Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Explication as a Method of Conceptual Re-engineering.Georg Brun - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (6):1211-1241.
    Taking Carnap’s classic exposition as a starting point, this paper develops a pragmatic account of the method of explication, defends it against a range of challenges and proposes a detailed recipe for the practice of explicating. It is then argued that confusions are involved in characterizing explications as definitions, and in advocating precising definitions as an alternative to explications. Explication is better characterized as conceptual re-engineering for theoretical purposes, in contrast to conceptual re-engineering for other purposes and improving exactness for (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   109 citations  
  • The Different Ways in which Logic is (said to be) Formal.Catarina Dutilh Novaes - 2011 - History and Philosophy of Logic 32 (4):303 - 332.
    What does it mean to say that logic is formal? The short answer is: it means (or can mean) several different things. In this paper, I argue that there are (at least) eight main variations of the notion of the formal that are relevant for current discussions in philosophy and logic, and that they are structured in two main clusters, namely the formal as pertaining to forms, and the formal as pertaining to rules. To the first cluster belong the formal (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  • The Formalization of Arguments.Robert Michels - 2020 - Dialectica 74 (2).
    The purpose of this introduction is to give a rough overview of the discussion of the formalization of arguments, focusing on deductive arguments. The discussion is structured around four important junctions: i) the notion of support, which captures the relation between the conclusion and premises of an argument, ii) the choice of a formal language into which the argument is translated in order to make it amenable to evaluation via formal methods, iii) the question of quality criteria for such formalizations, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • On exhibiting representational validity.Alexandra Zinke - 2015 - Synthese 192 (4):1157-1171.
    We can distinguish two non-equivalent ways in which a natural language argument can be valid: it can be interpretationally or representationally valid. However, there is just one notion of classical first-order validity for formal languages: truth-preservation in all classical first-order models. To ease the tension, Baumgartner suggests that we should understand interpretational and representational validity as imposing different adequacy conditions on formalizations of natural language arguments. I argue against this proposal. To that end, I first show that Baumgartner’s definition of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Exhibiting interpretational and representational validity.Michael Baumgartner - 2014 - Synthese 191 (7).
    A natural language argument may be valid in at least two nonequivalent senses: it may be interpretationally or representationally valid (Etchemendy in The concept of logical consequence. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1990). Interpretational and representational validity can both be formally exhibited by classical first-order logic. However, as these two notions of informal validity differ extensionally and first-order logic fixes one determinate extension for the notion of formal validity (or consequence), some arguments must be formalized by unrelated nonequivalent formalizations in order (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Adequate formalization.Michael Baumgartner & Timm Lampert - 2008 - Synthese 164 (1):93-115.
    This article identifies problems with regard to providing criteria that regulate the matching of logical formulae and natural language. We then take on to solve these problems by defining a necessary and sufficient criterion of adequate formalization. On the basis of this criterion we argue that logic should not be seen as an ars iudicandi capable of evaluating the validity or invalidity of informal arguments, but as an ars explicandi that renders transparent the formal structure of informal reasoning.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • Logical expressivism, logical theory and the critique of inferences.Georg Brun - 2019 - Synthese 196 (11):4493-4509.
    The basic idea of logical expressivism in the Brandomian tradition is that logic makes inferential relations explicit and thereby accessible to critical discussion. But expressivists have not given a convincing explanation of what the point of logical theories is. Peregrin provides a starting point by observing a distinction between making explicit and explication in Carnap’s sense of replacing something unclear and vague by something clear and exact. Whereas logical locutions make inferential relations explicit within a language, logical theories use formal (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Formalization and the objects of logic.Georg Brun - 2008 - Erkenntnis 69 (1):1 - 30.
    There is a long-standing debate whether propositions, sentences, statements or utterances provide an answer to the question of what objects logical formulas stand for. Based on the traditional understanding of logic as a science of valid arguments, this question is firstly framed more exactly, making explicit that it calls not only for identifying some class of objects, but also for explaining their relationship to ordinary language utterances. It is then argued that there are strong arguments against the proposals commonly put (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • A measure of inferential-role preservation.A. C. Paseau - 2019 - Synthese 196 (7):2621-2642.
    The point of formalisation is to model various aspects of natural language. Perhaps the main use to which formalisation is put is to model and explain inferential relations between different sentences. Judged solely by this objective, a formalisation is successful in modelling the inferential network of natural language sentences to the extent that it mirrors this network. There is surprisingly little literature on the criteria of good formalisation, and even less on the question of what it is for a formalisation (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Was ist ein philosophisches Problem?Jens Harbecke - 2024 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 72 (2):196-218.
    This paper approximates a definitional distinction between philosophical problems and scientific problems. It defends the claim that philosophical problems can be defined as certain inconsistent sets ???? of propositions. This set is characterised by its minimality, the plausibility of its individual propositions, the non-empirical character of some of these propositions, and by the fact that a discursive context exists within which some of ????’s non-mathematical non-empirical assumptions are rejected by argument. In particular, this extrinsic and pragmatic criterion constitutes the novel (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Causal Slingshots.Michael Baumgartner - 2010 - Erkenntnis 72 (1):111-133.
    Causal slingshots are formal arguments advanced by proponents of an event ontology of token-level causation which, in the end, are intended to show two things: (i) The logical form of statements expressing causal dependencies on token level features a binary predicate ‘‘... causes ...’’ and (ii) that predicate takes events as arguments. Even though formalisms are only revealing with respect to the logical form of natural language statements, if the latter are shown to be adequately captured within a corresponding formalism, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Reflective Equilibrium Without Intuitions?Georg Brun - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):237-252.
    In moral epistemology, the method of reflective equilibrium is often characterized in terms of intuitions or understood as a method for justifying intuitions. An analysis of reflective equilibrium and current theories of moral intuitions reveals that this picture is problematic. Reflective equilibrium cannot be adequately characterized in terms of intuitions. Although the method presupposes that we have initially credible commitments, it does not presuppose that they are intuitions. Nonetheless, intuitions can enter the process of developing a reflective equilibrium and, if (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  • Interpreting enthymematic arguments using belief revision.Georg Brun & Hans Rott - 2013 - Synthese 190 (18):4041-4063.
    This paper is about the situation in which an author (writer or speaker) presents a deductively invalid argument, but the addressee aims at a charitable interpretation and has reason to assume that the author intends to present a valid argument. How can he go about interpreting the author’s reasoning as enthymematically valid? We suggest replacing the usual find-the-missing-premise approaches by an approach based on systematic efforts to ascribe a belief state to the author against the background of which the argument (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Shallow Analysis and the Slingshot Argument.Michael Baumgartner - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (5):531-556.
    According to the standard opinions in the literature, blocking the unacceptable consequences of the notorious slingshot argument requires imposing constraints on the metaphysics of facts or on theories of definite descriptions (or class abstracts). This paper argues that both of these well-known strategies to rebut the slingshot overshoot the mark. The slingshot, first and foremost, raises the question as to the adequate logical formalization of statements about facts, i.e. of factual contexts. It will be shown that a rigorous application of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations