reason to think that other people may need to be empathized with, even if their emotional outlooks are at least minorly vicious. Finally, I outline two different solutions to this puzzle. Both solutions hold some promise, but they also bring new challenges in their train. (shrink)

We discuss the demandingness of Kant’s ethics. Whilst previous discussions of this issue focused on imperfect duties, our first aim is to show that Kantian demandingness is especially salient in the class of perfect duties. Our second aim is to introduce a fine-grained picture of demandingness by distinguishing between different possible components of a moral theory which can lead to demandingness: a required process of decision making, overridingness and the stringent content of demands, due to a standpoint of moral purity. (...) This distinction allows a specification of the sources of demandingness in Kant. The most characteristically Kantian form of demandingness springs from overridingness and purity and comes as a constant threat that an agent might find herself in a situation in which, due to no fault of her own, she is required to sacrifice everything for little to no non-moral goods. Our third aim is to discuss whether Kant has the resources to reply to those who criticize his ethics based on its demandingness. For this purpose we discuss Kant’s notion of “rationalizing” in the context of various types of current conceptions of demandingness and calls for moderate ethical theories. (shrink)

This essay is a critical engagement with recent assessments of comparative religious ethics by John Kelsay and Jung Lee. Contra Kelsay's proposal to return to a neo-Weberian sociology of religious norm elaboration and justification, the authors argue that comparative religious ethics is and should be practiced as a field of study in active conversation with other fields that consider human flourishing, employing a variety of methods that have their roots in multiple disciplines. Cross-pollination from a variety of disciplines is a (...) strength of comparative ethics, which has enlivened recent and ongoing research on ethics, not a problem to be resolved by convergence on a single, distinctively comparative project. The authors also argue in response to Lee and Kelsay that while individual comparative studies of virtue and personal formation can be flawed in various ways, this line of research has been productive and at times very compelling. Moreover, attention to comparative virtue ethics shows how scholarship on some ethical topics necessitates drawing on a variety of perspectives and disciplinary backgrounds, a conclusion relevant to all work in religious ethics today. (shrink)

Desert-realists maintain that those who do wrong without an excuse deserve blame. Desert-skeptics deny this, holding that though we may be responsible for our actions in some sense, we lack the kind of responsibility needed to deserve blame. In two recent papers, Randolph Clarke (Philosophical Explorations 16:153–164, 2013 and Journal of Ethics 20:121–137, 2016) advances an innovative defense of desert-realism. He argues for deserved-guilt, the thesis that the guilty deserve to feel guilt. In his 2013 paper, Clarke suggests two strategies (...) for defending deserved-guilt: the fitting-guilt strategy and the good-guilt strategy. In his 2016 paper, Clarke issues a challenge to the desert-skeptic: he calls on them to provide a non-desert based account of guilt’s fittingness. In the first two thirds of the paper, I respond to Clarke’s challenge to the desert-skeptic, showing that guilt felt by the guilty is alethic-fitting, reason-fitting, and value-fitting. None of these notions of fittingness, I argue, are desert based. In the last third of the paper, I show how the work done in previous sections affords us the tools to finely diagnose the failures of both the fitting-guilt and the good-guilt strategies. Here, I draw on one of Clarke’s own insights—namely, that desert is intimately connected to the value of justice. I propose that showing that guilt is fitting, or again non-instrumentally good, fails to show that it is deserved because to show that it is deserved one must show that guilt is fitting or good in a sense that implicates justice. (shrink)

Aristotle has famously made the claim that having the right emotion at the right time is an essential part of moral virtue. Why might this be the case? I consider five possible relations between emotion and virtue and argue that an adequate answer to this question involves the epistemic status of emotion, that is, whether the perceptual awareness and hence the understanding of the object of emotion is like or unlike the perceptual awareness of an unemotional awareness of the same (...) object. If an emotional awareness does not have a unique character, then it is unlikely that emotions provide an understanding that is different from unemotional states of awareness: they are perhaps little more than “hot-blooded” instances of the same understanding. If, on the other hand, an emotional state involves a perceptual awareness that is unique to the emotion, then emotions are cognitively significant, providing an understanding of the object of the emotion that is absent in a similar but unemotional episode of awareness. I argue the latter and substantiate the claim that emotions are essential to moral virtue because they can be essential to a full understanding of the situations that they involve. In such cases, emotions are not merely a symptom of the possession of an adequate understanding, but are rather necessary for having an adequate understanding. (shrink)

