The issue of hate speech has received significant attention from legal scholars and philosophers alike. But the vast majority of this attention has been focused on presenting and critically evaluating arguments for and against hate speech bans as opposed to the prior task of conceptually analysing the term ‘hate speech’ itself. This two-part article aims to put right that imbalance. It goes beyond legal texts and judgements and beyond the legal concept hate speech in an attempt to understand the general (...) concept hate speech. And it does so using a range of well-known methods of conceptual analysis that are distinctive of analytic philosophy. One of its main aims is to explode the myth that emotions, feelings, or attitudes of hate or hatred are part of the essential nature of hate speech. It also argues that hate speech is best conceived as a family resemblances concept. One important implication is that when looking at the full range of ways of combating hate speech, including but not limited to the use of criminal law, there is every reason to embrace an understanding of hate speech as a heterogeneous collection of expressive phenomena. Another is that it would be unsound to reject hate speech laws on the premise that they are effectively in the business of criminalising emotions, feelings, or attitudes of hate or hatred. (shrink)

In debates over the regulation of communication related to dual-use research, the risks that such communication creates must be weighed against against the value of scientific autonomy. The censorship of such communication seems justifiable in certain cases, given the potentially catastrophic applications of some dual-use research. This conclusion however, gives rise to another kind of danger: that regulators will use overly simplistic cost-benefit analysis to rationalize excessive regulation of scientific research. In response to this, we show how institutional design principles (...) and normative frameworks from free speech theory can be used to help extend the argument for regulating dangerous dual-use research beyond overly simplistic cost-benefit reasoning, but without reverting to an implausibly absolutist view of scientific autonomy. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper argues for a hidden way in which speech constitutes harm by enacting harmful norms. The paper then explores the potential legal consequences of uncovering such instances of harm constitution. In particular, the paper argues that some public racist speech constitutes harm and is thus harmful enough to warrant legal remedy. Such utterances are actionable, it is contended, because they enact discriminatory norms in public spaces.

This paper examines two recent contributions to the hate speech literature – by Steven Heyman and Jeremy Waldron – which seek a justification for the legal restriction of hate speech in an account of the way that hate speech infringes against people’s dignity. These analyses look beyond the first-order hurts and disadvantages suffered by the immediate targets of hate speech, and consider the prospect of hate speech sustaining complex social structures whose wide-scale operations lower the social status of members of (...) targeted groups. In Heyman’s and Waldron’s accounts we find plausible insights into the nature of identity-based social hierarchies, and the harms that redound to subordinated people under the operations of such hierarchies. I argue, however, that both analyses are unsuccessful as justifications for the restriction of hate speech, because they do not ultimately provide reason to think that hate speech is responsible for creating or sustaining identity-based social hierarchies. (shrink)

The issue of hate speech has received significant attention from legal scholars and philosophers alike. But the vast majority of this attention has been focused on presenting and critically evaluating arguments for and against hate speech bans as opposed to the prior task of conceptually analysing the term ‘hate speech’ itself. This two-part article aims to put right that imbalance. It goes beyond legal texts and judgements and beyond the legal concept hate speech in an attempt to understand the general (...) concept hate speech. And it does so using a range of well-known methods of conceptual analysis that are distinctive of analytic philosophy. One of its main aims is to explode the myth that emotions, feelings, or attitudes of hate or hatred are part of the essential nature of hate speech. It also argues that hate speech is best conceived as a family resemblances concept. One important implication is that when looking at the full range of ways of combating hate speech, including but not limited to the use of criminal law, there is every reason to embrace an understanding of hate speech as a heterogeneous collection of expressive phenomena. Another is that it would be unsound to reject hate speech laws on the premise that they are effectively in the business of criminalising emotions, feelings, or attitudes of hate or hatred. (shrink)

