Anhand der genaueren Analyse von Newtons experimentum crucis und der Argumentation, die er auf dieses Experiment stützt, sowie Goethes Kritik hieran sollen im Folgenden zwei verbreitete Vorurteile revidiert werden: -/- 1. Newton ist kein Dogmatiker, der methodische Ansprüche vertritt, die er nicht einlösen kann, sondern gründet seinen Anspruch, experimentelle Beweise führen zu können, auf einer vorbildlichen Methodologie kausaler Erklärungen, was seine Kritiker allerdings übersehen. 2. Goethe ist kein Antiwissenschaftler, der einen einzigartigen Kontrapunkt zur vorherrschenden wissenschaftlichen Tradition bildet, sondern steht inmitten (...) traditioneller Auffassungen zur Farbenlehre, deren experimentelle und methodologische Grundlagen bezüglich eines Erklärungsanspruches denen Newtons unterlegen sind. (shrink)

In §8 of Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (RFM), Appendix 3 Wittgenstein imagines what conclusions would have to be drawn if the Gödel formula P or ¬P would be derivable in PM. In this case, he says, one has to conclude that the interpretation of P as “P is unprovable” must be given up. This “notorious paragraph” has heated up a debate on whether the point Wittgenstein has to make is one of “great philosophical interest” revealing “remarkable insight” in (...) Gödel’s proof, as Floyd and Putnam suggest (Floyd (2000), Floyd (2001)), or whether this remark reveals Wittgenstein’s misunderstanding of Gödel’s proof as Rodych and Steiner argued for recently (Rodych (1999, 2002, 2003), Steiner (2001)). In the following the arguments of both interpretations will be sketched and some deficiencies will be identified. Afterwards a detailed reconstruction of Wittgenstein’s argument will be offered. It will be seen that Wittgenstein’s argumentation is meant to be a rejection of Gödel’s proof but that it cannot satisfy this pretension. (shrink)

This paper illustrates what a philosophical and a logical investigation of colors amounts to in contrast to other kinds of color analysis such as physical, physiological, chemical, psychological or cultural analysis of colors. Neither a philosophical nor a logical analysis of colors is concerned with specific aspects of colors. Rather, these kinds of color analysis are concerned with what one might call “logical foundations of color theory”. I will illustrate this first by considering philosophical and then logical analysis of colors.

In his early philosophy as well as in his middle period, Wittgenstein holds a purely syntactic view of logic and mathematics. However, his syntactic foundation of logic and mathematics is opposed to the axiomatic approach of modern mathematical logic. The object of Wittgenstein’s approach is not the representation of mathematical properties within a logical axiomatic system, but their representation by a symbolism that identifies the properties in question by its syntactic features. It rests on his distinction of descriptions and operations; (...) its aim is to reduce mathematics to operations. This paper illustrates Wittgenstein’s approach by examining his discussion of irrational numbers. (shrink)

Es wird gezeigt, dass Wittgenstein in seiner Frühphilosophie ein nicht-axiomatisches Beweisverständnis entwickelt, für das sich das Problem der Begründung der Axiome nicht stellt. Nach Wittgensteins Beweisverständnis besteht der Beweis einer formalen Eigenschaft einer Formel – z.B. der logischen Wahrheit einer prädikatenlogischen Formel oder der Gleichheit zweier arithmetischer Ausdrücke – in der Transformation der Formel in eine andere Notation, an deren Eigenschaften sich entscheiden lässt, ob die zu beweisende formale Eigenschaft besteht oder nicht besteht. Dieses Verständnis grenzt Wittgenstein gegenüber einem axiomatischen (...) Beweisverständnis ab. Sein Beweisverständnis bedingt ein Programm der Grundlegung der Mathematik, das eine Alternative zu den Ansätzen des Logizismus, Formalismus und Konstruktivismus darstellt. Wittgensteins Ansatz steht im Widerspruch zu den Ergebnissen der Metamathematik, da er die Möglichkeit der Formulierung von Entscheidungsverfahren in der Prädikatenlogik und Arithmetik voraussetzt. Um seinem Ansatz gegenüber der traditionellen Metamathematik Recht zu geben, müsste gezeigt werden, dass sein Beweisverständnis im Bereich der Logik und Arithmetik – der traditionellen Metamathematik zum Trotz – realisierbar ist. (shrink)

This paper describes a decision procedure for disjunctions of conjunctions of anti-prenex normal forms of pure first-order logic (FOLDNFs) that do not contain V within the scope of quantifiers. The disjuncts of these FOLDNFs are equivalent to prenex normal forms whose quantifier-free parts are conjunctions of atomic and negated atomic formulae (= Herbrand formulae). In contrast to the usual algorithms for Herbrand formulae, neither skolemization nor unification algorithms with function symbols are applied. Instead, a procedure is described that rests on (...) nothing but equivalence transformations within pure first-order logic (FOL). This procedure involves the application of a calculus for negative normal forms (the NNF-calculus) with A -||- A & A (= &I) as the sole rule that increases the complexity of given FOLDNFs. The described algorithm illustrates how, in the case of Herbrand formulae, decision problems can be solved through a systematic search for proofs that reduce the number of applications of the rule &I to a minimum in the NNF-calculus. In the case of Herbrand formulae, it is even possible to entirely abstain from applying &I. Finally, it is shown how the described procedure can be used within an optimized general search for proofs of contradiction and what kind of questions arise for a &I-minimal proof strategy in the case of a general search for proofs of contradiction. (shrink)

The young Wittgenstein called his conception of logic “New Logic” and opposed it to the “Old Logic”, i.e. Frege’s and Russell’s systems of logic. In this paper the basic objects of Wittgenstein’s conception of a New Logic are outlined in contrast to classical logic. The detailed elaboration of Wittgenstein’s conception depends on the realization of his ab-notation for first order logic.

This paper compares several models of formalization. It articulates criteria of correct formalization and identifies their problems. All of the discussed criteria are so called “semantic” criteria, which refer to the interpretation of logical formulas. However, as will be shown, different versions of an implicitly applied or explicitly stated criterion of correctness depend on different understandings of “interpretation” in this context.