Kant is frequently read as saying that all self-love is bad, and the virtuous agent is one who suppresses self-love as much as possible. This paper argues that this is mistaken and that the right kind of self-love – what Kant calls rational self-love – plays an important role in a successful moral life. It shows how Kant provides a detailed taxonomy of different kinds of self-love. He contrasts the (practical) incentive of self-love with the (pathological) feeling of it, self-love (...) of benevolence with self-love of delight, and self-absorbed/selfish with rational/moral varieties of each. The paper then argues that, while the Critique of Practical Reason only identifies a self-absorbed variety of self-love of delight, self-conceit, it gains a rational counterpart in Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason: “self-contentment”. This is a positive self-love of delight uniquely felt by the morally good person. It is suggested that this shift reflects Kant’s increasing appreciation of the affective dimension of the virtuous life: for imperfect human beings the moral law must not only be worth obeying, but worth loving. Thus, while for morally bad agents self-love and morality inevitably conflict, good agents can and should love themselves. (shrink)

This paper deals primarily with theDoctrine of Method(DM) of Kant’sDoctrine of Virtue. First, I present an overview of theDM(1.1) and an explanation of how it is possible to teach virtue (1.2). Second, I address the following issues: Why is aDMnecessary at all (2.1)? How does theDMrelate to what Kant calls casuistry (2.2)? I will argue that wide duties have two essential characteristics: They command the right kind of moral motivation in terms of a moral maxim, and they allow for latitude. (...) The fact that wide duties command the right kind of motivation leads to theDM; the latitude of wide duties, however, leads to casuistry. To unfold this interpretation, it must also be shown that both imperfect and perfect duties are wide duties. (shrink)

This paper focuses on Aristotelian phronesis and aims at highlighting its nature as an eye on particulars with general ends in sight. More specifically, it challenges the particularistic interpretation of phronesis and Aristotelian ethics in order to argue for a “qualified generalism.” After sketching a radical Particularistic Reading (PR), the paper defends an interpretation it calls the Priority of Particulars Reading (PPR). First, it shows how PPR effectively accounts for the Aristotelian priority assigned to practical perception while at the same (...) time counterbalancing that priority by means of two interpretive strategies. Then it offers further support to PPR by appealing to its own reading of Aristotle's phronesis. It aims to show that it is possible to defend a legitimate form of PPR without ending in holding PR, and that Aristotle's own theory and work ground the moderate reading. Finally, it draws some implications by analyzing educational practice. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss the viability of the claim that at least some forms of moral theory are harmful for sound moral thought and practice. This claim was put forward by e.g. Elisabeth Anscombe ( 1981 ( 1958 )) and by Annette Baier, Peter Winch, D.Z Phillips and Bernard Williams in the 1970’s–1980’s. To this day aspects of it have found resonance in both post-Wittgensteinian and virtue ethical quarters. The criticism has on one hand contributed to a substantial change (...) and broadening of the scope of analytic moral philosophy. On the other hand it is, at least in its most strongly anti-theoretical formulations, now broadly considered outdated and—to the extent that it is still defended—insensitive to the changes that have occurred within the field in the last 20–30 years. The task of this paper is to relocate the anti-theoretical critique into the field of analytic ethics today. (shrink)

The ‘reasonable person standard’ is often called on in difficult legal cases as the last resource to be appealed to when other solutions run out. Its complexity derives from the controversial tasks that people place on it. Two dialectics require some clarification: the objective/subjective interpretation of the standard and the ideal/ordinary person controversy. I shall move through these dialectics from the standpoint of an EV approach, assuming that on this interpretation the RPS can perform most persuasively its tasks. The all-round (...) model of phronetic agent that I present not only works better than competing models—such as the utilitarian–economic and the Rawlsian—in the law of tort but shows its best potentialities in other kinds of cases. In criminal law and matrimonial law cases the recourse to the EV approach offers through the virtues rich and substantial resources to evaluate conflictual cases. This approach makes the threshold of evaluation much closer to real life than competitors. (shrink)

Autonomous weapon systems could in principle release military personnel from the onus of killing during combat missions, reducing the related risk of suffering a moral injury and its debilita...