It is often held that people have a moral right to believe and say whatever they want. For instance, one might claim that they have a right to believe racist things as long as they keep those thoughts to themselves. Or, one might claim that they have a right to pursue any philosophical question they want as long as they do so with a civil tone. In this paper I object to those claims and argue that no one has such (...) unlimited moral rights. In Part 1 I explore the value of the freedoms of thought and expression. In Part 2 I argue against the unlimited moral right to free expression, focusing in particular on the special obligations and moral constraints that obtain for academics. In Part 3 I argue against the unlimited moral right to free thought. (shrink)

I take it that liberal justice recognises special protections against the restriction of speech and expression; this is what I call the Free Speech Principle. I ask if this Principle includes speech acts which might broadly be termed ‘hate speech’, where ‘includes’ is sensitive to the distinction between coverage and protection , and between speech that is regulable and speech that should be regulated . I suggest that ‘hate speech’ is too broad a designation to be usefully analysed as a (...) single category, since it includes many different kinds of speech acts, each of which involves very different kinds of free speech interests, and may cause very different kinds of harm. I therefore propose to disaggregate hate speech into various categories which are analysed in turn. I distinguish four main categories of hate speech, namely (1) targeted vilification, (2) diffuse vilification, (3) organised political advocacy for exclusionary and/or eliminationist policies, and (4) other assertions of fact or value which constitute an adverse judgment on an identifiable racial or religious group. Reviewing these categories in the light of the justifications for the Free Speech Principle, I will argue that category (1) is uncovered by the Principle, categories (2) and (3) are covered but unprotected , and that category (4) is protected speech. (shrink)

A provocative case for the inherently political nature of language In The Politics of Language, David Beaver and Jason Stanley present a radical new approach to the theory of meaning, offering an account of communication in which political and social identity, affect, and shared practices play as important a role as information. This new view of language, they argue, has dramatic consequences for free speech, democracy, and a range of other areas in which speech plays a central role. Drawing on (...) a wealth of disciplines, The Politics of Language argues that the function of speech—whether in dialogue, larger group interactions, or mass communication—is to attune people to something, be it a shared reality, emotion, or identity. Reconceptualizing the central ideas of pragmatics and semantics, Beaver and Stanley apply their account to a range of phenomena that defy standard frameworks in linguistics and philosophy of language—from dog whistles and covert persuasion to echo chambers and genocidal speech. The authors use their framework to show that speech is inevitably political because all communication is imbued with the resonances of particular ideologies and their normative perspectives on reality. At a time when democracy is under attack, authoritarianism is on the rise, and diversity and equality are being demanded, The Politics of Language offers a powerful new vision of the language of politics, ideology, and protest. (shrink)

-/- Hate speech is a concept that many people find intuitively easy to grasp, while at the same time many others deny it is even a coherent concept. A majority of developed, democratic nations have enacted hate speech legislation—with the contemporary United States being a notable outlier—and so implicitly maintain that it is coherent, and that its conceptual lines can be drawn distinctly enough. Nonetheless, the concept of hate speech does indeed raise many difficult questions: What does the ‘hate’ in (...) hate speech refer to? Can hate speech be directed at dominant groups, or is it by definition targeted at oppressed or marginalized communities? Is hate speech always ‘speech’? What is the harm or harms of hate speech? And, perhaps most challenging of all, what can or should be done to counteract hate speech? -/- In part because of these complexities, hate speech has spawned a vast and interdisciplinary literature. Legal scholars, philosophers, sociologists, anthropologists, political theorists, historians, and other academics have each approached the topic with exceeding interest. In this current article, however, we cannot hope to cover how these many disciplines have engaged with the concept of hate speech. Here, we will focus most explicitly on how hate speech has been taken up within philosophy, with particular emphasis on issues such as: how to define hate speech; what are the plausible harms of hate speech; how an account of hate speech might include both overt expressions of hate (e.g., the vitriolic use of slurs) as well as more covert, implicit utterances (e.g., dogwhistles); the relationship between hate speech and silencing; and what might we do to counteract hate speech. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to consider the question of whether democratic legitimacy requires viewpoint neutrality with regard to political speech – including extremist political speech, such as hate speech. The starting point of my discussion is Jeremy Waldron’s negative answer to this question. He argues that it is permissible for liberal democracies to ban certain extremist viewpoints – such as vituperative hate speech – because such viewpoint-based restrictions protect the dignity of persons and a social and moral environment (...) of mutual respect. According to Waldron, well-drafted narrow hate speech bans are not democratically illegitimate, and they do not undermine systemic democratic legitimacy – that is, the legitimacy of a democratic political system. In contrast to Waldron, I will argue that democratic legitimacy requires viewpoint neutrality to respect persons as thinking agents. I will defend a civil libertarian doctrine of viewpoint neutrality, and this doctrine requires that citizens in liberal democracies ought to have a legal free speech right to do moral wrong – that is, a legal right to express and defend any political viewpoint or idea, even if it is morally wrong to express, or expose others to, such views. It will be argued that any viewpoint-based restriction on public discourse (including narrow hate speech bans) is democratically illegitimate, and that such restrictions undermine systemic democratic legitimacy. (shrink)

Is it permissible for the state to censor or suppress conspiracy theories, even within liberal democracies? According to a number of political and legal theorists, it is. In this paper, I will argue that the state may sometimes censor conspiracy theories, but it should be permitted to do so only after very strict conditions have been met. I shall first offer some brief thoughts about the definition of ‘conspiracy theory’. I will then critique one existing attempt to address this issue (...) – namely Cíbik and Hardoš’s public reason approach. Next, I shall outline my own proposal. I will argue that we should sometimes consider conspiracy theorising to be a form of discriminatory speech against vulnerable individuals and groups, and we can consider it to be a form of defamation in these cases. Consequently, the state may sometimes be permitted to enact civil laws to sanction such theorising. Finally, I will outline some of the conditions that should be met before state censorship can be considered. (shrink)

Autonomy is increasingly rejected as a fundamental principle by liberal political theorists because it is regarded as incompatible with respect for diversity. This article seeks, via an analysis of the Danish cartoon controversy, to show that the relationship between autonomy and diversity is more complex than often posited. Particularly, it asks whether the autonomy defense of freedom of expression encourages disrespect for religious feelings. Autonomy leads to disrespect for diversity only when it is understood as a character ideal that must (...) be promoted as an end in itself. If it by contrast is understood as something we should presume everyone possesses, it provides a strong basis for equal respect among people from diverse cultures. A Kantian conception of autonomy can justify the right to freedom of expression while it at the same time requires that we in the exercise of freedom of expression show respect for others as equals. (shrink)

The ethical debate on whistleblowing concerns centrally the conflict between the right to political free speech and the duty of loyalty to the organization where one works. This is the moral dilemma of whistleblowing. Political free speech is justified because it is a central part of liberal democracy, whereas loyalty can be motivated as a way of showing consideration for one’s associates. The political philosophy of John Rawls is applied to this dilemma, and it is shown that the requirement of (...) loyalty, in the sense that is needed to create the moral dilemma of whistleblowing, is inconsistent with that theory. In this sense, there is no moral dilemma of whistleblowing. This position has been labelled extreme in that it says that whistleblowing is always morally permitted. In a discussion and rejection of Richard De George’s criteria on permissible whistleblowing, it is pointed out that the mere rejection of loyalty will not lead to an extreme position; harms can still be taken into account. Furthermore, it is argued that the best way is, in this as in most other political circumstances, to weigh harms is provided by the free speech argument from democracy. (shrink)

This article surveys the classic and contemporary literature on the nature and limits of freedom of expression (or free speech). It begins by surveying the main philosophical justifications for free speech, before moving to consider the two most discussed topics in the free speech literature: hate speech and pornography. The article offers some brief reflections on the large number of arguments which have been offered on these topics. Three newer battlegrounds for free speech are examined at the end: no platforming, (...) fake news and online shaming. (shrink)

In ‘The Harm in Hate Speech’ Waldron’s most interesting and ground-breaking contribution lies in a distinctive epistemological role he assigns to hate speech legislation: it is necessary for assurance of justice, and thus for justice itself. He regards public social recognition of what is owed to citizens as a public good, contributing to basic dignity and social standing of citizens. His claim that hate speech in the public social environment damages assurance of justice has wider implications, I argue: for hate (...) speech conducted in private; for pornography; and indeed for any speech that thwarts knowledge of what justice requires. (shrink)