To fulfill a perfect duty an agent must avoid vice, yet when an agent refrains from acting on a prohibited maxim she still must do something. I argue that the setting of morally required ends ought to consistently inform an agent's judgment regarding what is to be done beyond compliance with perfect, negative duties. Kant's assertion of a puzzling version of latitude of choice within his discussion of perfect duties motivates and complicates the case I make for a more expansive (...) interpretation of the duty to pursue virtue. (shrink)

Many maintain that if a beneficiary has a right to a benefit provided by his benefactor, then the former cannot owe the latter gratitude for that benefit. In this paper I argue against that view. I provide examples in which benefactors provide others with benefits to which they have a right even though most others are denying them that right. These benefactors are moral standouts; they do what is right when most similarly situated agents fail to do so. I then (...) spell out some of the features of these benefactors’ actions that make them worthy of gratitude. (shrink)

The question of whether there is such a thing as teachable justified anger encompasses three distinct questions: (1) the psychological question of whether the emotions in general, and anger in particular, are regulatable; (2) the moral question of whether anger can ever be morally justified; and (3) the educational question of whether we have any sound methods at our disposal for teaching justified anger. In this paper I weave Aristotelian responses to those questions together with insights from the current psychology (...) literature on emotion regulation and conclude that there is no good reason for teachers of moral education to shy away from the teaching of justified anger in the classroom, via various means and methods. (shrink)

Kant's most familiar and widely read works in practical reason are the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) and the Critique of Practical Reason (1788). His principal aims in these works are to analyze the nature and ground of morality and to justify its supreme principle (the categorical imperative). Nevertheless, in these texts, Kant also paints a picture of what it means to have a good will or good character, and it is this account of the good will and (...) the associated theory of moral motivation that have been the target of many of the historical and contemporary objections to Kant's rationalism. From the perspective of these foundational works in Kant's moral theory, it appears that all that is required for Kantian character is a firm commitment to do one's duty from the motive of duty in the absence of inclination, or in the teeth of countervailing inclination. Kant's defenders have rightly insisted that it would be hasty to draw any final conclusions about his considered views on character and moral psychology on the basis of the Groundwork and the second Critique. An adequate assessment of these kinds of charges against Kant, they have argued, must address his theory of virtue, as it is set out in his other important ethical texts, especially the Doctrine of Virtue (1797) and Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793). In his theory of virtue, Kant presents a detailed account of virtue as a character trait, provides lengthy discussions of the various virtues he sees as central for the ethical life, and maintains that there are moral feelings that are part of a virtuous character and serviceable for morality. For these reasons, those interested in gleaning a more complete picture of Kant's ethics await a detailed, systematic account of Kant's views about virtue. This entry aims to sketch the outlines of such an account. (shrink)

Thaddeus Metz, in his book “A Relational Moral Theory” compares the relational African view to Western theories of right action with a focus on Kant (respective contemporary Kantianism) and Utilitarianism. In focussing on the opposition between a relational and an individualistic view, Metz questions the interpretation of basic normative assumptions that are guiding central Western moral and political institutions. He particularly focusses on Kantian and Utilitarian approaches to which he ascribes substantive moral assumptions in terms of utility respective autonomy. In (...) this paper, we reconstruct Metz’s position on the opposition between a relational and an individualistic view on ethics. We then investigate whether his relational conceptualisation is a convincing reconstruction of African views and question his take on Western positions, focussing in particular on views around individual rights and communality as presented in the Kantian tradition. We highlight the value of ubuntu in intercultural discourse to foster ethical and moral reasoning in a holistic way and conclude that any reflection on ethics necessarily involves an understanding of our common human nature, which is at the core of philosophical anthropology. (shrink)

To be more than a meta-ethical stance, moral phenomenology must provide an account of moral norms. This paper unites two sorts of phenomenological considerations. The first considers the teleological character of intentional experiences as ordered toward "truthfulness" in all the spheres of reason and toward a notion of self-responsibility for our beliefs, attitudes, and actions as the flourishing of rational agents. The second considers the phenomenological tradition's identification of empathy as the experience in which we encounter others as conscious agents (...) like me but irreducibly different from me and that grounds the emotions of respect and sympathy. Respect grasps the other conscious agent as an irreducibly different cognizing, rational, reflection-capable being, as making articulated judgments of value, and as making articulated choices about what activities conduce to what ends. Respect for others cannot be separated from a sympathetic care for others, a sympathy that inclines one toward caring for and aiding the other person in developing her own rational capacities. Sympathy, in brief, complements respect. At the same time, respect complements sympathy insofar as sympathy runs the risk of transmuting into paternalism. This is why, just as we need sympathy in relation to respect, we need respect in relation to sympathy. The paper introduces a distinction between first-order goods for an agent and the second-order goods associated with truthfulness. The second-order goods, the paper argues, necessarily override first-order goods when they prevent the attainment of the second-order goods for anyone. (shrink)