“Sticks and stones will break my bones,” Justice Scalia pronounced from the bench in oral arguments in Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, “but words can never hurt me. That's the First Amendment,” he added. Jay Alan Sekulow, the lawyer for the petitioners, anti-abortion protesters who had been enjoined from moving closer than fifteen feet away from those entering an abortion facility, was obviously pleased by this characterization of the right to free speech, replying, “That's certainly our position on it, and that (...) is exactly correct …”. (shrink)

According to the influential “expressive” argument for hate speech laws, legal restrictions on hate speech are justified, in significant part, because they powerfully express opposition to hate speech. Yet the expressive argument faces a challenge: why couldn't we communicate opposition to hate speech via counterspeech, rather than bans? I argue that the expressive argument cannot address this challenge satisfactorily. Specifically, I examine three considerations that purport to explain bans’ expressive distinctiveness: considerations of strength; considerations of directness; and considerations of complicity. (...) These considerations either fail to establish that bans are expressively superior to counterspeech, or presuppose that bans successfully deter hate speech. This result severely undercuts the expressive argument's appeal. First, contrary to what its proponents suggest, this argument fails to circumvent the protracted empirical controversies surrounding bans’ effectiveness as deterrents. Second, the expressive argument appears redundant, because bans are expressively distinctive only insofar as hate speech is already suppressed. (shrink)

A popular view among autonomy theorists is that facts about the history of a person's desires, and specifically facts about how they were formed or acquired, matter crucially to her autonomy. I argue that while there is an important relationship between a person's autonomy and the history of her desires, a person's autonomy does not depend on how her desires were formed or acquired. I argue that a desire's autonomy lies not in its origins but in whether its bearer has (...) a history of having engaged with it in the right sort of way. I argue that this view has important advantages, and no obvious disadvantages, over its historical and its non-historical rivals. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIncreasing attention is being directed at the impact of fake news on democratic societies across the globe. Scholars in a range of fields are attempting to determine who is behind fake news...

Human rights are those legal and/or moral rights that all persons have simply as persons. In the current digital age, human rights are increasingly being either fulfilled or violated in the online environment. In this article, I provide a way of conceptualizing the relationships between human rights and information technology. I do so by pointing out a number of misunderstandings of human rights evident in Vinton Cerf's recent argument that there is no human right to the Internet. I claim that (...) Cerf fails to recognize the existence of derived human rights. I argue further that we need to consider what other human rights are necessitated by the digital age. I suggest we need a Declaration of Digital Rights. As a step toward the development of such a declaration, I suggest a framework for thinking through how to ensure the human rights are satisfied in digital contexts. (shrink)

Communicative practices in online and social media sometimes seem to amplify political conflict, and result in significant harms to people who become the targets of collective outrage. Many complaints that have been made about political correctness in the past, we argue, amount to little more than a veiled expression of resentment over the increasing influence enjoyed by progressive activists. But some complaints about political correctness take on a different complexion, in light of the technologically-driven changes to our communicative practices and (...) political discourse. Given the ways in which they are entangled in these new forms of online communication, well-meaning attempts to police the norms of political correctness may end up contributing to individual wrongs, or to destructive social patterns. In this paper we examine these worries, situate them in a broader sociological context, and offer some tentative proposals about how they might be addressed. (shrink)

The Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 represents a significant development in UK law. It extends the offence of incitement to racial hatred set out in the Public Order Act 1986 to make it also an offence to stir up hatred against persons on religious grounds. As the most celebrated liberal thinker of the nineteenth century, J.S. Mill might be expected to offer some lessons about the possible dangers of this sort of legislation. A Millian response to the 2006 Act (...) is developed here by first applying Mill’s famous defence of free speech to the Lords amendments to the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill 2005 and then by looking at potential cases in which even freedom of expression loses its immunity when this is necessary to prevent harm to others. Three versions of the harm‐prevention justification for liberty‐limiting restrictions are assessed and it is argued that the most promising version is the claim that it may be permissible to punish incitement to racial and religious hatred not so much because it is itself a kind of harm but by virtue of the acts of discrimination, violence and injustice that are more likely to occur within a climate of hatred. Ultimately, however, this rationale must be weighed against what is, for Mill, the special value of free speech and may in the end justify intervention in only the most acute cases. (shrink)

The digital public forum has challenged many of our normative intuitions and assumptions. Many scholars have argued against the idea of free speech as a suitable guide for digital platforms’ content policies. This paper has two goals. Firstly, it suggests that there is a version of the free speech principle which is suitable for platforms that have adopted a commitment to free speech to guide their content curation strategies. I call it the Principle of Epistemic Resilience. Secondly, it aims to (...) analyze some of the practical implications of the principle. It argues that upholding this principle in the digital public forum requires a comprehensive strategy, including (1) the automated removal and demotion of contents that threaten to cause serious harm; (2) changes to engagement optimization algorithms; and (3) changes to affordances inside the platform. These changes are necessary to create a fertile environment for deliberation, which is crucial to epistemic resilience. If such a comprehensive strategy is absent, platforms may actively undermine the societal value of speech. (shrink)

Deliberative democracy’s approach with its emphasis on a multidimensional conception of freedom is very well suited to offer a sophisticated and critical account of freedom of speech in the democratic public sphere. Nevertheless, it has rarely engaged other competing free speech theories in order to offer a valuable social critique of other ways of thinking about freedom of expression. This article tries to fill this gap by critically engaging Robert Post’s theory of freedom of speech based on democratic self-government. On (...) Post’s account, the key to effective democratic self-government is political autonomy, which he reduces to negative liberty and formal equality. I argue that this reduction creates serious problems. A purely procedural account of democracy makes it difficult to politicize new issues in the public sphere and also makes a dominant discourse resistant to contestation. Further, given his theory, Post does not have enough normative resources to offer an account of public justification, which would expand effective political liberty. (shrink)

Are government restrictions on hate speech consistent with the priority of liberty? This relatively narrow policy question will serve as the starting point for a wider discussion of the use and abuse of nonideal theory in contemporary political philosophy, especially as practiced on the academic left. I begin by showing that hate speech (understood as group libel) can undermine fair equality of opportunity for historically-oppressed groups but that the priority of liberty seems to forbid its restriction. This tension between free (...) speech and equal opportunity creates a dilemma for liberal egalitarians. Nonideal theory apparently offers an escape from this dilemma, but after examining three versions of such an escape strategy, I conclude that none is possible: liberal egalitarians are indeed forced to choose between liberty and equality in this case and others. I finish the paper by examining its implications for other policy arenas, including markets in transplantable human organs and women’s reproductive services. (shrink)

To what extent are authors morally culpable for harms caused by their published work? Can authors be culpable even if their ideas are misused, perhaps because they failed to take precautions to prevent harmful misinterpretations? Might authors be culpable even if they do take precautions—if, for example, they publish ideas that others can be reasonably expected to put to harmful uses, precautions notwithstanding? Although complete answers to these questions depend upon controversial views about the right to free speech, this paper (...) argues that five notions from philosophy of law and legal practice—liability, burden of proof, legal causation, mens rea, and reasoning by precedent—can be adapted to provide an attractive moral framework for determining whether an author’s work causes harm, whether and how culpable the author is for causing such harm, steps authors may take to immunize themselves from culpability, and how to responsibly develop new rules for publishing ethics. (shrink)

This paper clarifies the legal right to free speech, identifies ways that speech can be harmful, and discusses pornography hate speech, and lies. It is also written for a non-technical audience.