Kant's most familiar and widely read works in practical reason are the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) and the Critique of Practical Reason (1788). His principal aims in these works are to analyze the nature and ground of morality and to justify its supreme principle (the categorical imperative). Nevertheless, in these texts, Kant also paints a picture of what it means to have a good will or good character, and it is this account of the good will and (...) the associated theory of moral motivation that have been the target of many of the historical and contemporary objections to Kant's rationalism. From the perspective of these foundational works in Kant's moral theory, it appears that all that is required for Kantian character is a firm commitment to do one's duty from the motive of duty in the absence of inclination, or in the teeth of countervailing inclination. Kant's defenders have rightly insisted that it would be hasty to draw any final conclusions about his considered views on character and moral psychology on the basis of the Groundwork and the second Critique. An adequate assessment of these kinds of charges against Kant, they have argued, must address his theory of virtue, as it is set out in his other important ethical texts, especially the Doctrine of Virtue (1797) and Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793). In his theory of virtue, Kant presents a detailed account of virtue as a character trait, provides lengthy discussions of the various virtues he sees as central for the ethical life, and maintains that there are moral feelings that are part of a virtuous character and serviceable for morality. For these reasons, those interested in gleaning a more complete picture of Kant's ethics await a detailed, systematic account of Kant's views about virtue. This entry aims to sketch the outlines of such an account. (shrink)

The premise of this paper is that the fear of foolishness is essential to wisdom. Unfortunately, leaders are often conditioned to suppress fear in favor of confidence. However, wise leaders fear foolishness while foolish leaders are fearless. Leaders fall into traps and hit walls that result in fallacies. It is the recognition of these fallacies and the fear of their consequences that compel leaders to seek wisdom. This paper relies on protection motivation theory, the balance theory of wisdom, the imbalance (...) theory of foolishness, and the WICS model of leadership to caution leaders of foolishness so that wisdom can be developed. Specifically, the fear of foolishness is proposed as the motivating factor for the pursuit of wisdom. In doing so, the literatures of wisdom and fear are reviewed and the appraisal process of the fear of foolishness and the coping mechanisms to address foolishness are elaborated on. The protection motivation of the fear of foolishness can fundamentally change leader behaviors and attitudes for the sake of wisdom and individual, organizational, and societal well-being. (shrink)

It is now a commonplace that emotions are not mere sensations but, rather, conceptually contentful states. In trying to expand on this insight, however, most theoretical approaches to emotions neglect central intuitions about what emotions are like. We therefore need a methodological shift in our thinking about emotions away from the standard accounts' attempts to reduce them to other mental states and toward an exploration of the distinctive work emotions do. I show that emotions' distinctive function is to engage us (...) with both objective and personal values. Attention to emotions' work reveals that it is precisely their “unruliness” that allows them to play meaningful roles in our lives. (shrink)

Religious texts and historical narratives are instrumental in defining appropriate emotions and moral reasoning in a culture. In the Bhagavad Gītā, the warrior Arjuna is faced with a twofold dilemma: are his emotions appropriate and should emotions influence his actions? The Gītā is thought to be a redacted text with three primary layers: the original verses, the Sāmkhya/Yoga layer, and the devotional bhakti layer. Cross-cultural psychological theories of emotions are employed to analyze the layers of the Gītā. It is argued (...) that each of the three layers corresponds with one of three possible moral codes as proposed by R. A. Shweder and his colleagues (1997; 2000): the Ethic of Autonomy (promoting personal well-being and avoiding shame); the Ethic of Community (maintaining social order and emotional detachment); and the Ethic of Divinity (upholding cosmic order and endorsing emotional devotion). These three perspectives remain relevant for deciding emotionally laden moral dilemmas today. (shrink)

Traditionally the study of computer ethics involves taking students who are not philosophically trained, exposing them to action-guiding theories, presenting them with the codes of ethics of several companies and professional organizations and asking them to make ethical decisions in scenario-based cases. This approach is deliberately action-based and focuses on doing. "What would you do?" is the traditional question we ask our students. While this pedagogical methodology forces them to examine situations and argue from a particular point of view, it (...) does little to influence their character. They see the utilitarian or deontologist as someone other than themselves. There seems to be very little internalization of these action-based theories.Virtue Ethics offers character-forming theory that has been more successful with my students than the action-based theories of computer ethics texts. Why? Virtue Ethics is directed toward character development. The focus is on being rather than doing. It presents a good heuristic or approach to the problem of moral agency. Virtue ethics offers a way of teaching self-reflection through narratives that focus on core values, heroes and moral exemplars. It is grounded in practical wisdom. It is experiential, learning to care about the self, others, the community, living the good life, flourishing and striving for moral excellence. It offers a model for the development of character and personal ethics which will lead to professional ethics. Yet, the strict Virtue Ethics espoused by Aristotle has its limitations. This paper will explore the need for a more integrative approach to contemporary moral theory, one that may be found by revisiting the virtues through the works of Aristotle and Kant. It will offer insight into translating theory into practice for students of computer science and information technology. (shrink)