What should be the rules governing campus speech in a liberal democratic society? On one side are those arguing for maximal protections for campus speech analogous to the First Amendment in the United States. On the other are those promoting stricter regulation of speech through formal and informal speech codes. This paper aims to carve a new path in the conversation. Both sides agree that the mission of the university is the discovery and dissemination of knowledge and that achieving this (...) mission requires tolerant and open-minded students, faculty, and administrators. However, neither side has explicitly connected its advocacy for specific speech policies with these shared goals. Our paper advances the conversation by proposing a series of empirically testable mechanisms for connecting speech policies to the desired outcomes. We also argue that focusing on these mechanisms opens the way towards new and more tractable conceptual and normative debates. (shrink)

The idea that human beings are intellectually self-governing plays two roles in free-speech theory. First, this idea is frequently called upon as part of the justification for free speech. Second, it plays a role in guiding the translation of free-speech principles into legal policy by underwriting the ascriptive framework through which responsibility for certain kinds of speech harms can be ascribed. After mapping out these relations, I ask what becomes of them once we acknowledge certain very general and profound limitations (...) in people's capacity for intellectual self-governance. I argue that acknowledging these limitations drastically undermines the putative justifications for free speech of the type that I identify in the first part of the paper. I then show how we can reformulate an account of intellectual and doxastic responsibility on which we may still be held responsible for what we think or believe even though we lack agent-causal capacities in our thinking and believing. Then, in light of this ascriptive account of intellectual responsibility, I show how the key ideahave minds of their owncan (and should) still play a significant role in guiding the legislative outworkings of free speech. (shrink)

This paper argues that a sweeping prohibition against content‐based censorship is called for by the need to protect two distinct but related vital interests: first, our autonomy interest in making and implementing our own judgments about what is worth having or doing and, second, our social interest in living in contact with others. Because the most readily available way of overcoming our isolation is to bring the thoughts of others into either alignment or engaged opposition with our own by talking (...) to them, every instance of censorship undermines our autonomy by preempting a choice that should properly be ours alone. (shrink)

If there is one point on which defenders and critics of the doctrine of proportionality agree, it is that Dworkin's rights as trumps model stands as a radical alternative to the doctrine. Those who are sympathetic to proportionality reject the rights as trumps model for failing to acknowledge that there are conditions under which a right may be justifiably infringed. In turn, those who regard rights as trumps reject the doctrine of proportionality for failing to take rights seriously. This paper (...) argues that each of these views is mistaken. On the one hand, Dworkin's rights as trumps model elides with a prominent version of the proportionality doctrine. On the other, this version takes rights seriously. (shrink)

Susan Hurley has argued against a well known argument for freedom of speech, the argument from autonomy, on the basis of two hypotheses about violence in the media and aggressive behaviour. The first hypothesis says that exposure to media violence causes aggressive behaviour; the second, that humans have an innate tendency to copy behaviour in ways that bypass conscious deliberation. I argue, first, that Hurley is not successful in setting aside the argument from autonomy. Second, I show that the empirical (...) data are irrelevant to statutory regulation of media violence. They do not yield a sufficiently strong correlation between exposure to media violence and non-autonomously copied criminal violence, and they do not yield a way ex ante to individuate the viewers who will be affected by media violence. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that academic institutions have a pro tanto obligation to delegitimize transphobic views, which in many contexts is undefeated. By this, I mean academic institutions generally should not take such views seriously as viable candidates for belief, though sometimes this obligation may be outweighed by other considerations. Three premises together justify this conclusion. First, if academic institutions do not delegitimize transphobic views, then they structurally perpetuate the subordination of trans people. Second, institutions have a pro tanto (...) obligation to avoid structurally perpetuating subordination, which can only be defeated when such avoidance is excessively burdensome. Third, academic institutions can delegitimize transphobic views in a manner that is not excessively burdensome, at least in many contexts. More specifically, delegitimizing transphobic views aligns with important institutional norms and a robust notion of academic freedom. (shrink)

Hate speech is commonly defined with reference to the legal category of incitement. Laws targeting incitement typically focus on how the speech is expressed rather than its actual content. This has a number of unintended consequences: first, law tends to capture overt or obvious forms of hate speech and not hate speech that takes the form of ‘reasoned’ argument, but which nevertheless, causes as much, if not more harm. Second, the focus on form rather than content leads to categorization errors. (...) Hate speech taking the form of ‘reasoned argument’ is often legally characterized as either political or academic debate, and so is deemed both permissible and justified in societies where free speech principles exist. In this paper, I argue that it is important to identify instances of hate speech as hate speech, no matter how articulately or reasonably the speech is expressed. The danger in mischaracterizing an instance of hate speech by calling it academic or political debate is that it risks normalizing the views and sentiments that are expressed and accepting those views as an important part of our political and academic discourses. With reference to Habermas’ account of ‘distorted communication’, I propose different criteria for defining and understanding hate speech and suggest that there might be good reasons for interpreting the concept of incitement more broadly, so as to include these different kinds of it. (shrink)

The article examines the status of free speech in Vietnam in light of some of the explosive debates that have flared up in both the US and Europe. It argues that unlike in the West the Vietnamese case requires a critical defense to augment the space for free speech as such. To lead up to this conclusion, the essay looks at two case studies of literary censorship in Vietnam to demonstrate that, since the middle of the twentieth-century, literary speech has (...) been synonymous with political speech. Given the limited space for political speech itself, the essay concludes by advancing a version of the autonomy defense of free speech as one viable critical resource in the Vietnamese context. (shrink)

La liberté d’expression est reconnue par les régimes démocratiques et les conventions internationales des droits de l’homme comme un droit fondamental. Est-elle pour autant absolue, comme l’affirment certains philosophes qui refusent qu’elle soit mise en balance avec d’autres droits ou principes? Cet article considère la signification de la thèse absolutiste et examine deux de ses principales défenses philosophiques, proposées par Alexander Meiklejohn et Thomas Scanlon. Il montre que ces théories échouent à établir la liberté d’expression comme un droit absolu : (...) elles ne parviennent ni à justifier la priorité stricte qu’elles lui accordent par rapport à tout autre droit ou principe, ni à le spécifier et à le délimiter de manière à rendre une telle priorité praticable. (shrink)

There is evidence to the effect that exposing children to alcohol consumption in the media increases the chances that they will consume alcohol as minors or as adults, and since alcohol consumption is associated with numerous public health issues, calls for stricter regulation can be heard from many quarters. This article argues that with the available research we cannot conclude that exposure to portrayals of alcohol consumption plays a genuine causal role in bringing about the things with which it is (...) associated, that the strength of the correlation is too weak to justify regulation and that the sorts of things with which it is associated only rarely count as genuine harms from a liberal point of view. This article also argues that even if genuine harms were caused, no justification for regulation would directly follow because alcohol in the media could still be protected by freedom of speech and expression. Yet, the article argues that regulation is defensible if it can be shown that the harmful consequences arise in ways that bypass autonomy, or if it can be shown that the harmful consequences are unacceptable from the point of view of so-called ‘proleptic’ autonomy. (shrink)

What justifies political power? Most philosophers argue that consent or democracy are important, in other words, it matters how power is exercised. But this book argues that outcomes primarily matter to justifying power.

The limits on freedom of expression are tested in our democracy when we have to deal with hate speech. A thinker who faced the problem of those limitations was John Stuart Mill, who formulated what has been called “harm principle” in his On Liberty (1859), and according to which the only good reason to interfere with an individual’s liberty is to prevent harm to others. On these grounds, several authors have tried to reconstruct the category of “offense”, in order to (...) forbid varieties of conduct even though they do not cause harm to others. However On Liberty is a remarkable work in defense of liberty, even for those who want to refine their premises introducing elements that justify restrictions on freedom of expression. Certainly the weakness of Mill’s thought, at least one that help us to draw lessons for our democracies, appears only when we notice its flaws in light of a joint reading of On Liberty and Considerations On Representative Government (1861). This task points out an unjustified split between free speech and political participation rights, and one that would exclude certain individuals from citizenship indeed. (shrink)