The teaching of ethics in school is considered important and necessary. But can ethics be taught? And should its teaching consist in conveying knowledge about ethical concepts, possibly a discussion around them, or rather in shaping students’ moral attitudes and appropriate behaviour? The article engages in reflection on these problems with reference to various traditions of ethical thought and moral theory. It proposes to take the contemporary renewed Aristotelian virtue ethics as the main point of reference and basis for educational (...) practice. The concept of phronesis as practical rationality, allowing the formation of moral judgements that are both context-sensitive and take into account the complexity of interests and goods that are difficult to agree upon, seems to be a still valid model for moral education. Teaching and discussion oriented towards the consideration of concrete cases and stories, i.e. training the skills of this type of judgement, avoids the dangers of learning focused on theoretical issues: becoming entangled in definitional ambiguities in defining moral values, or thinking detached from emotion and experience. Learning that consists of analysing a philosophical tradition runs the risk that the knowledge imparted will prove inadequate to the age and level of personal development of the student, generating moral subjectivism and relativistic scepticism. However, this argument is not directed against theorising and the introduction of abstract considerations in the educational process, even at the earliest stages: theorising and the construction of rational justifications are necessary but should result from the inspiration and development of intellectual predispositions, not from the transmission of ready-made knowledge. (shrink)

The notion of community—a many that is one—is troubled in two respects: (1) On a theoretical level, given that there are many kinds of communities, what, despite their differences, do they share as communities? (2) On a practical level, communities in fact often manifest little unity riven, as they are, by factions and conflicts. After exploring the ways in which empathy as supplemented and complemented by affective dimensions of experience contributes to both the unity and disunity of communities, I shall (...) focus on what I take to be an extreme instance of a disunified community, namely, the political community in which the disunity is institutionalized in political parties, governing administrations, and opposition movements. The focus on the disunified community, I suggest, points to a difference between those communities unified by a shared understanding of the ends and activities pursued in collective action and those communities more weakly unified by conflicting “thick” understandings of a shared “thin” understanding of the ends and activities proper to the political community. (shrink)

After three decades of concentrated effort, commentators still seem to disagree about Kant's understanding of the nature of emotions. I argue that the appearance is misleading because the disagreement depends on different assumptions that are independent of Kant. I then propose a way out of this deadlock by pointing to the fact that, although the Kantian phenomena commonly understood as emotions originate in two different faculties, they all involve pleasure. This account provides the necessary yet insufficient conditions on a Kantian (...) phenomenon's being an emotion, but it allows us to mitigate the conflicting needs of historical accuracy and contemporary interest. (shrink)

It seems to be a phenomenon of contemporary life that we consider goodness embarrassing and rather dull. In contrast, the activities and inner lives of villains are deemed more complex and fascinating than those of good people. This paper attempts to understand the conception of goodness that underlies this phenomenon, and I suggest that informing it is the combination of two ideas, in tension with each other: firstly, a distorted understanding of the ancient conception of full virtue as the absence (...) of all inner conflict; and secondly, the intuition that real goodness is only apparent and generated in inner conflict. In response, I offer an alternative picture of goodness as an ongoing, active and progressive relation to value, and conclude that in order to render goodness attractive again we need more adequate portraits of goodness from both philosophy and art. (shrink)

The paper discusses the nature and functioning of argumentum ad misericordiam, a well-known but less theorised type of argument. A monograph by D. Walton (1997) offers an overview of definitions of misericordia (which he eventually translates as ‘pity’), as well as the careful analysis of several cases. Appeals to pity, Walton concludes, are not necessarily fallacious. This view seems to be supported and further refined by the critical remarks of H. V. Hansen (2000), as well as the recent work of (...) R. H. Kimball (2001, 2004) and A. Aberdein (2016) focusing on the virtue ethical aspects of such arguments. There is, on this account, a difference between ad misericordiam arguments and fallacies, even though the former may be fallacious in some cases. In this paper I argue for a narrower concept of ad misericordiam, as distinguished from the more generic class of appeals to pity, limiting it to cases in which someone asks for the non-application of a certain rule, clearly relevant to their case, with reference to some (unfavourable) circumstance, which is, however, irrelevant for the application of the rule. (shrink)