This publication articulated in three parts, and twelve chapters endeavours to engage with the complex negative emotions and consequent phenomenon of self-deceit, radicalisation and extremism. First part: Emotions as Lines of Demarcation or Guidelines to Our Self. The Psychodynamic Surrounding of our Intentional Self; second part: Case Studies of Some Concrete Societal Encapsulations of the Negative Passions; and third part: Resisting the Colonisation of Tyrannical Affections. Possible Paths of Mitigating Radicalisation and Extremism. What kind of educational responses can be given (...) to extremist claims of territory, identity, resources, power, and interpretations? How can a dialogue on unifying ethical principles and values aid in developing common grounds for preventing radical and extremist excesses? With authors from three continents, this publication endeavours to not only ask the uncomfortable questions with regard to the exteriorisation of human emotive predispositions and inclinations to ostracize, stigmatise and discriminate. The exit door from the extreme is also clearly presented, through four contributions, notably the interplay of Charvaka philosophy, Sikh wisdom on balanced forms of engagement with strong emotions. (shrink)

Formułowane w ostatnim czasie przez postępowych Amerykanów zarzuty wobec cynicznej, konserwatywnej „weaponizacji” wolności słowa trafnie zwracają uwagę na tkwiący w niej aspekt hipokryzji. Przesłankę tych oskarżeń często stanowi jednak wolność słowa rozumiana „absolutystycznie” jako bezwzględne dobro. W istocie należy ją zawsze rozumieć jako coś, co prowadzi do innego celu: mającego wymiar obiektywny, subiektywny bądź intersubiektywny. Najczęstszą funkcją wolności słowa jest tworzenie warunków dla epistemologicznego poszukiwania prawdy. Zwracali na to uwagę liberałowie, tacy jak John Stuart Mill, oraz marksiści, tacy jak Herbert (...) Marcuse – twierdzący, że realizację tego celu utrudnia „represywna tolerancja” dla szkodliwych lub błędnych idei. Wolności słowa można bronić również ze względu na wpisaną w nią możliwość wyrażania indywidualnych opinii i uczuć, bez której nie ma mowy o jednostkowej autonomii. Trzecia funkcja wolności słowa ma charakter performatywny: język może służyć do działania w świecie. Współcześnie najczęściej mówi się w tym kontekście o ograniczaniu „mowy nienawiści” jako aktu przemocy symbolicznej, jednak konsekwencje tak rozumianej wolności słowa mogą być również pozytywne. Czwarty telos wolności wypowiedzi – semantyczny raczej niż epistemologiczny, ekspresywny czy performatywny – to tworzenie nowych znaczeń kulturowych bądź krytyka konwencjonalnych. Ponieważ wolność słowa może służyć jednej lub większej liczbie z tych funkcji, warto jej bronić również w niedoskonałym społeczeństwie, niezależnie od tego (przy całym szacunku dla Marcusego), że nie ma ona wartości bezwzględnej. (shrink)

JOHNSTONE M‐J. Nursing Inquiry 2012; 19: 107–115 [Epub ahead of print]Academic freedom and the obligation to ensure morally responsible scholarship in nursingAcademic freedom is generally regarded as being of critical importance to the development, improved understanding, and dissemination of new knowledge in a field. Although of obvious importance to the discipline of nursing, the nature, extent and value of academic freedom and the controversies surrounding it have rarely been considered in the nursing literature. It is a key aim of this (...) paper to redress this oversight by providing a brief examination of: (i) the principle of academic freedom; (ii) the distinction between academic freedom, freedom of speech, and the academic freedom to publish; (iii) the problem of ideological judgments being dressed up as scientific or discipline judgments to supports ‘bad’ conclusions; and (iv) the standards that might otherwise be appealed to for determining whether maverick manuscripts supporting morally abhorrent conclusions should be accepted for publication. It is suggested that the tenets of academic freedom require robust international debate, with due attention being given to such issues as the development of an international declaration on academic freedom to publish in nursing, how to ensure a robust rebuttal system in nursing journals to counter specious scholarship, and how to better promote the letters pages of nursing journals as a venue for facilitating debate on controversial issues. (shrink)